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Abstract
The research reported in this dissertation supports a conceptualisation of impulsivity 
as a fundamental trait which is not subsumed by other traits in large scale models of 
personality, whether of tliree five or more factors. It argues for this by showing that a 
measure o f impulsivity demonstrates incremental validity over and above the validity 
o f two measures of the Big Five personality traits in the prediction o f a variety of 
behaviours which previous research has linked to individual differences in 
impulsivity. The research also demonstrates that while impulsivity is a coherent trait it 
nevertheless subsumes at least two and perhaps three coiTelated lower order traits; in 
the first instance this is demonstrated through an analysis of the factor structure of the 
BIS-11 which replicates the factor structure proposed by Patton et al (1996). Research 
reviewed in the first three chapters suggests a conceptual overlap between the multi­
facetted trait of impulsivity and the dual factor model of inattentive and impulsive 
behaviours which constitutes the syndrome of ADHD. Two studies explore this 
overlap by first establishing that ADHD behaviours may be considered as two highly 
correlated tmits and then exploring the correlations and conceptual overlap between 
these ADHD traits and the impulsivity facets measured by the BIS-11. The results 
suggest that while the correspondence between the variables across the two 
questionnaires and domains is not simple it does justify further exploration. The final 
study explores the relationships between self report measures of inattention and 
impulsivity and laboratory tasks selected to tap into behavioural and cognitive 
inhibition. The significant correlation between the cognitive inhibition tasks and the 
variance shared by the inattention and impulsivity scales supports the hypothesised 
role o f cognitive variables in affecting individual differences in a unitary construct of 
impulsivity/inattention.
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Summary
Introductory chapters 1-3
Chapter 1 aims at a delineation o f the construct o f impulsivity which lies at the core of 
most discussions o f impulsivity. This occurs through establishing a coherent 
definition of impulsivity which is differentiated from phenotypically similar 
constructs; in particular, the relationship with the trait of sensation seeking, as defined 
by Zuckeiman, is clarified. Next the construct o f impulsivity as operationalised in a 
number of impulsivity scales is explored and the considerable overlap in variance 
between these scales is discussed; reflecting their overall agreement on the core 
construct of impulsivity while acknowledging the possibility of a model of 
impulsivity comprising correlated facets.
The second section discusses the positioning of impulsivity within hierarchically 
structured models of personality, noting the general agi eement which exists on 
situating impulsivity within a broader higher-order trait of conscientiousness as it 
occurs in five factor models o f personality or within largely similar constructs in other 
models (e.g. constraint for Tellegen, psychoticism for Eysenck and impulsive- 
sensation seeking for Zuckerman). There is some discussion of the different 
flavours/connotations given to impulsivity within these different models.
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The third section explores the conceptualisation of impulsivity within research and 
theory in developmental psychopathology; a conceptualisation which argues for a 
conceptual and empirical link between behavioural disinhibition and regulation of 
attention. Both Rothbart and Eisenberg employ a construct of effortful control which 
involves the control of both attentional processes and behaviour while ADHD 
theorists give equal weight to problems of behavioural inhibition and attention 
regulation as facets of the ADHD syndrome.
Chapters 2 & 3 are concerned with the exploration and explanation of impulsivity. In 
Chapter 2 the contribution of the resear ch into personality traits is assessed and its 
limitations discussed; in particular the neglect of the development of causal 
frameworks in structural models of personality and the tendency to treat personality 
traits only as independent variables. The relationship of impulsivity to 
conscientiousness is given special attention.
Chapter 2 also explores the way in which the behaviours which co-vary with 
impulsivity contribute to an explanation o f its nature; in particular the relationship 
with various aspects of psychopathology in adults. The co-variation of impulsivity 
with a wide though delimited selection of psychopathological behaviours suggests to 
some theorists that these behaviours are typical sequelae of, and indeed caused by, 
impulsivity.
Chapter 3 explores a structured model of the causes and nature of impulsivity, 
building upon genetic, biochemical, neurological and cognitive research on both 
impulsivity and ADHD, which discusses jiypothetical causal chains from the most
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distal elements -  genetics- to the most proximal -  behavioural traits, social 
relationships and educational/occupational career.
Empirical chapters
Chapter 4 involves an exploration of the BIS-11 which confirms its structure as three 
correlated traits with conceptually coherent relationships to other Big Five traits. A 
short form of the BIS-11 is developed to reflect the three facets as well as the higher 
order construct of impulsivity. The construct validity of the various scales is 
demonstrated through their correlations with measures of personality traits and self 
report measures o f aggressive behaviour, alcohol consumption and driving behaviour.
Chapter 5 reports two studies which demonstrate that impulsivity adds incremental 
validity to the Big Five, with the aim of exploring the relationship between 
impulsivity and the Big Five The first o f these studies finds that impulsivity adds 
incremental validity in the prediction o f academic perfonnance while the second 
study demonstrates incremental validity in the prediction of alcohol consumption and 
driving behaviour among students.
Chapter 6 explores an alternative model of impulsivity to that explored in the previous 
chapter; a model which deliberately embeds impulsivity within the Big Five 
framework while aiming to deconstruct the construct of impulsivity as a single 
coherent variable. The data from the study in this chapter confirms the three factor 
structure of the scales adapted from the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) UPPS
XV
impulsivity questionnaire but argues against these authors’ reduction of impulsivity 
traits to nothing more than facets of the Big Five.
Chapter 7 develops the theoretical argument in chapter 2 relating impulsivity to 
ADHD behaviour considered as a trait. In the first study of this chapter the data 
provide evidence for the-validity of ADHD as a trait and demonstrate that this trait 
cannot be reduced to some combination of Big Five traits. The second study in this 
chapter explores the relationships between the two ADHD subtraits and the three 
facets of the BIS-11; an exploratory factor analysis o f the items of both scales 
identifies three different though related facets of impulsivity.
Chapter 8 explored the relationship between self report measur es of two of the facets 
of impulsivity identified in the earlier chapters, behavioural impulsivity and 
inattention, and laboratory studies sustained of attention regulation, and of response 
inhibition; with the aim of exploring whether these two highly correlated traits have 
different cognitive underpinnings. The fact that both self report traits correlated with 
measur es of attention regulation is consistent with much research from ADHD 
domain which does not differentiate between the two sub-traits in terms of cognitive 
or neuropsychological variables. The results also support the argument that 
impulsivity be conceived of as involving both attentional and behavioural inhibition.
Chapter 9 discusses the implications of the findings.
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Summary of research methods and analysis
Two methods of research and analysis are used throughout the studies reported in this 
thesis; the first is exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and the second is multiple 
regression. According to Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum and Strahan (1999) “ EFA 
is used when a researcher wishes to identify a set of latent constructs underlying a 
battery of measured variables.” In a number of studies exploratory factor analysis is 
used to identify the number of latent variables underlying the responses to the items in 
a questionnaire. In chapter four the BIS-11 is factor analysed to replicate the factor 
structure of that questionnaire proposed by Patton et al (1996). In that analysis, and 
others which employ exploratory factor analysis, three of the issues raised by Fabrigar 
et al. (1999) were tackled in a consistent way.
The first issue relates to the use of factor analysis rather than principal components 
analysis; as Fabrigar et al (1999) point out factor analysis, as opposed to principal 
components analysis, aims to identify the common factors (or latent variables) which 
account for the correlations between items and in doing so ignores unique or enor 
variance. Since, as mentioned above, the aim in this thesis is to identify latent 
variables then factor analysis (promax) is used tliroughout.
The second issue relates to the criterion for deciding on the number of factors to 
extract. In this thesis the scree test was used to estimate the number of factors which
XV ll
best characterised the data sets analysed rather than the ‘eigen value greater than one’ 
is generally considered to lead to over factoring. While the scree test involves an 
element of subjectivity in judgements as to where the substantial drop in value (or 
‘elbow’) occurs more formal decision rules, such as parallel analysis, were judged 
unnecessary since the aim was not to discover the correct number of factors; rather in 
most cases inspection of the scree plot serves to support the extraction of the number 
of factors as stipulated by previous research. Thus analysis of the scree plots produced 
in the factor analysis of the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) scales in chapter six and the 
analysis of the ADHD scales in chapter seven justified the extraction of three and two 
factors respectively as described by previous research which is discussed in the 
relevant chapters.
The third issue relates to the use of orthogonal or oblique methods of factor rotation; 
in this thesis oblique rotation was used througliout. As Fabrigar et al. (1999) point 
out, while orthogonal rotation constrains factors to be uncon elated, oblique rotation 
allows factors to be correlated when they are in reality correlated. In the case of the 
questionnaires employed in this thesis substantial correlations were to be expected 
since not only do most personality traits correlate to some extent but many 
impulsivity questionnaires embody models of impulsivity comprising correlated 
facets. According to Fabrigar et al (1999) observation of substantial correlations 
between factors supports the hypothesis of higher order factors and thus serves the 
aim of tills thesis in arguing for a higher order factor of impulsivity which subsumes 
traits such as acting without thinking, inattention, distractibility and premature 
responding. In the case of the BIS-11 and the ADHD questionnaires the use of 
oblique rotation allowed the examination of con elations between factors in order to
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replicate previous research. In the analysis o f the Wliiteside and Lynam (2001) 
questionnaires the correlations between the factors were utilised to argue, against 
those authors, for the existence of a latent trait influencing the various manifestations 
of impulsivity.
The second major research strategy was the use correlation coefficients and regression 
analysis to demonstrate the validity of measures of impulsivity tiaits in the prediction 
of behaviours which were taken as indicators of impulsivity. While the first step was 
to demonstrate the validity o f the measures of impulsivity through their correlation 
with indicators of behavioui which previous research had demonstrated to be 
manifestations of impulsivity. The second step was to demonstrate the incremental 
validity of impulsivity traits over measures o f the Big Five personality traits.
Previous research has associated impulsivity with maladaptive behaviours such as 
poor academic perfoimance and driving misdemeanours; research in the domain of 
psychopathology has associated impulsivity with more serious behaviours such as 
excessive alcohol consumption, impulsive aggression, and emotional disregulation. 
Research on the con elates of ADHD has similarly identified driving behaviour and 
alcohol misuse as the sequelae of ADHD symptoms in adults. Consequently measures 
of these behaviours are used throughout the studies in chapter four to seven.
The second step was the use of regression analysis to illustrate the incremental 
validity of impulsivity tiaits in the prediction of these behaviours; in most cases the 
concern was to illustrate the incremental validity over the Big Five traits. In chapters 
four and five a measure o f impulsivity derived from the BIS-11 was shown to predict
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significant variance in a number of variables over and above the variance predicted by 
the Big Five; similarly in chapter 7 the ADHD traits were shown to have incremental 
validity over the Big Five in the prediction o f both self and peer reports of behaviour. 
This same strategy was employed in chapter six to support the argument that the 
impulsivity traits identified by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) should not, contrary to 
their conceptualisation of impulsivity, be simply identified as aspects of the Big five 
traits of conscientiousness.
Chapter 1 
The conceptualisation and operationalisation of impulsivity
The concept of impulsivity figures in a number of different domains of 
Psychology.
1. It is a significant element in most structural models of personality where it is 
usually considered a lower order trait; a facet of a higher order trait such as 
Psychoticism (Eysenck’s PEN model) or Conscientiousness (as in most five 
factor models).
2. It is a core symptom of the syndrome of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) wherein it serves to define, together with hyperactivity, one 
of the major subtypes of the disorder.
3. It is an important symptom in many psychiatric diagnoses; from Kleptomania 
through to Bulimia. In these contexts it is typically considered as a type of 
behaviour caused by the underlying pathology ( as in borderline personality 
disorder) , though is some diagnoses -  fire setting and compulsive gambling - it 
may be play a more causal role.
4. In the study of a variety of behaviour disorders, dr ug and alcohol abuse or 
anti-social behaviour and delinquency it is gr anted a more clearly causal role; 
e.g. as a mediating variable between parental discipline and delinquency.
Defining and delineating impulsivity
It has become commonplace to comment upon the fact that “...there exists little 
consensus in the literature about what constitutes Impulsivity...” and that “ ...the lack of 
conceptual clarity in the impulsivity construct has become a source of widespread 
confusion in the literature on this topic.” (Parker & Bagby 1997 p. 142). Thus Solanto, 
Abikoff, Sonuga-Barke, Schachar, Logan, Wigal, Hechtman, Hinshaw, & Turkel, (2001) 
point out that beyond broad definitions “there is little consensus with respect to specific 
criteria for, or conceptual modelling of, this behavioural construct” ( p. 215). In particular 
there is disagreement, or at least a lack of clarity, as to the relationship of impulsivity to 
other traits: Depue & Collins (1999) note that impulsivity has been used to refer to a wide 
and heterogeneous variety of traits including “impulsivity, sensation seeking, risk-taking, 
novelty seeking, boldness, adventuresomeness, boredom susceptibility, unreliability and 
unorderliness” (p. 495). To this list one might add distractibility and lack of persistence 
from the developmental literature (Barkley, 1997) as well as explosive aggression and 
irritability from the clinical domain (Moeller, BaiTatt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann. 
2001)
It is the contention of the present chapter that there is substantial agreement among many 
researchers, using self report questionnaires as well as laboratory tasks, in delineating a 
narrow and relatively well defined concept of impulsivity.
• Solanto et al (2001) propose a broad definition of impulsivity -  “An impulsive 
response may be defined as one that is executed with insufficient forethought, 
planning or control and is therefore inaccurate or maladaptive,”
• Moeller et al. (2001) refer to a “Tendency to act with less forethought than most 
individuals of equal ability and knowledge.”
• Cherek, D., Moeller, Dougherty, and Rhoades (1997) define impulsivity as “... 
an inability to inhibit one’s behaviour when such inhibition is required by the 
particular context.” (Cherek et al. 1997, p. 52).
These definitions capture the common and essential elements of impulsivity as expressed 
by numerous researchers. Thus impulsivity refers to behaviour which ...
.... occurs before a proper, normative, amount of consideration of consequences,
.... involves some degiee of lack of control by tire subject
.... is maladaptive from the perspective of both the actor and their society.
Implicit in this foimulation are the assumptions that
a
• the impulsive behaviour is not due to lack of knowledge of the consequences, 
though it may involve a lack of attention to or a forgetting of, the situational 
consequences
• that the inability to inhibit behaviour is not due to a general cognitive deficit,
• nor that the actor does not care about the consequences
Delineating impulsivity
Differences between researchers in their conceptualisation of impulsivity tend to lie not 
in their disagieement with the above description of impulsivity but rather in the range of 
other traits which are included in their use of die construct. An illustrative example is 
Hollander and Evers (2001) who offer the following definition: “Impulsivity (...) is the 
failure to resist an impulse, drive or temptation that is harmful to oneself or others (....) 
manifesting as impatience, carelessness, risk-taking, sensation seeking and pleasure 
seeking, an underestimated sense of harm, and extroversion.’ This is an extraordinarily 
wide definition which, furthermore, emphasises the harmful and maladaptive behaviours 
which figure in psychopathology. The authors go on to list the psychiatric diagnoses 
which include impulsive behaviour; these too range widely -  from antisocial and 
borderline personality disorders to Trichotillomania. However, the definition provided by 
Hollander and Evers (2001) provides a useful focus for discussing at this point some of 
the tiaits which the present thesis differentiates fr om impulsivity; though these issues will 
be discussed again later in the context of models of personality and impulsivity.
Like Barkley (1997) the core of their model is the failure to resist an impulse, ie a failure 
of inhibition; the rest of the constructs which they list are referred to as manifestations of 
this core disinhibition. Using a similar logic Buss and Plomin (1975) suggest that 
inhibitory control is the core of impulsivity, though other characteristics such as 
inattention, distractibility, persistence and boredom are often included in the concept. 
Both of these approaches agiee with the model underlying the present thesis.
It is useful to take issue with the details of the conceptualisation proposed by Hollander 
and Evers (2001). Their suggestion that both extraversion and pleasure seeking might be 
a manifestation of impulsivity is disputed by theorists such as Eysenck, Tellegen and 
Depue and Collins; this issue will be discussed below in the sections of Eysenck, Gray 
and Tellegen. Their use of the terms ‘risk taking* and ‘sensation seeking’ refers to the 
tiait, or trait complex of sensation seeking; Zuckerman includes impulsivity and sensation 
seeking as two facets of the super-ordinate trait which he terms ‘impulsive unsocialised 
sensation seeking (Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993), a trait which he 
considers to be a close approximation to Eysenck’s trait of psychoticism. While the traits 
of impulsivity and sensation seeking are frequently conflated, a number of theorists 
suggest that they should be considered as separate traits. Eysenck, himself distinguishes 
between impulsivity, which he relates to psychoticism, and venturesomeness, which he 
considers to be an element of extraversion. Similarly, in their model of impulsivity 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) situate their construct of sensation seeking (which they 
explicitly identify with Eysenck’s venturesomeness and Zuckerman’s sensation seeking 
scales) within the higher order personality domain of extraversion, while situating 
impulsivity within the domain of conscientiousness. Thus these autliors each imply a 
distinction between the constructs of impulsivity and sensation seeking in terms of 
underlying latent variables while acknowledging their co-variance in terms of behaviour. 
Nevertheless the fr equency of that conflation and the undoubted covariance of 
impulsivity and sensation seeking requires more detailed discussion.
Impulsivity and sensation seeking
Zuckerman’s construct of sensation seeking comprises four lower order traits or facets; 
thrill and adventure seeking, excitement seeking, disinhibition and boredom 
susceptibility; however the coherence of this construct is questionable. Quilty and 
Oakman (2003) found the correlations betweeu the facets to range from .11 to .46; 
particularly low were the correlations between boredom susceptibility and thrill and 
adventure seeking and excitement seeking (r = . 11 and .22 respectively), Quilty and 
Oakman (2003) also provided data on tlie relationship between sensation seeking facets 
and the facet scales of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton, Stanford, & 
BaiTatt, 1995). Correlations between the BIS-11 facet scales and the thrill and adventure 
and excitement scales ranged from .11 to .24, while the correlations between the BIS-11 
facet scales and the dis-inhibition and boredom susceptibility scales ranged from .23 to 
.33.
Flory, Harvey, Mitropoulou, New, Silverman and Siever (2006) analysed data from a 
number of impulsivity and sensation seeking scales which were administered to 350 
subjects. They administered the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale- version 10 (BIS-10 a 
precursor of the BIS-11 discussed below) as a single factor measure of impulsivity, and 
the Zuckerman four facet scales of sensation seeking from the SSS-V5. They also utilised 
the three novelty seeking scales of the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ: 
Cloninger 1987); these assess exploratory excitability versus stoical rigidity, 
impulsiveness versus reflection and extravagance versus reserve. Examination of scree
plot and eigen values led them to extract three factors. The first of these was identified by 
the sensation seeking scales of thrill and adventure seeking and excitement seeking as 
well as the exploratory excitability scale of tire TPQ. The second factor was identified by 
the BIS-10 total score and two scales from the TPQ — extravagance versus reserve and 
impulsiveness versus reflection. The third was defined by the dis-inhibition scale and the 
boredom susceptibility scale from the SSS-V5.
When the three component scores were correlated with the Big Five personality traits the 
impulsivity component correlated predominantly with conscientiousness and secondarily 
with neuroticism (-.61 and .30 respectively) figures similar to those reported below in 
chapter 2, The thrill seeking component correlated with extraversion and openness (.33 
and .61 respectively) and the disinhibited behaviour component correlated moderately 
with openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness (.27, -.31.-.24 respectively). Once 
again this pattern of correlations suggests a distinction between impulsivity and sensation 
seeking; in particular the correlations between the ‘impulsivity’ variables and the Big 
Five suggest that while thrill and adventure seeking is a relatively benign and even 
admirable trait, both impulsivity and disinhibition are maladaptive -  characterised by 
negative affect and low conscientiousness. Correlations between BIS-10 scores and the 
scales of the SSS-v5 are also revealing; the BIS-10 correlated .27 and .23 with boredom 
susceptibility and disinhibition respectively and .15 and .10 witli excitement seeking and 
thrill and adventure respectively (Flory, 2007. personal communication). While all but 
the last of these was significant, given the sample size of 351, the pattern of correlations 
is reminiscent of the results of Quilty and Oakman (2003) discussed above where
impulsivity correlates more substantially with the maladaptive aspects of sensation 
seeking.
Studies utilising other measures of sensation seeking tiaits find a similar pattern. Thus 
Dahl en, Martin, Regan and Kuhlman (2005) correlated the total BIS-11 scores with 
scores on the Arnett inventory of sensation seeking (Arnett 1994) and the Boredom 
Proneness scale (Rupp & Vodanovich 1997). The sensation seeking and boredom scales, 
reflecting aspects of Zuckerman’s constmct did not correlate significantly (r = .11); 
furthermore the BIS-11 coiTelated more highly significantly with the boredom proneness 
scale than with the sensation seeking scale (r = .50 and .28 respectively, both p<.01) 
reflecting the results of Quilty and Oakman (2003). These results question the coherence 
of the sensation seeking construct and its relationship to impulsivity.
Miller, Joseph and Tudway (2004) factor analysed data fiom the Dickman functional and 
dysfunctional scales (Dickman, 1990), the Eysenck impulsivity and venturesomeness 
scales(Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985), the BIS-11 facet scales (Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) and the BIS/BAS scales of Carver and White (1994). The 
three BIS-11 scales the Eysenck impulsivity scale and the Dickman dis-functional 
impulsivity scale loaded on the first factor; the second factor was defined by the Eysenck 
venturesome and the Dickman functional impulsivity scales, with substantial secondary 
loadings from the fun and drive scales of the BAS; the third factor Was defined by the 
fun, drive and reward responsiveness scales of the BAS. These results indicate a clear
differentiation between impulsivity and sensation seeking and an affinity between the 
latter and positive affectivity, or extraversion.
The data considered above suggest that one should differentiate between two distinct 
senses of sensation seeking; the first of these is independent of impulsivity and involves a 
desire for strong stimulation, excitement and variety, -  for sky diving, cocaine; a 
deliberate and controlled exposure to risks - a desire which often involves planning and 
which co-exists with a generally well-regulated life style. The second involves 
impulsivity and dis-regulation, boredom susceptibility, distractibility, lack of forethought 
and is found in conjunction with personality and conduct disorders. What Eysenck, 
Dickman and Whiteside and Lynam mean by venturesomeness, fimctional impulsivity 
and sensation seeking respectively may be the first of these senses of sensation seeking; a 
non-impulsive sensation'seeking. Interestingly, Zuckerman (1993) makes passing 
reference to this point when he remarks that mountain climbers are characterised by high 
scores on a sensation seeking scale yet their mountain climbing is characterised by 
careful planning. Gilclirist, Povey, Dickinson and Povey (1995) compared the 
Zuckerman sensation seeing.scores of a sample of people who had recently been on an 
adventure holiday to a demographically similar control group. Wliile the two groups 
differed significantly on thrill and adventure seeking and experience seeking subscales 
thee were no significant differences on either the disinhibition or boredom susceptibility 
scales. The thrill and adventure scale correlated moderately with the excitement seeking 
scale (r = .47) and the boredom susceptibility and disinhibition scales correlated .42 while 
the other scale inter-coirelations ranged from .11 to .28.
If this hypothesis is correct it suggests that the sensation seeking construct is a prime 
example of taking superficial description to indicate the nature of latent or causal 
variables. Thus it appears that at least some, if not all, of “...the lack of conceptual clarity 
in the impulsivity construct...... a source of widespread confusion in the literature on
this topic.” (Parker & Bagby, 1997, p. 142) may be susceptible to clarification.
Psychometric approaches to impulsivity
In the field of individual differences impulsivity is considered as a personality trait and is 
most often measured by self-report questionnaire. The individual differences, 
psychometric tradition aims to establish a nomological network within which the validity 
of a trait such as impulsivity is established. Such research tends to view the trait as an 
independent variable and explores its relationship with other variables; this may well be 
driven by the pragmatic requirement of testing in applied psychology where predictive 
validity is prioritised (Caprara & Cervone,1999). Where the nature of the trait is explored 
it is in a superficial way -  refining descriptions, drawing finer distinctions. This is 
explanation at the simplest level, mapping out the surface structure [phenotype] of 
behaviour: though the demonstrable consistency of the behaviour across time and 
situations adds a further layer of explanation. Trait psychology does not however simply 
explore single traits, it also considers the relationship between different traits; of 
particular importance is the exploration of structural/hierarchical models of personality, 
such as the Big Five of Costa & McCrae (1992) where co-varying lower level traits
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produce higher level traits which subsume the lower level traits; the higher level traits 
being assumed to be independent or orthogonal.
The last few decades has seen the rise of structural models of personality which aim to 
encompass the major aspects of personality within a hierarchical trait model; the most 
prominent of these being the Five Factor Model (FFM). (John & Srivastava, 1999). Such 
models tend to concur in identifying five traits at the highest level of the hierarchy - the 
acronym OCEAN serves as a useful mnemonic for Openness to experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. At a lower level more 
narrow, or primary, traits such as deliberation and self discipline are identified as facets 
of, for example, conscientiousness; while at the lowest level are situated narrowly defined 
behaviours such as tidiness and orderliness at home.
Many omnibus personality questionnaires, and not only those operationalising the FFM, 
include measures of impulsivity. Impulsivity scales within such personality inventories 
include the self-control scale of the California Personality Inventory (CPI) and the 
Control/Impulsiveness scale of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ ); 
in each case the Impulsivity scale is conceptualised as a primary trait which is then 
situated within a higher order factor; e.g. within Constraint in the three factor model of 
the MPQ, In the following sections approaches to impulsivity considered as a relatively 
independent trait will be discussed, whether the scales are independent stand alone scales 
or whether they are part of an omnibus personality questionnaire. Approaches to
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impulsivity where impulsivity is conceptualised as an integral part of a structural model 
of personality will be discussed in chapter 2 .
A number of theorists have studied impulsivity as an independent trait often developing 
stand alone measures of trait, among the best known are the Barratt impulsiveness scale 
(BIS-11), Dickman’s scale of functional and dysfunctional impulsivity and the Eysenck 
scale of impulsivity and venturesomness, the I7 . For each of these, there is considerable 
evidence for their internal and external validity. The BIS scales have been utilised in a 
considerable number of clinical studies, demonstrating their validity in differentiating 
between impulse disorders, such as borderline personality disorders, and non-impulse 
disorders such as depression (Solof et al., 2000). The Eysenck Impulsiveness scale, the I7  
has also been developed over a number of years with numerous studies attesting to its 
validity; finding it to significantly predict problem gambling (Vitaro, Arsenault & 
Tremblay, 1999) and antisocial behaviour (Luengo, Carrillo-De-La-Pena & Otero, 1994) in 
adolescents. These impulsivity scales share considerable variance; The I7  and Dickman’s 
disfunctional impulsivity scale have been found to conelate 0.73 (Dickman, 1990; Claes et 
al., 2000), while correlations between the I7  and the BISl 1 have been reported to be 
between .7 and . 8  (Luengo et al., 1991). Miller et al. (2004) administered the Dickman, 
Eysenck and BIS-11 scales to a sample of 245 adults (mean age 42.7, 44% male). The 
correlation between the Dickman dysfunctional impulsivity and the Eysenck impulsivity 
scales was .78 while the correlation between these two scales and the BIS-11 facet scales 
ranged from .45 to .63.
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A number of omnibus personality questionnaires contain scales to measure impulsivity 
The Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire ( MPQ: Tellegen, 1982) contains a 
Control/hnpulsiveness scale which refers to impulsiveness, carelessness and 
recklessness; the Personality research Form (PRF Jackson 1984) contains an ‘Impulse’ 
scale which refers to acting on the spur of the moment and without appropriate 
forethought; while the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (GTZS; Guilford, 
Zimmerman & Guilford, 1976) contains a scale assessing the ‘happy-go-lucky, carefree, 
impulsive individual’. Once again these scales show considerable overlap in variance 
amongst themselves and with the single trait scales discussed above. Parker & Bagby 
(1997) report coiTelations ranging from 0.78 to 0.89 between the PRF, MPQ and GZTS 
scales of Impulsivity, while Dickman (1990) finds the PRF impulsivity scale to correlate 
.83 with Eysenck’s 17 impulsivity scale, and .67 with his own dysfunctional impulsivity 
scale but only .14 with the FI scale. This shared variance and the evidence for the validity 
of individual scales argues for the validity of their common concept/construct of 
impulsivity.
Impulsivity as a multi-dimensional constmct
Wliile acknowledging the distinction between impulsivity and other traits one may 
nevertheless explore the faceted nature of impulsivity; this is legitimate even if  one 
eventually incorporates impulsivity into an hierarchical model -  traits at all levels may be 
further subdivided. Note that there is a general problem of deciding to what extent multi­
factorial models are carving the body of impulsivity into equivalent facets; it is not
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enough to simply compare labels. It is necessary to compare the various subscales — at 
least one of the studies below attempts to do this -  or to establish equivalent validity by 
relating them to common behavioural indicators.
Parker, Bagby and Webster (1993), explored the dimensionality of three impulsivity 
scales which were factors within well known personality questionnaires, using data from 
a sample of 252 adults and 230 undergraduate students. Exploratory and confirmatory ' 
factor analysis of the twelve item impulsivity scale from the Personality Research Form 
(PRF-form e; Jackson, 1984) supported a single factor solution in both samples. A similar 
analysis of the 24 item control scale from Tellegen’s MPQ suggested two factors which 
tlie authors labelled cautious/spontaneous and methodical/disorganised dimensions. The 
two subscales constructed upon this analysis correlated .60 and .63 across the two 
samples; both of the scales correlated substantially with the PRF scale, .83 and .61 
respectively.
A similar analysis of the Guilford-Zimmerman temperament survey (GZTS) suggested a 
solution of three factor which they labelled carefree, serious minded and spontaneous 
respectively. Correlations between the constructed subscales varied from .35 to .43 across 
the two samples. Their spontaneous scale correlated substantially with the PRF and the 
cautious scale of the MPQ (.74 and .72 respectively), however the correlations between 
the carefree and serious minded scales and the PRF and MPQ scales were only modest 
(.31 to .50). It is worth noting at this point that the inspection of the GZTS items 
illustrates the vagaries in the conceptualisation of impulsivity in different models. The
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analysis of Parker et al. (1993) of the GZTS items produces a carefree dimension 
characterised by liking to have a good time and lively parties, being carefree and happy 
go lucky as well as craving excitement and liking wild enthusiasm. This item content 
suggests positive affect and perhaps an element of sensation seeking; a trait which was 
considered above as not being a core aspect of ‘narrow’ impulsivity.
The authors subjected the 6  separate thus identified sub-subscales to an exploratory factor 
analysis and concluded that the results suggested a two factor solution which they 
describe as entailing a cautious-spontaneous dimension and a methodical-disorganised 
dimension, though that analysis of the first sample produced eigen values for the first two 
factors of 3.59 and 1.03 and a confirmatoiy factor analysis of their second sample 
produced a parameter estimate for the relationship between the two factors of .72.
Though such a correlation might suggest that the two traits share only 50% of their 
variance, the correlation is similar to that typically obtained between different measures 
of the same trait. Parker and Bagby (1997) in revisiting that data report correlations 
between 0.78 and 0.89 between the PRF, MPQ and GZTS scales of Impulsivity. The 
results of their analysis thus support a model of impulsivity as a single coherent higher 
order trait consisting of two highly correlated lower order traits.
The authors conclude that their data concurs with other research suggesting a multi­
dimensional construct of impulsivity; citing the models developed by Barratt and his 
colleagues (discussed below), Dickman (1990) and Eysenck et al. (1985). With regard to 
the latter two examples, one sees once again a lack of clarity caused by relying upon
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nomenclature. While the research of Eysenck and colleagues (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting 
& Allsop, 1985) is indeed often described as supporting a multi-facetted model of 
impulsivity consisting of impulsivity and venturesomeness, the data suggests that these 
two traits are different and only superficially related, aligning impulsivity with 
psychoticism and venturesomeness with extraversion, the two super-ordinate factors 
being independent and orthogonal within the Eysenck framework. Somewhat similarly, 
Dickman’s model of impulsivity is described as involving two types of impulsivity -  
functional and dysfunctional — however Dickman himself describes these as ‘two distinct 
forms of impulsivity that are independent of each other’ (Dickman, 2000. p.567). 
Dickman himself (Dickman 1990) identifies functional impulsivity with extraversion and 
dis-functional impulsivity with Eysenck’s construct of core impulsivity. A recent study 
by Smillie and Jackson (2006) suggests that functional impulsivity should be renamed as 
reward reactivity as a contribution to clarifying the confusion around the variety of 
‘impulsivity’ traits. There is a frequent tendency to blur conceptual distinctions by not 
distinguishing between superficial similarities and underlying variables or between 
similar labels and different behaviours. This issue of when and whetlier observed 
(behavioural) co-variance is attributable to a common latent variable will be discussed 
further below when considering the model of impulsivity proposed by Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001).
The most prominent multi-faceted model of impulsivity is that associated with the work 
of Banatt and his associates who have carried out a program of research into impulsivity 
which involves a variety of strategies including the development and frequent revision of
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a self report scale, the latest version being the BIS-11 (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt 1996). 
While the authors claimed that the overall item pool was consistent in being an 
homogenous measure of impulsiveness - overall alpha was . 8  - they argued that the data 
also supported three secondary factors: motor impulsiveness, cognitive impulsiveness 
and non-planning impulsiveness; the correlations between these ranging from .46 to .53. 
these will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
The BIS-11 has been used extensively in the domain of clinical psychology; the 
accumulated data provides evidence of the validity of the scale as well as 
providing insights into the role of impulsivity in various disorders. While the 
validity of the total scale is well established, research does not unequivocally 
demonstrate the value of differentiating between the facets of the BIS-11 ; where 
differential validity is demonstrated the results are inconsistent across studies, 
while other studies find the facets to correlate equally with criterion variables.
Nevertheless the BIS-11 is valuable in providing a multi-faceted model of 
impulsivity which allows further exploration of the nature and stmcture of 
impulsivity. Of particular interest in the context of the present thesis is the 
recognition of the importance of attentional impulsivity; operationalised in 
terms of reports of failures of attention and concentration, distractibility and the 
occurrence of extraneous and distracting thoughts. Whiteside and Lynam (2001) 
too identify a trait which they label perseverance which they operationalise in 
terms of giving up and failing to complete tasks and difficulties in
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concentration. They distinguish between lack of perseverance and lack of 
premeditation which they identify in terms of the acting and thinking without 
due consideration, perhaps the most common conceptualization of impulsivity, 
though in fact the two traits correlate 0.45.
Developmental models of impulsivity
Goldsmith, Lemery and Essex (2004) illustrate the way in which developmental 
psychology has enriched the theorising of impulsivity. They identify a regulatory domain 
of temperament involving the ability to inhibit behaviour when required, the ability to 
deploy attention effectively and finally the ability to dampen negative affect. All three of 
these occur in the model of impulsivity as effortful control developed by Derryberry and 
colleagues, and in the syndrome of ADHD as described by Barkley (1997).
Derrybeiry and Rothbart (1997) employ the trait construct of effortful control, defined as 
the ability to inhibit a dominant response to perform a subdominant response; which 
involves the effortful control of both attentional processes and behaviour and is used to 
modulate emotional experience and expression. Eisenberg, Spinrad, Fabes, Reiser, 
Cumberland, Shepard, Valiente, Losoya, Guthrie and Thompson (2004) describe a 
similar model which includes reactive control as well as effortful control; by reactive 
control they refer to inhibition of behaviour which occurs as a consequence of fear, 
anxiety and stress and which is often involuntary. They refer to the negative pole of this 
dimension - reactive under-control - as impulsivity; this seems to mean behaviour
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unconstrained by fearful inhibition. Marking this distinction between two types of control 
is important; effortful control is similar to the construct of narrow impulsivity delineated 
at the beginning of this chapter and is an affectively ‘cooT process while reactive control 
is affectively ‘hot’ since it is a function of negative affect.
Both the research programs of Rothbart and of Eisenberg suggest an interaction between 
effortful control and emotional reactivity such that low effortful contiol and high negative 
affect lead to maladjustment. Both research programs find a correlation between low 
effortful control and negative affect, suggesting that the interaction between them begins 
in early childhood. The simplest possibility is that low levels of effortful control interfere 
with the development of strategies for emotion regulation so that the child’s latent 
negative affectivity develops as neurotic behaviour. It may also be the case that high 
levels of negative affect (NA) may interfere either with the development of executive 
control strategies or in a stressful situation would interfere with the execution either 
behavioural or attentional control. Both of these lines of research suggest that the 
variable of effortful control entails the inhibition or control of both behaviour and 
attentional processes and which is essentially independent of affectivity though it may 
interact with both positive and negative affect to produce adjustment problems.
Rothbart, Ahadi and Evans (2000) point out the similarities between some of their 
temperamental variables and the Big Five personality traits; nevertheless they also 
suggest that temperamental models are more likely to lead to the exploration of the 
interaction of organism and environment (and I would add, between temperamental
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traits). They suggest that descriptive models of personality tend to reinforce a simple 
trait based model of personality without either dynamic or developmental elements. Five 
factor models rarely consider either the causal mechanisms which lead to either the 
covariance of behaviours which constitute a trait such as neuroticism or the reasons 
behind individual differences of such a trait. Interestingly the exceptions to this rule are 
the theories of Eysenck and Zuckerman which begin from a causal perspective. Similarly 
five factor models of personality rarely consider the interaction between traits, 
considering them to be orthogonal and to have independent/additive effects upon 
behaviour. An example of this is the attempt to reduce personality disorder syndromes to 
Big Five trait descriptions; a strategy which risks losing sight of the dynamic aspects of 
personality disorders such as narcissism. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2 .
This recognition of a dimension of attentional as well as behavioural impulsivity is 
paralleled by the structure of the syndrome o f  ADHD as defined by DSM. Barkley (2006 
p.79) points out that ‘Two dimensions of behaviour are almost universally found when 
the symptoms of ADHD as rated by parents and teachers are factor analysed.” These 
clusters of symptoms form the basis of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (2000 ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association) description of the 
ADHD syndrome which divides the symptoms of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder into three subtypes: inattentive, hyperactive/impulsivity and combined type.
The inattention cluster is reflected in parent and teacher ratings of lack of concentration, 
distractibility, forgetfulness and lack of organisation as well as in direct observation of
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off-task behaviour. The hyperactive/impulsive cluster includes lack of inhibition and 
hyperactivity.
In considering the syndrome of ADHD, though impulsivity may seem rather a 
minor element in terms of the number of symptoms in which it is implicated, 3 
out of 18, its import in terms of explanations of ADHD is more central. Olsen 
(2002) points out that according to a number of theorists ( Barkley 1997; Quay 
1997; Schachar et al., 2000) deficiencies in impulse control are conceptualised 
as central deficits in ADHD, with problems of attentional and activity regulation 
viewed as secondary manifestations.
The relevance o f ADHD to the understanding of impulsivity is highlighted by die 
increasing recognition that while the conceptualisation of ADHD as a diagnostic category 
may have value clinical practice, the underlying variable or variables may well be 
dimensional; three lines of evidence support this argument. Firstly, studies of the latent 
structure of ADHD symptoms do not support the view that a latent category underlies 
ADHD (Haslam, Williams. Pior, Haslam,Graertz & Sawyer 2006); secondly, behavioural 
genetic research finds that heritability estimates do not vary according to severity of 
ADHD nor to where thresholds for caseness are set (Levy, Hay, McStephen, Wood & 
Waldeman, 1997); and thirdly, experimental studies indicate that the laboratory tasks 
which are utilised to tap into the cognitive basis of impulsivity (continuous performance 
task, go/no-go tasks and matching familiar figures) are also tasks which significantly 
differentiate ADHD cases fiom non-cases. It has, furthermore, become clear in recent
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years that ADHD problems do not fade with the passing of childhood but that the 
symptoms or sequelae of ADHD persist into adulthood. Adults with a history of 
childhood ADHD evince higher rates of driving accidents and of drug abuse and the 
problems seen in school are reflected in the adults’ problems with employment stability 
and effective work habits.
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Chapter 2
Explaining impulsivity; the trait approach
The present chapter argues that approaches to explaining impulsivity conespond to 
Cronbach’s (1957) distinction between two disciplines of psychology: the correlational 
and the experimental. This distinction was utilised by Eysenck (1997) to characterise two 
different approaches to the study of personality. Eysenck argued that the correlational 
approach per se lacked any explanatory power and indeed lacked any particular 
commitment to the explanation of personality; he identified the Big Five approach to 
personality as just such a purely correlational approach and thus lacking in explanatory 
power. He further argued that an explanatory theory would need to establish relationships 
between the trait constmcts and other variables which were not themselves fiom the same 
domain of psychology; i.e. not other traits. This is similar to the argument of Caprara and 
Ceiwone (2000) who argue that explanations must utilise constructs of a different type to 
the constructs to be explained. Caprara and Cervone (2000) also suggest that the lack of 
interest in explanation is attributable to the intimate link between personality assessment 
and applied fields of psychology, particularly organisational and occupational psychology 
where prediction -  especially of job performance - has been an ovemding aim.
An adequate explanatory scheme would derive from studies of the genetic, neurological 
and cognitive precursors of personality traits as well tracing the influences of these traits 
upon large scale behaviours such as sexual behaviour or criminality. In the following
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discussion it will be argued that the approach to impulsivity within the trait approach to 
personality consists largely of the correlational approach with an emphasis upon 
description rather than explanation and that one needs to move outside of this approach in 
order to reach an explanatory theoiy. It will be argued in the next chapter that the study of 
ADHD provides a model for research and theory on impulsivity.
The trait approach to impulsivity
There are a number of ways in which to begin to explain impulsivity within the 
correlational or trait approach. One may begin by a careful delineation of impulsivity, as 
was done in Chapter 1, to distinguish impulsivity from sensation seeking. Similarly one 
might carefully distinguish between affect related inhibition which arises from anxiety 
and fearfiilness (a construct elaborated by Gray and Kagan) and an affect free inhibition 
as espoused by Depue and Collins as well as Eysenck. Equally valuable is the work of 
Smillie, Jackson and Dalgleish (2006) in identifying a trait complex involving reward 
sensitivity and functional impulsivity which they relate to Gray’s behavioural activation 
system and which they distance from the more ‘nanow’ construct of impulsivity 
described by Eysenck and defended by the present thesis.
A second strategy is to examine the correlates of impulsivity; both the other traits with 
which it CO -varies and the particular behaviours with which it is associated. The lack of 
association with affective traits discussed above is particularly informative since it argues 
against the possibility that impulsivity is a neurotic disorder. Impulsivity would seem not
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to be a defining characteristic of axis I disorders as defined by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4*^  ^ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association 1994), and this again concurs with the above conceptualisation of impulsivity 
as an essentially affect fi’ee trait. Nevertheless, the presence of impulsive behaviours in 
some Axis II syndromes of psychopathology -  personality disorder and bulimia are 
examples -  is challenging and awaits future exploration; here the constructs of emotional 
dysregulation and the constiuct of urgency identified by Whiteside & Lynam (2001) are 
likely to prove fhiitful.
Within the trait approach to impulsivity certain issues, or questions tend to predominate; 
this chapter shall concern itself with two of these issues, the tendency either to seek to 
situate impulsivity within a structural model of personality or to identify coiTelations of 
impulsivity with criterion variables of interest. In each of these cases the tendency is treat 
impulsivity as an independent variable.
Recent decades have seen the rise of structural models of personality which aim to 
encompass the major aspects of personality within a hierarchical trait model; the most 
prominent of these being the Five Factor Model (FFM: John & Srivastava, 1999). Such 
models tend to concur in identifying five traits at the highest level of the hierarchy - the 
acronym OCEAN seiwes as a useful mnemonic for openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. At a lower level more 
narrow, or primary, traits such as deliberation and self-discipline are identified as facets
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of, for example, conscientiousness; while at the lowest level are situated narrowly defined 
behaviours such as tidiness and orderliness at home.
Within such a hierarchical model we enquire as to the behaviours which co-vary to give 
rise to the construct: rising into the higher levels of the hierarchy one asks for the traits 
which co-vary with impulsivity to form higher order traits. The answers given to these 
questions are essentially descriptive rather than explanatory. An interesting effect of this 
is that different models of personality are compared in terms of psychometric criteria 
applied to the data obtained, typically by self report, not in terms of the theoretical 
models which they may imply, nor even in relation to other forms of data. For example 
Ashton, Lee, Pemgini, Szarota, de Vries, Di Bias, Boies and De Raad (2004) 
propose a six factor model of personality; their sixth factor being an honesty and 
humility factor. There is however no discussion of what it means from a theoretical point 
of view to detach honesty /humility from agreeableness. A further interesting aspect of 
their model is that tliey identify irritability as a facet of agreeableness, unlike the model 
of Costa and McCrae (1992) which subsumes it into neiuroticism. Though Ashton et al, 
(2004) present this as a consequence of an alternative rotation of factors it also raises 
important theoretical questions as to the causal relationships between anxiety, irritability, 
interpersonal hostility and agieeableness. While it may be argued that until we can agree 
upon the correct model it is fruitless to look for theoretical explanations of personality 
structure, Eysenck (1997) argues that without a causal model “...different ways of 
distributing the variance (as in factor analysis) cannot be discriminated as being better or
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worse,” In this instance conducting more studies with more trait adjectives and different 
analytical methods is unlikely to prove fruitful.
Within the trait approach to personality there is a relative neglect of two fundamental 
questions to do with causation and explanation. The first asks why it is that certain 
behaviours rather than others co-vary. This applies at ahy level of the hierarchy; so that 
we may ask why impulsivity comprises certain behaviours rather than others as well as 
asking why impulsivity should co-vary with some traits rather than others. The second 
question asks why it is that individuals differ in the level which they manifest of a 
particular trait and what the underlying mechanisms or processes may be. Traits tend to 
be almost always treated as independent variables, though even then they are treated 
merely as predictors rather than causes of the behaviour with which they are found to 
coiTelate.
Explaining the covariance of certain traits rather than others is rarely addressed; the 
exceptions are in theoretical models which are explicitly based upon physiological 
mechanisms; models such as Eysenck and recent attempts to identify the core aspects of 
extraversion to be considered below. Not only is the covariance between traits rarely 
addressed, the possibility that the covariance is, at least to some extent, an artefact of 
semantic similarity or overlap is neglected.
In concrete teims, it is clear that there is a significant amount of semantic overlap in the 
meanings of the terms which often cluster together to form factors or traits. One sees the
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problem at its worst in narrowly focused trait scales where the items are often virtually 
synonymous; while such item repetition may by useful in establishing the reliability of 
the scale (asking the same question twice does not always produce the same answer so 
that repeating questions can produce an interesting microscopic level test -retest 
reliability) it tells us little about the nature of the trait.
An instructive recent example can be seen in the research of Roberts, Bogg, Walton, 
Chernyshenko and Stark (2004) who factor analysed responses to a long list of adjectives 
relating to conscientiousness; in this way they identified clusters of items to identify and 
differentiate the facets of conscientiousness. Scrutiny of their results shows many of these 
facets consist of near synonyms and antonyms; e.g. the first factor which they label 
reliable was identified by the items reliable, unreliable, dependable and undependable. 
Leaving aside the problem of antonyms, it is instructive to ask what information is 
afforded by the fact that someone who describes themselves as reliable also describes 
themselves as dependable. More interesting perhaps is to ask what we would infer if 
someone described themselves as reliable but undependable, or dependable but 
unreliable; would we not be more likely to question their understanding of the terms 
rather than infer conflicting aspects of personality?
This problem may be particularly acute when dealing with adjectives rather than 
statements or descriptions of behaviour; though even in the latter case it is difficult to 
avoid this problem. Consider the following two items from the UPPS scales of 
impulsivity -  T usually think carefully before doing anything’ and T like to stop and
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think things over before I do them’ (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). However a further pair 
of items from the same scales illustrates the possibility of sampling from different forms 
or manifestations of the trait behaviour, or of the behaviour in different contexts and the 
way in which one might use similar items to access consistency across situations; - 
‘ Wlien I feel rejected I will often say things that I later regret’ and ‘In the heat of an 
argument I will often say things that I will later regret’.
Kline (2000) points out the possibility that in some cases a factor structure may reflect 
the nature of the items rather than the nature of the psychological constructs when he 
points out that “. . .a  factor can be little more than a bloated specific or a tautologous 
factor. A set of items which are little more than paraphrases of each other will load a 
factor.” (Kline, 2000. p. 171). This is another instance of Eysenck’s (1997) argument 
that without a causal model, or at least conceptual reasoning, the results of purely factor 
analytical approaches can be misleading.
Impulsivity and conscientiousness
Most structural models of personality identify impulsivity as a facet, or lower order trait, 
of a higher order trait, or domain and most research finds a strong correlation between 
impulsivity and conscientiousness. Nevertheless there are interesting differences between 
these models in the identification of the facets which co-vary with impulsivity within the 
higher order domain. Thus Eysenck situates impulsivity within the domain of 
psychoticism along with aggression, tough-mindedness, coldness and egocentricity;
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Tellegen (1982 ) situates it within the domain of constraint along with traditionalism and 
harm avoidance and Costa and McCrae (1992) within the domain of conscientiousness 
along with competence and achievement striving. These differences are largely due to the 
different conceptualisation of the higher order trait across the different models. As is well 
known, the PEN model of Eysenck and the FFM of Costa and McCrae differ crucially in 
their treatment of conscientiousness and agreeableness; Eysenck encompasses both of 
these within the construct of psychoticism while the FFM constiues them as distinct and 
independent. Consequently, within the respective theoretical models, while impulsivity 
co-varies with both conscientiousness and agreeableness for Eysenck, for the FFM it co- 
varies only with conscientiousness.
What is important here are the tlieoretical implications of situating a trait such as 
impulsivity within one domain rather than another; the actual pattern of first order 
correlations is less important. This can be seen in the model of impulsivity proposed by 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) discussed in Chapter 6 . The NEO-PI-R facet of impulsivity, 
which occurs in the domain of neuroticism, is considered as a fundamentally different 
source of impulsivity behaviour to that identified by the facets of deliberation and self 
discipline which occur within the domain of conscientiousness. This distinction is 
maintained despite the fact that impulsivity coirelates at least as will with self discipline 
and deliberation as it does with the other neuroticism facets.
A number of recent studies have attempted to explore the facet level structure of 
conscientiousness. Saucier and Ostendorf (1999) analysed two independent yet
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representative lexical data sets , one in German and the other in English, each consisting 
of 500 adjectives, in order to identify sub-components, or facets, of the Big Five which 
generalised across the two languages. They identified four facets of conscientiousness; 
orderliness, decisiveness-consistency, reliability and industriousness -  none of which 
could be unequivocally identified with impulsivity. Nor did they identify any trait 
resembling impulsivity in the other four Big Five domains.
Roberts et al (2004) similarly carried out a lexical analysis of a set of 83 trait adjectives 
all relating to the Big Five domain of conscientiousness. The results of their analysis 
identified eight sub-components of conscientiousness. Four of their components were 
close replications of the four components identified by Saucier and Ostendorf (1999); 
however they also found a clear impulsivity factor, identified by the terms careless, un- 
cautious (and their contraries) as well as reckless, rash and impulsive (!). Other sub­
components included formalness, conventionality and punctuality.
Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark and Goldberg (2005) used a different strategy to identify 
the subcomponents of conscientiousness; they identified 36 extant scales which were 
conceptually related to conscientiousness and factor analysed the scale level (rather than 
item level) data from the administration of these scales to a large sample (N = 737). 
Industiiousness, order and responsibility emerged clearly, as in the two previous 
analyses; additionally they found a self control factor and a traditionalism factor which 
seemed to correspond to the impulsivity and conventionality factors of the Roberts et al
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(2004) analysis. However they did not identify a decisiveness factor as the two previous 
analyses did.
If we at least partly define the trait of impulsivity in terms of the company that it keeps 
(as when distancing impulsivity fiom sensation seeking) then the picture derived from the 
above analyses is not completely consistent. Roberts et al (2005) provide data which 
allow some exploration of the place of impulsivity within different models of 
conscientiousness. From their table 3 we can see that the six facets of the NEO 
conscientiousness domain divided into three groupings; four facets which loaded on the 
industiious factor (competence, achievement stiiving, self discipline and dutifulness), the 
NEO facet deliberation loaded on the impulsivity factor along with the MPQ self control 
scale while the NEO facet order on the order factor along with scales labelled orderliness 
and perfectionism.
Tellegen (1982) and Watson and Clark (1999) have proposed a three factor model 
consisting of positive emotionality (related to extraversion), negative emotionality 
(related to neuroticism) and constraint. This last factor consists of three sub-factors -  
control, harm-avoidance and traditionalism — and is unrelated to either positive or 
negative emotionality; i.e. it is affect neutral. Patrick, Curtin, and Tellegen (2002) found 
that an impulsivity scale correlated substantially with the MPQ control scale but much 
less so with the harm avoidance and traditionalism scales; thus the coherence of this 
constraint factor is open to doubt, and its overall relationship to impulsivity unclear.
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Church (1994) studied the correspondence between the MPQ and the NEO models of 
personality and found that each of the major aspects in one questionnaire was included in 
the other. However this correspondence masked some significant and theoretically 
important differences. The negative emotionality dimension of Tellegen conflates 
neuroticism and agreeableness, dimensions which according to both the FFM and 
Eysenck are independent. Tellegen's positive emotionality dimension subsumes not only 
the FFM domain of extraversion but also the achievement aspects of conscientiousness; 
this implies that Tellegen’s constraint factor contains only the ‘control’ aspects of the 
FFM trait of conscientiousness. The other two facets of constraint - harm avoidance (akin 
to low sensation seeking) and traditionalism -  traits which the results of Church (1994) 
suggest are more akin to the FFM trait of openness to experience. Thus the lack of 
correspondence between Tellegen’s model and the FFM, and their different situating of 
impulsivity, are as severe as that between the FFM and Eysenck’s PEN model.
These different models of personality propose important differences in the way in which 
tliey group lower order traits, in particular in the way they situate impulsivity.
For the FFM, impulsivity relates to industriousness and achievement striving for Eysenck 
it relates to agreeableness and aggression and for Tellegen it relates to harm avoidance 
and traditionalism.
There would seem to be a lack of clarity in the implications of the structure in these 
models; a lack of commitment to the implications of the structure, in particular to the 
relationships between variables implied by different structures. The point of a particular
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model of personality is the relationship between different aspects of behaviour which it 
models; the differences between different models is not simply in terms of the number of 
orthogonal traits it postulates but also in the way in which it clusters the lower level 
behaviours.
An interesting example is the difference between Eysenck’s PEN model and the Big Five 
of the NEO. Eysenck’s model of personality consists of extraversion, emotionality and 
psychoticism. At first impulsivity was conceptualised as a component part of extraversion 
along with sensation seeking and venturesomeness but later it was assigned to the 
psychoticism factor (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). This shift in the positioning of 
impulsivity is not a mere detail of factor rotation or facet covariance; it has important 
theoretical implications for the understanding of extraversion. Eysenck explains the 
covariance of sensation seeking and venturesomeness with the other facets of 
extraversion such as sociability and liveliness in terms of a common latent causal variable 
which he identifies as central nervous system, or cortical, arousal. The extraverts low 
basal arousal level leads him or her to seek out experiences which will raise that arousal 
level whereas the introvert with an already high level of arousal will avoid situations 
which raise that arousal above an uncomfortable level. It would seem that in this scheme 
sensation seeking is neither maladaptive nor benign, no more than is extraversion itself. 
Individual differences in impulsivity are explained in terms of the latent variable, latent 
inhibition, underlying psychoticism; the variable which explains the covariance between 
the psychoticism facets such as aggressiveness, tough/tender mindedness and
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egocentricity, Impulsivity is thus maladaptive and carries a risk for both anti-social and 
personality disorders.
Eysenck’s argument is that conscientiousness and agreeableness are facets of 
psychoticism because they are both a product of the same latent variable (perhaps latent 
inhibition) though there will be other latent/causal variables which will result in various 
levels of different facets within psychoticism. The reply from the Big Five theorists is 
however entirely based upon analyses of the co-variance of between rating scales which 
suggest that these two variables are orthogonal; they have no theoretical basis for their 
model and no explanation for either the covariance of behaviours which coalesce to 
produce the two traits nor the lack of relationship between them. Impulsivity then will be 
related to agreeableness in Eysenck’s model but not in the FFM; once again we 
understand a trait in terms of the company it keeps.
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) have carried out a programme of research to relate different 
aspects of impulsivity to the FFM as operationalised in the NEO-PI-R of Costa and 
McCrae (1992). This 240 item scale allows not only for the measurement of the Big Five 
factors of personality but also of six facets of each of those five traits, giving a total of 30 
variables; thus providing a hierarchical model of personality allowing for greater 
differentiation of individuals at different levels of the hierarchy. Within this model 
impulsivity relates to extraversion, conscientiousness and neuroticism; in their model of 
impulsivity Whiteside and Lynam (2001) identify two of the facets of conscientiousness 
(deliberation and self discipline), one of the facets of extraversion (excitement seeking)
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and one of the facets of neuroticism (impulsivity) as being most clearly related to 
impulsivity. Thus this model in effect also separates sensation seeking from impulsivity 
and places it in the higher order trait of extraversion in agreement with Eysenck while the 
more traditional aspects of impulsivity are placed under the umbrella of 
conscientiousness. Their identification of an element of impulsivity, which they tenu 
urgency, with a facet of neuroticism is puzzling in the light of the research above which 
considers impulsivity to be affect neutral; this will be discussed further in chapter 6  
where their model of impulsivity is considered in more detail.
It would seem that situating impulsivity within a structural model of personality involves 
some difficult and sophisticated conceptual issues; impulsivity may be situated within a 
model simply in terms of shared variance but it is the status of impulsivity within that 
model which is debatable. Within Eysenck’s PEN model impulsivity is theorised to be a 
manifestation of the more basic trait of Psychoticism; a function of the interaction 
between Psychoticism and environmental influences, especially socialisation; however 
within five factor models of personality the relationship between levels is unexplored and 
under-theorised. Thus impulsivity may be seen as a manifestation of a higher order and 
more basic variable such as conscientiousness or constraint; alternatively it may be seen 
as itself a more basic trait which, in combination with other basic traits, produces the 
surface, or emergent, trait of conscientiousness. These two alternatives coiTespond to the 
distinction between reflective and formative models made by Borsboom, Mellenbergh 
and Heeerden (2003). More radically one might even hypothesise impulsivity to be the 
core of conscientiousness; the latent causal variable which produces the covariation
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between the facets of conscientiousness. The parallel drawn here is with the discussion 
around the core of extraversion, which Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh and Shao (2000) 
identify as reward sensitivity and Ashton, Lee and Paunonen (2002) identify as social 
reinforcement. Despite their differences both sets of authors aim to identify the core of 
extraversion which explains the covariance between the facets, however proponents of 
the FFM provide little in the way of such explanation.
Given the fact that impulsivity is often found to correlate with neuroticism, extraversion 
and agreeableness there is the further possibility that impulsivity as defined by the BISl 1 
is not a facet of only one higher trait but rather a blend of several traits, the parallel here 
perhaps being with traits such as integrity or ‘customer service orientation’ (Schneider & 
Hough, 1995).
Borsboom et al. (2003) point to the neglected causal status of the latent variables within 
most models of personality; put another way one can point out that the psychometric 
approach to personality almost invariably considers personality traits as independent 
variables. There is little discussion or exploration of the antecedents or causes of the trait; 
there is little attempt to explain either the causes of individual differences or the reasons 
for the co-variance of the facets of the trait. An exception to this generalisation is the 
study of the behaviour genetics of personality; however once it is conceded that all 
behaviour is influenced by genetics there is little more to be said.
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A model for the understanding of conscientiousness may be found in the research which 
seeks to identify the underlying latent variable which explains the covariance between the 
facets of extraversion. Clark and Watson (1999) argued that positive affect was at the 
core of extraversion on the basis that tlie various facets of extraversion correlated more 
strongly witli an independent measure of positive affect then with each other. Lucas, 
Diener, Grob, Suh and Shai (2001) guided by the theorizing of Gray (1981) and of Depue 
and Collins (1999) provided evidence that it is reward sensitivity which is at the core of 
extraversion; though they used a measure of positive affect as a proxy measure of reward 
sensitivity. Such research however is limited by its reliance upon self report measures; 
the limits of such an approach as can be seen by the fact that Ashton, Lee and Paunonen 
(2 0 0 2 ) used a very similar approach to argue that the central feature of extraversion is in 
fact the desire for social attention, not reward sensitivity.
Nevertheless these researchers are beginning to go beyond a merely descriptive account 
of personality traits and it is argued in this chapter, and throughout this thesis, that the 
trait approach can, if informed by careful conceptual and theoretical analysis based upon 
research in related areas of psychology, provide insight and understanding. For example 
it will be argued that related work on ADHD in both children and adults can support the 
argument for a cognitive as well as a behavioural aspect to impulsivity, and can begin to 
connect these traits to a neuropsychological substrate.
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Impulsivity and adult psychopatliology
Impulsivity is an element in a wide variety of psychiatric diagnoses; in particular 
impulsivity is typically identified as a symptom of personality disorder particularly in 
connection with the emotional dysregulation which characterises the patterns of 
narcissistic, borderline and histrionic personality disorders. While many theoretical 
formulations of personality disorder attribute the impulsivity to an underlying pathology, 
emotional dysregulation or disturbed attachment models (Meyer & Pilkonis, 2004) others 
however ascribe a causal role to impulsivity in the development or maintenance of 
personality disorders (Depue & Lenzeweger, 2004). Bomalova, Lejuz, Dauhters, Zachary 
and Lynch (2005) review evidence which shows measures of impulsivity, particularly 
self report measures, to correlate with number and severity of borderline personality 
disorder symptoms and with severity of both drug and alcohol use. However 
interpretation of the role of impulsivity in these behaviours is difficult due to the cross- 
sectional nature of the majority of such research and to the fact that impulsivity 
behaviours are often part of the criteria of personality disorder syndromes.
Impulsivity is often associated with the complex of anti-social behaviours comprising the 
syndromes of conduct disorder, delinquency and anti-social personality disorder, and is 
fi equently attributed a causal role in the development of these syndromes. While in this 
area too the majority of studies are cross-sectional there are some longitudinal studies. 
Vitaro, Arseneault and Tremblay (1999) found a significant relationship between 
impulsivity assessed at 13 and problem gambling at 17 years of age; this relationship held
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after controlling for demographic variables as well as gambling behaviour at the earlier 
assessment. Lynam et al. (2000) similarly found that impulsivity assessed at 13 predicted 
delinquency at age 17; once again the relationship held up when SES and baseline (age 
13) delinquency were contiolled. Nevertheless the interpretation of such longitudinal data 
is again difficult; if impulsivity is an element of delinquency at age 13 then it will equally 
be so at age 17, and this would be equally tine of any manifestation of delinquency.
BCineger, Hicks, Patrick, Carlson, Jacono and McGue (2002) argued for a model in which 
a number of externalizing behaviours, conduct disorder, antisocial behaviour, alcohol and 
ding dependence as well as the trait of constraint derived from the MPQ are influenced 
by an underlying externalising latent variable. This model suggests that disinhibited 
personality style is as much a consequence of the latent trait as is antisocial behaviour; 
the comorbidity of tr aits such as constraint and impulsivity with disorders such as drug 
abuse is then attributable to a common latent trait. Krueger et al. (2 0 0 2 ) draw a parallel 
with the work of Mineka, Watson and Clark (1998) who explain the comorbidity of mood 
and anxiety disorder in terms of the temperamental trait of negative affect influencing 
both disorders; the difference between the two models, however, lies in the fact that the 
temperamental trait in Krueger et al (2002) model is at the same level of the hierarchy as 
the disorders.
The relationship between the trait of impulsivity and various maladaptive behaviours
such as binge drinking, driving violations and gambling suggests a trait which is
)
intimately connected with a general dysinhibited life style. These associations between
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impulsivity and maladaptive phenomena do not however allow any confident inferences 
as to cause and effect. It is as plausible to argue that the development of a maladaptive 
life style leads people to act in ways which do not involve a careful consideration of the 
consequences of their actions or even to a lack of concern as to those consequences; 
especially where a delinquent lifestyle leads to an alienation from, or even antipathy 
towards, the values of school and work.
To some extent this issue of interpretation is compounded by an element of ambiguity in 
many of the terms associated with the construct of impulsivity especially when studied as 
an element within delinquency and conduct disorder; an ambiguity seen most clearly in 
the adjectives careful/careless/carefree. Roberts et al. (2004) identify tenns such as 
careless and cautious, as well as their antonyms, as core aspects of impulsivity. A 
sensitive reading of these terms might distinguish between a sense of carelessness which 
is typical of dyslexia or attention disorder and a second sense which is associated with 
conduct disorder or delinquency; the latter captured by the English idiom - ‘He couldn’t 
care less’.
The difficulty in distinguishing between explanation and mere description is seen in the 
work of Lynam and associates in their research examining the relationship between 
personality traits and antisocial behaviour Miller, Lynam and Leukefeld (2003) identify 
the NEO-PI-R facets of low straightforwardness, low compliance and low deliberation as 
the strongest and most consistent predictors of antisocial behaviours. While the 
agreeableness facets of straightforwardness and compliance are almost part of the
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definition of antisocial behaviour, the conscientiousness facet of deliberation - which 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) identify as impulsivity - exists in a limbo between 
description and causation. The important point is not that impulsivity does not play a part 
in either the causation or maintenance of antisocial behaviour but that this type of 
evidence does not support such a claim.
Nevertheless considerable headway can be made in the explanation of impulsivity 
through the study of traits and their inter-relationships; as argued in Chapter 1 it is 
possible to differentiate between a relatively benign aspect of sensation seeking which 
would seem to be part of extraversion and distinct from impulsivity, perhaps related to 
the latent variable of reward sensitivity. Research reported in later chapters aims to 
clarify the relationship of impulsivity to the Big Five personality traits and establish its 
distinctive qualities Chapter 6  examines the relationship between the trait of impulsivity 
and the tiaits of inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity derived from the study of 
ADHD to explore the importance of the construct of inattention in relation to impulsivity.
Antecedents: genetic and neurological factors
One area of research where the trait of impulsivity has been treated as an dependent 
variable is research in behaviour genetics and the effects of neurological development. 
Estimates of genetic influences upon impulsivity typically produce heritability estimates 
of .5 to . 6  (Eysenck 1991); approximately half of the variance in impulsivity seems to be 
the result of genetic factors -  as indeed is the case with almost all personality traits. This
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however tells us little about the nature of impulsivity or about the more proximal causes 
which bring about individual differences in impulsivity. One positive and fruitful 
contribution of behaviour genetic studies of traits is the light which they shed onto 
environmental effects ,upon traits, Eysenck reports that the effect of shared environmental 
factors is approximately half of the effect of specific or unique environmental factors; a 
finding which is common to most behaviour genetic studies of human traits.
Though the behaviour genetic data tell us that environmental factors are as important as 
genetic factors this does not tell us which aspects of the environment are causal. The 
understanding of the profound effects of heredity means that a correlation between 
parental and child characteristics does not imply the influence of the former upon the 
latter; similarly the eiratic discipline or disorganised family background of the impulsive 
child may simply be a manifestation of the same tendencies in the parent rather than a 
causal factor. The relative lack of variance accounted for by common environmental 
factors suggests that the search for family wide factors such as socio-economic status and 
parental characteristics which are common to all children within the family is likely to 
prove fruitless. As Eysenck acknowledges the search for environmental factors unique to 
a particular child within a family presents considerable methodological challenges; one 
area of research is that which focuses upon neuropsychological factors and this will be 
discussed below.
Given the discussion above on the plausibility of taking the ADHD construct as a 
dimension which affects adult as well as child psychology and the relevance of that
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dimension to the understanding of impulsivity, a consideration of the research on the 
aetiology of ADHD may be instructive. Barkley (2006) has reviewed data to suggest that 
the heritability of the ADHD syndrome is of a greater magnitude Üian that for most 
personality traits. His review of large scale twin studies suggests that “...the majority of 
the variance (70-95%) in the tiaits of ADHD is a result of genetic factors (averaging 
approximately 80%+) and that such a genetic contribution may increase as the scores 
along this trait become more extreme, although this latter point is debatable.” (Barkley 
2006. p.227). This latter possibility may account for the high heritability estimates 
compared to other tiaits. Other types of evidence also attest to such a high heritability; 
Biederman et al. (1995) report that the risk of developing ADHD in an offspring of an 
ADHD parent is 57%.to an offspring.
Such studies concur with Eysenck’s conclusion that the shared environmental risk is 
negligible; such environmental influence as there is operates individually for each child. 
One set of environmental factors which are unique to individuals within the family are 
neuro-psychological trauma or str uctural or bio-chemical deficits and on these there has 
been considerable research.
Studies of neurological function have been largely carried out in the areas of 
psychopathology and psychiatry and have studied impulsivity within the context of either 
ADHD or conduct disorder and criminality. Research in the area of delinquency is 
however more difficult to relate clearly to the construct of impulsivity and disinhibition. 
Wliile impulsivity is a definitive part of the syndrome of ADHD, its role in conduct
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disorder and anti-social personality disorder is as both description and explanation of the 
maladaptive behaviour. Most research in this latter area aims to establish the correlations 
between relatively distal areas such as neuropsychological constructs and pathological 
syndromes such as impulsive aggression and drug abuse, where the role of impulsivity is 
unclear and the correlations observed may be due to other aspects of the 
psychopathology, consequently this discussion will tend to focus on either ADHD or 
upon impulsive behaviours in non-clinical subjects.
Research into both ADHD and conduct disorders has assumed a similar explanatory 
framework involving a number of common elements; the most distal and most proximal 
of these being genetic influences and the construct of disinhibition respectively. 
Immediately proximal to the construct of inhibition lie the cognitive processes commonly 
referred to as executive functions.
The general model is one in which weaknesses in executive function lead to disinhibited 
behaviour which then results in maladaptive behaviour. The executive functions are 
usually identified with the functioning of the pre-frontal cortex; an identification which is 
supported by brain imaging data suggesting a lower or less efficient level of functioning 
in these areas. Malfunction in these areas is attributable to actual damage ‘trauma’ or to 
neurochemical abnoimalities which compromise their efficient functioning.
As part of this picture research has explored the influence of perinatal and prenatal 
factors on maladaptive, externalising behaviour. Wliile the link between maternal 
perinatal factors and ADHD is a clear indicator of a link between such factors and
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impulsivity or disinhibition, the data from studies of conduct disorder and criminality rely 
upon the assumption that impulsivity is the key mediating process between disrupted 
neurological function and criminality.
The pathogenic factor most commonly identified is that of maternal cigarette smoking 
during pregnancy which has been associated with an increased risk of ADHD, conduct 
disorder and substance abuse; though there seems to be no effect upon the incidence of 
internalising disorders such as anxiety and depression (Barkley 2006, Brennan et al 
2006). The effect of maternal smoking is evident even after various factors such as 
maternal behaviour and mental health as well as other perinatal factors are statistically 
controlled. While other pathogenic factors have been identified the specificity of their 
effects is unclear; for example, Taige et al (2007) review evidence indicating that 
antenatal maternal psychological stress has an influence on a variety of infant behaviours 
including both internalising (negative affect) and externalising (ADHD and conduct 
disorders) problem behaviours. These effects remain after controlling for a variety of co- 
varying factors including smoking behaviour. The problem in interpreting such results 
lies, at least in part, in identifying and understanding the mechanisms linking behaviour 
to ante-natal experiences.
One neuropsychological variable which continues to attract attention is that of 
physiological, and especially cortical, arousal; while research on anti-social behaviour 
has focussed on autonomic arousal that on impulsivity and ADHD has focussed on 
cortical arousal. Although this research is reminiscent of Eysenck’s suggestion that
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extraversion and impulsivity are related to lowered cortical arousal the hypothesised 
causal relationships are here different. Eysenck would argue that these lower arousal 
levels cause people to seek out stimulation to increase their arousal level; conversely 
those already high in arousal will seek to reduce stimulation. Impulsivity then is the 
behaviour which ensues when people seek out high levels of stimulation. In support of 
this theoretical formulation, Barratt (1993) reported research in which high impulsive 
subjects were less aroused on EEG measures than low impulsive subjects. Similarly 
Mathias and Stanford (2003) provided evidence for lower levels of autonomic arousal in 
high impulsive subjects both at rest and during a cognitively demanding task. Research 
on ADHD, too, reports lower arousal levels in cases of ADHD whether in children or 
adults; thus Barry, Clarke and Jolmstone (2003) reviewed EEG studies showing patterns 
of electrical activity, higher rates of low frequency (beta) activity or an elevated ration of 
theta to beta wave activity. However these results have been interpreted as indicating an 
arousal or alerting problem in ADHD which results in poor attention and lack of ' 
inihibition of behaviour. Nigg (2006) suggests that the inattentiveness of ADHD sufferers 
reflects a state of low alertness which may reflect “a state of low cortical arousal which 
makes it difficult for the child to control or mobilise their resources.” (Nigg, 2000 p.
100). Thus Nigg argues that low cortical arousal leads to inattention and impulsivity 
through interference with efficient cognitive and executive processes, unlike Eysenck and 
Zuckerman who argue for an energising function of low arousal - a drive to increase 
stimulation.
47
Two other approaches to exploring the neuropsychological underpinnings of individual 
differences in impulsivity are the study of neurotransmitters and of neurological 
mechanisms. Carver (2006) has recently reviewed a body of evidence suggesting a link 
between levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin and impulsivity. A variety of studies 
which either manipulated levels of serotonin or observed the relationships between 
serotonin levels and impulsivity in both normal and clinical samples, found that low 
levels of serotonin were related to impulsiveness, emotional volatility and aggression. For 
example Dolan, Anderson and Deakin (2001) in a study of male offenders found low 
serotonin levels to be related to impulsivity as measured by the Eysenck I7 scale; a scale 
which embodies a construct of nanow impulsivity similar to that proposed in chapter one. 
Carver (2006) argues that serotonin levels are not related to anxiety and so relate to the 
type of behavioural constraint captured by Rothbart et al (2000) in their construct of 
‘effortful control’ as well as Depue and Collins (1999) construct of ‘affect free’ 
inhibition.
Evidence relating brain damage to behaviour indicates that the frontal lobes are 
implicated in the control and inliibition of behaviour. Suchy, Leahy, Sweet and Lam 
(2003) found a battery of tests of executive function to contribute significantly to 
differentiating between patients with damage to the frontal lobes and patients with 
damage elsewhere in the brain. This battery included the Trail Making Test, the Stroop 
Test and the CO WAT; all three of which have been found to coiTelate with impulsivity 
and to discriminate significantly between cases of ADHD and normal contiols. Other 
clinical evidence is however less clear since such injuries to tlie fiontal lobes result in
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anxiety and aggression as well as disinhibition (Zuckerman (1991). Similarly, studies 
which show brain injuries to be much more frequent in criminal offenders and especially 
in violent ones do not allow for specific linkages between brain function and impulsivity. 
Blair (2002) found that damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex led not only of 
impulsivity but also to lowered reactivity to disturbing stimuli and reduced 
responsiveness to punishment.
Nevertheless the role of the frontal cortex in executive functioning and the link between 
disinhibition and executive functioning support the hypothesised site of inhibition as the 
frontal cortex. Studies of functional neuroimaging in ADHD are particularly valuable in 
relevance to impulsivity. Durston and Konrad (2007) review studies which show 
decreased activation in preffontal and striatial areas of the cortex during cognitive control 
tasks such as go/no-go tasks and the Stroop interference task; both of these tasks are 
taken to reflect individual differences in inhibition/impulsivity.
In teims of the causal modelling framework discussed by Morton and Frith (1995) the 
causal path from the genetic and neurological factors to the behavioural phenotype, 
impulsivity or inattention, requires an intermediary level of analysis and exploration. The 
following chapter will consider some laboratory performance measures which in the 
study of ADHD have been hypothesised to provide this intermediate level of causal 
explanation.
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Chapter 3
Explaining impulsivity; laboratory studies of inhibition and attention.
Following Eysenck (1997) this chapter argues that the understanding and explanation of 
impulsivity requires the kind of research and theory which typifies the experimental 
approach to both guide the conelational approach and to establish its validity. Research 
and theory on ADHD provides a model for such an approach. While the syndrome and its 
sub-division into the inattention, hyperactivity/impulsive subtypes has been established 
through studies of behaviours and their covariation this occurs in the context of research 
and theorising involving genetic, neurological, cognitive arid tieatment studies. Thus, 
while the sub-types of attention and hyperactivity/impulsivity guide much of the research, 
the relationship between the subtypes is explored through studies of cognitive function. 
The behavioural phenotype of ADHD is studied both as a dependant variable, in 
researching the causes of ADHD, and as an independent variable, in studying the effects 
of ADHD upon school performance, driving behaviour and workplace difficulties.
As the first section of chapter 1 indicates, definitions of impulsivity tend to emphasis the 
inhibition of an inappropriate behaviour; consequently studies of the trait of impulsivity 
have largely utilised measures of response inhibition. Logan, Schachar and Tannock 
(1997), noting the part it plays in personality theory and in both child and adult 
psychopathology, offer a conceptualisation of impulsivity which, they suggest, spans 
these various domains; they operationalised impulsivity “in terms of the ability to inhibit
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prepotent courses of action: people who are impulsive have trouble inhibiting action, 
whereas people who are not impulsive find it easier to do so.” (p. 60). The majority of 
recent laboratory studies of impulsivity have followed Logan et al. (1997) in the use of 
tasks which involve behavioural inhibition particularly the Stop Task and the Continuous 
Performance Test discussed below.
Research exploring the link between problems of behaviour inhibition and problems of 
attention has tended to occur most obviously in theoiy and research into ADHD and child 
psychopathology; there is however research within the study of trait impulsivity which 
has drawn attention to the importance of attentional processes in impulsivity. The chapter 
begins with an overview of two research programmes (Dickman, 1993 and Barrett, 1993) 
the results of which suggest a two facet model of impulsivity.
In the early stages of his research into impulsivity (summarised in Barratt, 1993) Barratt 
explored the relationship between self-reported impulsivity and a number of laboratory 
tasks relating to a variety of cognitive processes. Impulsivity scale scores were 
significantly related to intra-individual variability of performance on perceptual-motor 
tasks and to intra-individual variability of autonomic nervous system measures; this 
phenomenon of inter-subject variability will occur later in this chapter! Impulsiveness 
was also related to inaccuracy of fine perceptual motor performance on such tasks as 
paced tapping and the Porteus Maze. Results also suggested that high impulsive subjects 
were less aroused on EEG measures and that in an eye blink conditioned paradigm they 
conditioned better to positive than to negative stimuli. Barratt (1981) found impulsive
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people to underestimate time intervals and to be characterised by visual-evoked potential 
(VEP) augmentation; these two variables being significantly correlated. Barratt et al 
(1987) confirmed the relationship between impulsivity and the augmenting/reducing of 
VEPs; note that in Zuckerman’s research this is found to be a characteristic of people 
high in impulsive sensation seeking. The relevance of cortical arousal to impulsivity and 
attention will also be discussed later in this chapter.
Dickman (1993, 2000) reviewed evidence on the relationship between self-reported 
impulsivity and a variety of cognitive tasks and suggested that deficits in attention 
regulation, particularly in the efficient maintenance of sustained attention, underlie and 
explain individual differences in impulsive behaviour. Dickman (1993) reviewed the 
evidence relating self reported impulsivity to a variety of cognitive tasks, including 
simple and complex reaction time tasks, short term and long teim memory tasks and IQ 
tasks and concluded that the majority of such tasks did not differ between those high and 
low in impulsivity. The tasks that did differentiate between these groups were tasks that 
were sensitive to even momentary lapses of attention. According to the attentional fixity 
theory as outlined by Dickman (2000) impulsivity is related to the tendency for attention 
to remain fixed on the current source of input; in impulsive individuals attention is easily 
shifted fiom its cuiTent fixation while the attention of those low in impulsivity is difficult 
to shift. Dickman does not use the term distractibility though it seems central to his 
theoiy.
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There are two interesting points to be drawn from Dickman’s review. The first is that it 
draws attention to the relationship between behavioural impulsivity and attentional failure 
suggesting a close relationship between the two and perhaps a common latent variable. It 
is noteworthy that Dickman’s scale of dysfunctional impulsivity contains no items 
relating to attention. This lack of overlap precludes the effects of response sets or 
common method variance and is particularly convincing evidence of the psychological 
affinity between behavioural and attentional inhibition. The second point is that failure to 
sustain attention may account for the phenomenon of intra-individual variability in 
performance reported by a number of researchers, including Barratt (1993) as discussed 
below; an hypothesis which is supported by Douglas (2005) in the study of ADHD.
Evidence thus far suggests two approaches to the clarification and explanation of 
impulsivity; the first focuses upon the construct of behavioural inhibition while the 
second emphasises sustained attention and distractibility. Both of these processes have 
been discussed in terms of the hypothetical construct of inhibition. Within the study of 
ADHD Barkley (1997) hypothesised that a construct of inhibition explained problems 
with attention and distractibility as will as impulsivity and hyperactivity. Nigg (2000) in 
reviewing the major tasks utilised in the study of ADHD acknowledges that there is 
considerable evidence for the role of executive inhibition as an important element in 
ADHD but at the same time points out the under-specification of the concept of 
inhibition, a problem like that which besets discussions of impulsivity but which is more 
acute given the desire to more precisely specify and delineate the former construct within 
the domains of both developmental and experimental psychology.
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Nigg (2006) divides the executive control domain into two related but distinguishable 
areas; the first refers to the ability to identify and resolve interfering information while 
the second refers of a function of suppressing, interrupting or cancelling a prepared motor 
response. Similarly, in discussing the fundamental deficit which underlies ADHD, 
Kenemans, Bekker, Lijffijt, Overoom, Jonkman and Verbaten (2005) refer to basic 
deficits in two putative cognitive functions, attention and inhibition. Here attention refers 
to the ability to focus and maintain that focus, on a limited part of available information 
as far as the control of actions is concerned. The control of actions refers to the ability to 
suppress in-going reactions or pre-potent reactions. As they point out, the relative 
contributions of attention control and response inhibition to a particular task are often 
difficult to disentangle or identify. For example while Robertson et al. (1994) describe 
die Stroop task as one of selective attention, Freedman and Miyake (2003) treat it as 
involving response suppression.
A further question refers to the relationships between these two cognitive functions; the 
first possibility is that they are manifestations of different processes, the second is that 
they may be the same processes manifested in different tasks, and the third is that there is 
a single inhibition function which in interaction with other processes leads to different 
executive functions. The last suggestion seems to underlie Barkley’s suggestion that there 
is a single inhibition process which affects a variety of tasks and executive functions.
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Buss & Plomin (1975) suggest that inhibitory control is the core of impulsivity, though 
other characteristics such as inattention, distractibility, persistence and boredom are often 
included in the concept. Similarly, in developing a theoretical model of ADHD, Barkley 
(1997) identifies deficits in inhibition as the primary dysfunction which then affects the 
efficacy of a variety of executive functions including attentional control, distractibility, 
working memory and emotional regulation.
Friedman and Miyake (2003) used a latent modelling strategy to distinguish empirically 
between three conceptually defined inhibitory functions, two of which related to the 
cognitive functions described above. Referring to the taxonomy of inhibition related 
functions proposed by Nigg (2000) they tested a model in which nine tasks were 
classified as assessing either prepotent response inhibition, resistance to distractor 
interference and resistance of proactive inhibition. The first hypothesised function of 
prepotent response inhibition was assessed by a Stroop task, a Stop-signal task and an 
antisaccade task; it is worth noting that they classified the Stroop task as requiring 
response inhibition rather than resistance to interference. The second hypothesised 
function, of resistance to distractor interference was assessed by the Eriksen flanker task, 
a word naming task and a shape matching task; all of which tasks involved matching 
stimul in the presence of a distractor. The final function was resistance to, inhibition of, 
proactive interference assessed through learning a series of tasks in which subjects had to 
resist the interference from earlier tasks. While the model distinguishing between these 
three hypothesised functions fit the data adequately there was a high degr ee of correlation 
between the latent variables of response inhibition and resistance to distractor
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interference (r = .68) though the correlation between both of these and the third function 
was close to zero and non-significant.
The distinction which Freeman and Miyake (2003) make between response inhibition and 
resistance to interference relates to the model of ADHD discussed in Chapter 1 which 
distinguishes between a cluster of symptoms related to problems of impulsivity and 
hyperactivity and a second relating to problems of attention. However whereas their 
response inhibition function seems conceptually to be closely related to the impulsivity 
component of ADHD the coiTespondence between their resistance to distractor 
interference and the inattention component of ADHD is less clear. As will be discussed 
below, identifying the aspect of attention which is affected in ADHD has proved difficult
Impulsivity and ADHD
Deficiencies in impulse control are conceptualised as central deficits in ADHD, with 
problems of attention and activity regulation viewed as secondary manifestations.
Barkley (1997) identifies deficits in inhibition as a primary dysfunction which then 
affects the efficacy of a variety of executive functions including attentional control, 
distractibility, working memory and emotional regulation. Similarly, at least 
superficially, Quay (1997) argues for an under active behavioural inhibition system (BIS 
Gray, 1982) as the neuropsychological basis for ADHD. Thus in most models of ADHD 
the two clusters of symptoms are related both statistically and theoretically.
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The theoretical perspective which sees disinhibition as the core of ADHD is similar to the 
conceptualisation developed in this thesis, of ‘narrow’ impulsivity as the failure of 
inhibition of both cognitive and behavioural processes, a faculty which is perhaps at the 
core of conscientiousness. A point of particular interest is the suggestion that the deficit 
in ADHD is more a matter of weak inhibition of impulses, rather than the strength of pre­
potent impulses. This is related to the finding that responses are generally slow rather 
than fast in the ADHD group, a puzzling finding which may implicate attentional and/or 
activational processes. A further point of contact is the conceptualisation of disinhibition 
within this model as being unrelated to emotional/motivational processes; this resonating 
with my own conceptualisation of narrow impulsivity as independent of negative affects 
or neuroticism. Experimental studies suggest a commonality of ADHD and impulsivity; 
the laboratory tasks which are utilised to tap into the cognitive basis of impulsivity 
(continuous performance task, go/no-go tasks and matching familiar figures) are also 
tasks which significantly differentiate ADHD cases from non-cases.
Experimental studies of impulsivity
The use of behavioural tests of impulsivity has seiwed mainly thr ee functions or 
strategies. The first is to use test performance as a laboratory analogue of impulsive 
behaviour; this occurs in animal studies where behaviour in an experimental procedure is 
defined as impulsivity and the effect of experimental manipulations upon that behaviour 
is observed. In studies of human subjects perhaps the most obvious analogue procedure is 
a delayed gratification task-
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The second is to use tests to attempt to identify the elements of impulsivity; this is more 
typical of studies employing humans where subjects who are assessed as more or less 
impulsive complete tests of basic attentional or executive ftinctions. The aim here is often 
to explain impulsivity in terms other tlian behavioural descriptions of impulsive 
behaviour; this approach satisfies the demand from Caprara and Cervone (2000) that 
behaviour be explained in terms of phenomena other than the behaviour itself. For this 
purpose studies of analogue laboratory behaviours are less useful; to relate self reports of 
impulsivity to the inability to delay gratification to is not to explain impulsivity but 
simply to describe a particular manifestation of impulsivity and to validate the self report 
questionnaire. Furthermore it is far from obvious what processes are involved in the 
behaviour being studied: one may distinguish between cognitive processes such as 
inattention and motivational variables such as delay aversion (Solanto et al. 2001). On the 
other hand laboratory tasks can serve to identify tire cognitive processes which result in 
impulsive behaviour, e.g. tlie attentional blink. Thus a number of studies using 
continuous performance tests (CPTs) suggest a deficiency in inhibitory processes as an 
explanation for impulsive behaviour. A sophisticated version of this strategy is provided 
by studies which use a number of tasks to differentiate between possible cognitive 
processes underlying impulsive behaviour.
An extension of this strategy is where tests of cognitive processes which are believed to 
underpin impulsivity are used to understand problem behaviours which involve impulsive 
behaviour. This strategy has been used in the exploration of ADHD, conduct disorder and
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personality disorder. This strategy is discussed below in the sections on child and adult 
psychopathology. The third purpose of laboratory tasks is to aid the diagnosis of 
syndromes of psychopathology; tliis has occurred particularly in the study of ADHD and 
will be discussed below.
Explorations of impulsivity have used a wide variety of laboratory tasks, eg. Stroop Test, 
time estimation, reaction time, circle tracing, Matching Familiar Figures Test and Delay 
of Gratification tasks. Though such tasks are more precise and objective than self report 
measures, their underlying mechanisms are not always either clear or simple. As Nigg 
(2000) argues, it is not clear that that all these tests tap into the same mechanisms and few 
studies have included more than one such test. The small number of studies which have 
done so find few significant or sizeable correlations between the different tests. The 
remainder of this chapter discusses tests which can be argued to be measures of either 
response inhibition or attention control. In the majority of cases only one behavioural task 
is considered.
Inhibition of behaviour
This concept of impulsivity as a lack, or failure, of inhibitory control occurs in most self 
report measures whether these are single trait measures of Impulsivity, such as the Barratt 
impulsivity scale (BIS 11 Patton et al. 1995) or as lower order traits in omnibus 
personality questionnaires such as the Personality Research Foim (Jackson 1984).
59
This sense of impulsivity as lack of inhibition also informs many laboratory measures of 
Impulsivity; such tasks define impulsivity as a tendency to make rapid and premature 
decisions such that fast reaction times coupled with high error rates are defined as 
impulsive behaviour. Three tasks in particular are discussed as clear manifestations of 
behavioural inhibition; the Stop Signal Paradigm (Logan et al. 1984), the Continuous 
performance task (Connors 1995) and the Stroop Colour-Word Interference Test (Stroop 
1935) are argued to involve the ability to inhibit a prepotent motor response. These and 
other tasks emphasise the core function of disinhibition in defining Impulsivity.
The relationships between different measures of impulsivity has involved usually two of 
three putative measures; laboratory tasks which could be argued to involve response 
inhibition, self report measures of impulsivity and behaviours (either normal or 
pathological) which are believed to be manifestations of impulsivity. No one of these 
should be prioritised as the true measure of impulsivity and it is the agreement between 
two or more measures which supports the required inferences. The discussion below will 
consider first studies relating laboratory tasks to self report measures of impulsivity and 
secondly studies relating such tasks to pathological behaviours, in particular ADHD and 
conduct disorders.
The Stop Task would seem to be the paradigmatic inhibition task, and indeed Logan et 
al, (1997) argue it to be so -  “We treat the stop-signal paradigm as a model of inhibitory 
contiol”. The task consists of a discrimination task where a subject is required to a make 
a two-choice response to presented stimuli; a number of the stimuli are followed after a
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variable time by a stop signal. The stop signal reaction time is the delay between go apd 
stop signal which will allow the subject to consistently inhibit the response. The subject 
is entirely aware of the relevant stimuli, of the appropriate responses and is duly 
motivated to inhibit the response. The occurrence of the response can only be due to a 
failure of inhibition; other processes or explanations would seem unlikely. Logan, 
Schachar and Tannock (1997) found stop-signal reaction time to correlate .32 with 
impulsivity (as assessed by an earlier Eysenck scale) in undergraduates. Dolan and 
Fullam (2004) found significant correlations between BIS-11 scores and performance on 
a Stop task, but not a Go/No go task.
The Continuous Performance Test (CPT) occurs in a variety of foims and entails 
responding to some signals and not others; failure to respond when one should is an error 
of omission and is usually interpreted as a measure of attention, while responding when 
one should not do so is an error of commission and is interpreted as a measure of 
inhibition. Marsh et al. (2001) included a modified Stop task and their own CPT and two 
self report measures of impulsivity. The CPT task correlated .31 and .30 with Eysenck’s 
f  and the BIS-11 respectively, though the Stop task correlated significantly (.25) only 
with the I^ . Swann et al. (2002) also found significant correlations between the CPT and 
the BIS-11. Moeller et al. (2004) in a study involving drug abusers as well as control 
subjects found a correlation of 0.4 between overall BIS score and their own variant of a 
CPT. Dougherty et al. (2000) obtained a correlation of .42 between BIS-11 scores and 
CPT scores.
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The Stroop task could be described in terms of either inhibition or distraction, though 
distinguishing between these possibilities is not easy. The Test of Everyday Attention 
manual identifies the Stroop as a test of visual selective attention, yet experimental 
manipulations which present the colour information before the word do not eliminate the 
interference effect. MacLoed and MacDonald (2000) suggest that all models of Stroop 
performance “...require; (1) maintenance of goal oriented processing and (2) blocking of 
more readily available word-reading responses.” (p. 390); however, as Kane and Eagley 
(2003) in the traditional form of presentation where the different forms of the stimuli are 
presented in block (i.e. a sheet of paper containing only coloured figures or only 
conflicting word/colour combinations) would seem to facilitate the goal maintenance 
process and make it a task of response inhibition..
.A variety of other tasks have also been related to impulsivity. Barratt and his colleagues 
have focussed on two tasks; a delay of gratification task and their own form of a 
continuous performance task (CPT). Cherek et al. (1997) found a correlation of .42 
between BIS-11 scores and the number of immediate reward choices in a delayed 
gratification task in a sample of male parolees. Spinella (2004) utilised an anti-saccade 
task and a simplified go/no-go task and found significant correlations with the BIS total 
score. Li et al. ( 2004) utilise a measure of ‘attentional blink’ and found a clear difference 
between high and low impulsive subjects as assessed by a Japanese translation of the 
BIS.
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The above tasks have also been examined in ADHD research. A review by Woods et al. 
(2002) identified a number of tasks and processes which successfully differentiated 
between adult ADHD groups and matched controls. The most consistently successful 
were continuous performance tests, Stroop tests and controlled word association tasks 
(CO WAT), all of which may be conceptualised as tasks involving inhibition of behaviour 
or response suppression. In a more recent meta-analysis of tasks differentiating ADHD 
adults and controls Hervey, Epstentin and Curry (2004) found effect sizes of .85 in stop 
signal reaction times, .51 in errors of commission on the Conners’ CPT and an effect size 
of .47 in performance on the colour word conflict condition of the Stroop though the 
effect size for an interference measure was only .15.
A problem in interpreting such data is that ADHD control subjects differ not only in the 
impulsivity aspect of ADHD but also in the inattention aspect. Attempts to differentiate 
subtypes of ADHD are not consistently successful; a recent large scale study by Murphy 
et al. (2001) ( n = 105) reported differences between patient and control groups but no 
significant differences between inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity subtypes on a 
number of tests including CO WAT, Stroop and CPT.
The heuristic value of such theorising is the links which it affords with the domains of 
cognitive neuro-psychology, in which disinhibition is a key element in frontal lobe 
symptoms and the hypothesised executive functions, and with the domain of 
developmental psychology, wherein theories of ADHD often appeal to a concept of 
disinhibition.
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The delineation of impulsivity described above -  whereby an impulsive act is one which 
was carried out prematurely or inappropriately - is virtually synonymous with a failure of 
inhibition, where inhibition is described in teims of not canydng out a particular 
behaviour. In this sense, at least, the construct of inhibition explains little about 
impulsivity. The value of the construct of inhibition, as used in the study of ADHD and 
cognitive processes lies in the following considerations. The first is the distinction it 
makes between failures of inhibition which are related to cognitive processes and 
inhibition which is related to negative affect; in the former case the failure of inhibition is 
maladaptive, in the second case the occunence of inhibition is the problem. The second is 
in clarifying the distinction between impulsivity and often related traits, such as 
venturesomeness, carefireeness and sensation seeking; venturesomeness is not a failure to 
inhibit a behaviour which the person will later regret. Similarly, in explaining the 
‘impulse disorders’ of DSM-IV one is led to distinguish between those which are 
characterised by strong emotions (self harming), those which involve considerable 
planning (fire setting) and those which are more clearly a failure of inhibition 
(Trichotillomania).
A focus upon the constmct of inliibition allows a further important distinction to be made 
-  that between dis/inhibition due to a failure of inhibitory mechanisms and between 
dis/inhibition due to the press of urgency of the inappropriate impulse, where the 
inhibitory mechanisms are adequate for most purposes but are overwhelmed by affective 
arousal.
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The heuristic value of such theorising is the links which it affords with the domains of 
cognitive neuro-psychology, in which disinhibition is a key element in frontal lobe 
symptoms and the hypothesised executive functions, and with the domain of 
developmental psychology, wherein theories of ADHD often appeal to a concept of 
disinhibition. Further delineation and differentiation of constructs of inhibition require a 
close consideration of behaviour, symptoms, situations and experimental procedures. A 
further sense of inhibition derives from studies of attention control or interference 
control.
Attention and impulsivity
The second approach identifies the role of sustained attention and distractibility in 
explaining impulsivity. These findings are particularly interesting since the task 
behaviours tend not to be cited as instances of impulsivity and hence cannot be seen as 
merely restatements of impulsive behaviour. Data on intra-individual variability jn  
cognitive tasks was provided by Barratt’s early research and has since been substantiated; 
this variability can plausibly be attributed to variations in sustained attention. Dickman’s 
review of the relationship between impulsivity and information processing concludes that 
it is failure to sustain close attention to a task which characterises impulsive subjects. 
Dickman also points out that while impulsive people are often thought of as acting 
quickly they usually respond more slowly in experimental tasks; this may be attributed to 
a general slowing - perhaps due to low arousal - or because they more often experience
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lapses of attention. Though impulsive subjects may appear to respond quickly in certain 
situations it may be that they simply respond prematurely. While it is conceivable that 
attention may simply weaken during the course of a task it is also plausible that attention 
may be distracted from the target task by either internal or external distracters.
Dickman’s characterisation of attentional fixity seems a too mechanical one; whether 
attention is fixed or shifted depends upon environmental stimulation and the differential 
sensitivity of the fixity mechanism in different individuals. Impulsivity is thus a bi-polar 
construct with positive and negative values and an implied neutral midpoint (akin to 
extraversion; extremes on either pole would then be maladaptive. In this it is similar to 
Block’s construct of ego control which can be either too strong or too weak. In contrast 
the conceptualisation of impulsivity as a failure in executive control, or effortful contiol 
to use Rothbart’s term, implies the ability to regulate attention and behaviour in the 
service of goals; a less mechanical conceptualisation of the construct as one of higher 
level — executive -  control. Dickman’s review includes few studies which include 
measures of executive function.
In the theories of Rothbait or Barkley tlie dimension of impulsivity goes from low to 
high, in one direction only (a uni-polar dimension more like neuroticism or emotional 
stability); the more one is able to control impulses the better. Note that this is more akin 
to Block’s notion of ego flexibility, the ability to control behaviour when required. 
Excessive inhibition is not the converse of dis-inhibition - not the inhibitory mechanism 
set at a higher level. It is a consequence of negative affect and neuroticism - fear and
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anxiety. My construct of narrow impulsivity is akin to Rothbart’s view of effortful 
control as independent of affect, an argument supported by Depue & Collins (1999)
A number of other tasks which may be classified as involving attention rather than 
response inhibition differentiate between ADHD adults and controls. As pointed out 
above, omission scores on the continuous performance test are interpreted as failures of 
attention. Hervey et al. (2004) in their meta-analysis of comparisons between ADHD and 
control adults reported a weighted mean effect size of .51 using the Conners CPT and .76 
using more traditional CPTs. In their meta-analysis Hervey et al. (2004) reported that the 
largest differences in Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test performance were in the 
arithmetic and digit-symbol subtests, subtests which are often grouped within a freedom- 
ffom- distractibility factor. They also found an effect size of .83 for performance on the 
Paced Auditory Serial-Addition Tasks which they classify as involving sustained 
attention.
Recently a great deal of attention has been given in the field of ADHD to intra-personal 
variability of response. Hervey et al. (2004) report an effect size of .53 for differences 
between adult ADHD and control groups in reaction time variability in the Conners’
CPT. Klein, Wendling, Huettner, Ruder and Peper (2006) reviewed studies comparing 
inti'-subject reaction time variability in ADHD and control children and found significant 
differences in 16 out of 19 studies using a CPT task. They also noted a strong general 
tr end towards significant differences in intr-subject variability in a number of tasks 
including Stop and Stroop tasks and the Matching Familiar Figures test. Among the
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studies utilising the Stop task eight shoed no significant different in reaction time but 
significant differences in reaction time variability.
Douglas (2004) discusses data which shows slower and more variable reaction times in 
children with ADHD and reports further analysis which showed that the differences were 
in the tail end of the reaction time distribution; the ADHD subjects showed abnormally 
slow reaction times which Douglas interprets as indicating occasional attentional lapses. 
This construct of attentional inconsistency is similar to the construct of vigilant attention 
as described by Robertson et al.(19.
A number of researchers have suggested a link with the concept of arousal discussed at 
the end of Chapter 2. Klein et al (2006) argue that individual differences in intra- subject 
variability.to show considerable consistency across tasks and that this suggests a general 
impairment in state regulation or cortical under-arousal in ADHD children. Nigg (2006) 
concludes from his review of the evidence that low levels of alertness in ADHD may be 
attributable to low cortical arousal.
Conclusion
The evidence in this chapter supports a distinction between two related functions within 
the general domain of impulsivity; two functions which in Chapter 2 were refened to as 
attentional and behavioural impulsivity. This distinction is seen particularly clearly in the 
research and theory in the area of ADHD; in the rating scale studies eliciting behavioural
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descriptions from carers in the case of children and from self report in the case of adults 
as well as in the laboratory studies of cognitive functions.
Douglas (2004) identifies three components of self-regulation problems in ADHD; an 
attentional component which she refers to as effortful attention, an inhibitory, component 
which involves controlling impulsive or inappropriate responding , and a strategic or 
organisational component, (p. 24). The differentiation of the first two of these parallels 
the division made by Nigg (2006) and Kenemans et al (2005) between the function of 
resolving interfering information and the function of suppressing or interrupting a 
prepotent or on-going response. There is a further parallel with the differentiation made 
by Feldman and Miyake between prepotent response inhibition and resistance to 
distractor interference.
Studies 5 and 6 in chapter 6 will pursue the dual nature of impulsivity in questionnaire 
measures of traits derived fiom ADHD while chapter 7 will aim to relate laboratory 
measures of these two functions to self report measures of those traits.
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Chapter 4
Validation of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale -Version 11 and the Development of a
Short Form — the BIS-Short.
Introduction
The overall purpose of this chapter is to explore the construct validity of the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale- Version 11 (BIS-11; Patton et al 1995) and the model of 
impulsivity which it embodies. Barratt and his colleagues argue that the BIS-11 
operationalises a tripartite model of impulsivity whereby the higher order trait of 
impulsivity consists of three highly correlated lower order factors. Study 1, reported in 
this chapter, had four aims. First, it was designed to replicate the tri-partite structure of 
the BIS-11 proposed by Patton et al (1995). Second, a 10-item version of the BIS-11 was 
developed and correlated with the total score of the BIS-11 as well as its subscales, with 
the aim of capturing the general factor within the BIS-11, as well as reflecting the 
different facets within that scale. Third the validity of the BIS-Short, the BIS-1 land the 
differential validity of its subscales was examined by evaluating their relationships with 
self report measures of aggressive behaviour, alcohol consumption and driving 
behaviour.
There is considerable evidence for the validity of the trait of impulsivity and for its utility 
in the prediction and understanding of both normal and pathological behaviour. Vitaro, et
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al. (1999) found impulsivity to predict both delinquency and problem gambling in 
adolescents. Kahn et al (2002) found impulsiveness to be significantly positively 
correlated with sexual risk behaviours in young women. In a study of trauma patients 
Ryb, Dischinger, Kufera and Read (2006) found that a measure of impulsivity 
significantly predicted the occurrence of a range of risky behaviours including speeding, 
low seatbelt use, drinking and driving and binge drinking; odds ratios ranged from 1 . 5 3  to 
2.91 after accounting for factors such as age, gender and socio-economic status.
Trait Impulsivity is usually measured by self report questionnaires such as the BIS-11 
(Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995), the Eysenck I? (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & 
Allsopp, 1985) and Dickman’s scale of functional /dysfunctional impulsivity (Dickman, 
1994); research described in the introduction shows these scales to share a considerable 
amount of variance. The oldest of these, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, was first 
described in 1959 (Barratt 1959), and has undergone continuous revision leading to the 
latest version the BIS-11 (Patton, Stanford & Barratt 1995). Throughout this development 
the aim has been to establish a measure which was as independent as possible of affective 
dimensions, particularly trait anxiety, and which was independent of other ‘action 
oriented’ dimensions such as sensation seeking (Fosssati, Di Ceglie, Aquarini & Barratt 
2001). In this regard, Barratt can be seen to have anticipated the analysis of Depue and 
Collins (1999) who similarly identified an affect-firee construct of control or lack of 
inhibition. On the basis of the analysis of the BIS-11, Barratt and his associates have 
proposed a tlrree-component model of impulsivity consisting of motor impulsiveness, 
cognitive or attentional, impulsiveness  ^and non-planning impulsiveness. (Moeller,
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Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz & Swann 2001). Patton et al. (1995) argued that item 
analysis of the BIS-11 supported an internally consistent and homogenous measure of 
impulsiveness (alpha = .82); together with the substantial correlations between these 
components, from 46 to .53, the data are congruent with an hierarchical model of a higher 
order single trait of impulsivity with three lower order facets.
The validity of the BS-11 has been demonstrated in a number of ways in areas of 
personality and psychopathology. Research discussed in chapter 1 illustrates the high 
correlations between different scales of impulsivity — generally in excess of .70 - attesting 
to the degree of agreement between different researchers as to the behaviour 
characteristic of impulsivity. Most of these approaches to impulsivity agree in two 
important respects; they distinguish between impulsivity and negative or positive 
affective traits and they distinguish between impulsivity and sensation seeking. Thus 
they provide evidence supporting the construct of impulsivity independent of affective 
traits as well as other ‘action oriented’ dimensions such as sensation seeking.
A number of studies have established the constmct validity of the BIS-11 by exploring its 
relationships to behaviour which is typically considered to involve an element of 
impulsivity. Two recent studies found significant correlations between tlie total BIS-11 
score and the scales of the Buss and Perry (1992) aggression questionnaire. Marsh et al. 
(2002) obtained correlations with the four aggiession scales ranging from .25 to .46, 
while Wu and Clark (2000) obtained correlations ranging from .19 to .28. A basic yet 
frequently overlooked aspect of scale validity was addressed by Wu and Clark (2000)
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who found a correlation of .45 between the total score on the BIS-11 and a behavioural 
report scale of impulsivity based upon daily records of behaviour.
The BIS-11 has also been utilised in a considerable number of clinical studies, 
demonstrating its validity in differentiating between impulse disorders, such as borderline 
personality disorders, and non-impulse disorders such as depression (Solof et al. 2000). 
The BIS-11 (as well as an earlier version the BIS-10) has significantly discriminated 
between violent and non-violent female and male parolees (Cherek & Lane1999), self- 
mutilating patients and patients manifesting other impulsive behaviours, and non- 
impulsive patients (Herpertz et al. 1997), alcoholic and non-alcoholic groups 
(Ketzenberger & Forrest 2000), as well as between bulimic patients and normal controls 
(Steiger et al. 2001 ). In an interesting recent study, Dom, Hulstijn and Sabbe (2006) 
compared early and late onset alcoholic patients and found the former to be significantly 
higher in impulsivity. The validity of the BIS-11 in research on both personality and 
clinical psychology suggests that the types of impulsivity discussed in the two domains 
have significant elements in common.
While many studies have employed the total score from the BIS-11, a smaller number 
have utilized the subscale scores- though here the results are less clear. O f the studies 
considered above, while Herpertz et al. (1997) found that self-mutilating patients scored 
more highly on the non-planning scale, as well as on total BIS-10 score, Steiger et al 
(2 0 0 1 ) found significant differences between bulimic patients and normal controls in 
scores on the attention and motor subscales as well as the total BIS-10, though not on the
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non-planning scale, Dougherty et al. (1999) found significant differences between 
Borderline patients and controls only in the attention subscale though also the BIS-11 
total score. While the defining conditions of the patient groups in these three studies are 
nominally different they are frequently co-morbid with each other and thus could be 
assumed to share the same elements of impulsivity.
Other studies have failed to find evidence for the differential validity of the BIS-11 
subscales. Miller et al (2004) found correlations of the BIS-11 scales of attentional, motor 
and non-planning impulsiveness with Dickman’s dysfunctional impulsivity scale to be 
,45, .56 and .63 respectively; the Eysenck impulsiveness scale gave correlations of .52. 
.58 and .58 witli the same BIS-II scales. Dom, Hulstijn and Sabbe (2005) found all three 
impulsivity subscales to differentiate significantly between early and late onset 
alcoholics.
Thus research has yet to demonstrate the value of differentiating between the facets of the 
BIS-11. Indeed the definition of the three factors has proved somewhat elusive in 
previous research, Barratt (1994) factor analysed the 34 item BIS-10 to extract 3 factors 
which were defined as ideo-motor impulsivity (consisting of cognitive and motor items), 
careful planning impulsivity and future orientation/coping stability impulsivity with 
alphas coefficients of .72, .73 and .50 respectively. More recently Patton et al. (1995) 
developed'the BIS-11 by removing four items of the BIS-10 on the basis of item statistics 
and analyzing data fi-om a more substantial and varied sample of 733 subjects, 34% of 
whom were psychiatric inpatients. Analysis of the new scale produced three factors
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which were similar, but not identical, to those of the BIS-10. In particular the cognitive 
and motor items now identified two distinct scales while careful planning and future 
orientation items were collapsed into one scale
There has however been no independent replication of the factor structure of the BIS-11 
in English. Fossati et al (2001) developed an Italian translation of the BIS-11 and 
produced a three-factor solution which bore only a moderate resemblance to the factor 
structure outlined by Patton et al (1996), with a substantial number of differences in the 
pattern and magnitude of individual item loadings. Values of Cronbach’s alpha ranged 
from .62 to .75, with correlations between three second-order factors ranging from .28 to 
.6 8 . Fossati, Barratt, Carretta, Leonard!, Grazioli, and Maffei (2004) in a further study 
utilising the Italian translation of the BIS-11 found correlations between the three sub­
scales ranging from .43 to .56, values similar to those reported by Patton et al. (1995); 
however values of Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales ranged from only .52 to .64.
Study 1 Analysis of the BIS-11 and development of a short form
The first aim of this study was to explore the replicability of the model of the BIS-11 
proposed by Patton et al (1995); a model consisting of three highly correlated lower order 
factors and a single super-ordinate higher order factor. The first step was to carry out an 
exploratory factor analysis extracting three factors which led to the creation of 6  item 
subscales corresponding to the extracted factors. Fossati et al (2001) argued against using 
confirmatory factor analysis to analyse the factor structure of the BIS-11. (See note  ^at
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the end of the chapter for more details). In the second step these subscales and the three 
factor scores from the factor analysis were correlated with the subscales as defined by 
Patton et al (1995). The second aim was to develop and assess a short form of the BIS-11 
which would reflect the higher order factor. The third aim was to assess the differential 
validity of the sub-scales by comparing their correlations with a number of criterion 
variables.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The sample was composed of 975 undergraduate students attending the University of 
Surrey; 273 (28%) male and 702 (72%) female. The mean age was 20.28 with a SD of 
5.8 The BIS-11 was distributed to groups of first year students consisting of social 
science and nursing students, over a period of 5 years. Subsequent to that a further 
sample of students completed the BIS-11 at the beginning of their academic year and 
then three months later completed the ten item BIS-short as a stand-alone measure (n = 
47).
Of the total sample described above, 335 students also completed a self report scale of 
alcohol consumption, a scale of emotion regulation and the Driving Behaviour 
Questionnaire (DBQ; Westerman & Haigney 2000). Further, 241 of the above sample 
also completed the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry 1992).
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Measures
The BIS-11 is a 30-item self report questionnaire; responses to each item are made on a 
4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = rarely/never to 4 = almost always/always (see table 
A-1 in appendix for items). Barratt and his associates have proposed a multi-faceted 
model of impulsivity derived from the analysis of the BIS-11 (Patton et al. 1995). While 
the authors argued that item analysis suggested an internally consistent and homogenous 
measure of impulsiveness (alpha = .82), they nevertheless carried out an exploratory 
factor analysis of the BIS-11 and extracted 6  primary factors, as their interpretation of the 
scree plot suggested. A higher order factor analysis of the correlations between these 
primary factors produced 3 secondary factors: motor impulsiveness, attentional 
impulsiveness and non-planning impulsiveness. Correlations between the factors were 
merely summarized; they were described as ranging from .15 to .42 for the six primary 
factors and from .46 to .53 for the three secondary factors. The study did not report alpha 
coefficients for either primary or secondary factors. Patton et al. (1995) interpreted these 
data as indicating a hierarchical model of impulsivity whereby the three sub-factors are 
subsumed by a general impulsivity factor. Stanford et al. (1996) reported a Croribach’s 
alpha coefficient for the whole scale of 0.80 for a sample of university students. Wu and 
Clark (2000) report Cronbach’s alpha values of .80 for the total scale and between .60 
and .72 for the subscales the lowest being the attentional subscale. Correlations between 
the subscales ranged from .29 to .52.Though in the original scale responses are made on a
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4-point Likert scale, in order to enhance item variance the present study employed a 6 - 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 = disagree strongly to 6  = agree strongly.
The Buss-Peixy Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ Buss & Perry 1992) is a 29-item self 
report questionnaire consisting of four subscales measuring four aspects of aggression — 
physical, verbal, angry and hostile aggression. Buss and Perry (1999) report values of 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha as .85, .72, .83 and .77 for the subscales and .89 for the total 
scale; correlations between the subscales ranged from .25 to .48.
Alcohol consumption was assessed with a 10 item self-report scale developed for the 
author’s research programme (see table A.2 in appendix) . The scale consisted of nine 
questions relating either to excessive alcohol consumption (e.g. T have dmnk alcohol 
until I felt ill’) or to the undesirable consequences of such consumption (e.g. T have 
failed to do what was expected of me due to drinking too much alcohol’); the final 
question asked about the frequency of consuming more than 6  units of alcohol on one 
occasion - a commonly used measure of binge drinking, the full scale is included in the 
appendix. Questions required responses on a 6 -point scale ranging from 1 = never to 6  = 
almost always and the total score was the simple sum of responses. Cronbach’s alpha for 
this scale was 0.91 in this sample. In a separate sample of students the correlation 
between self and peer report versions of this scale was r ~ 0.62 (N = 266, p < .01) and 
the test-retest correlation between two administrations of the alcohol scale across 
approximately 12 weeks was r = .74 (N = 144, p < .01). In that separate sample males
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obtained a significantly higher score than females; a difference amounting to .64 of the 
standard deviation of the whole sample.
Driving behaviour was assessed with the Driving Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ; 
Westerman & Haigney 2000) which assesses violations (deliberate infringements of the 
law or driving improperly), errors (errors of intention) and lapses (errors of action).
Alpha reliability coefficients for the three scales, each of 8  items, were 0.74 for lapses. 
0.67 for errors and 0.74 for violations. Westerman and Haigney (2000) reported a 
correlation of 0.59 between errors and lapses, suggesting considerable overlap between 
the two. In the interests of economy only the former two scales, violations and errors 
were utilised: thus there were 16 items to which responses were made on a 6 -point Likert 
scale ranging from 1= never to 6  = very often. In the present sample alpha reliability 
values were .80 for the violations scale and .82 for the errors scale; the violations and 
error scales correlated .50 (n = 550, p < .01)
Emotion regulation was assessed with a 6 -item scale developed by the author and was 
derived from the DSM-IV description of borderline personality disorder- a disorder 
which is characterised by strong negative affect and behavioural disinhibition.. The scale 
consisted of items relating to anxieties or difficulties in understanding or regulating 
emotions (e.g. T get confused when my feelings get too strong’); none of the items 
however refer to either cognitive or behavioural inhibition. Items required responses on 
a 6 -point scale ranging from 1 ~ never to 6  = almost always; and the total score was the 
simple sum of responses. (See table A.3 in appendix). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale
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was,87. This scale correlated .64 with the urgency scale of the UPPS impulsivity 
questionnaire of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) which will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. The urgency scale is conceptually related to emotion regulation since it is a 
measure of impulsivity driven by negative affect; though there is no overlap in item 
content with the emotion regulation scale.
Results
Evaluating the factor structure of the BIS-11
The BIS-11 data for the entire sample (N = 975) were subjected to an exploratory factor 
analysis utilizing a principal axis factoring extraction and promax (oblique) rotation.
Figure 1.1 Scree plot of eigen values from factor analysis of BIS-11 
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The scree plot supported the extraction of three or four factors. Following the suggestion 
of Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum and Strahan (1999) that over factoring is unlikely to 
mislead while at the same time often serving to clarify the factor structure both three and 
four factor solutions were extracted. Comparing the two solutions in tables 2.1 and 2.2 it 
can be seen that extracting the fourth factor removes three items from the first factor but 
otherwise leaves the first three factors unchanged. As shown in table 2.3, the correlations 
between factors in the three factor solution ranged from .46 to .57; the correlations 
between the first three factors in the four factor solution ranged from .43 to .56, however 
the fourth factor correlated .33 with the factor from which it had split but hardly at all 
with the remaining two factors. Scrutiny of table 2.2 shows that when adopting a pattern 
loading of .30 or more as significant then factor 1 was identified by eight items, factor 2  
by 6  items, factor 3 by seven items and factor 4 by three items. Six items did not load on 
any factor above the tlireshold level.
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Table 2,1 pattern matrix for 3 factor extraction from factor analysis of BIS-11
Item
1
Factor
2 3
11 .655 .052 -031
1 .643 .096 -.056
22 312 -.248 -.102
15 .571 -.029 .168
6 .488 .160 -.080
23 .470 -.108 -.062
12 .461 -.012 -.051
9 .375 .252 -.118
7 .363 .092 .147
29 .344 .215 -.280
26 J03 -.068 .093
28 .210 .050 -.156
27 .202 .055 .042
16 -.114 .784 .051
14 -.061 .768 .011
3 -.074 .484 -.294
2 .146 .449 .129
18 .117 .436 .018
19 .252 J23 .044
24 .003 .260 -.048
25 -021 .151 .072
30 -.163 .130 .098
20 -.145 .064 .641
21 .063 -.114 .517
8 .340 -.095 .463
5 -.218 .231 .431
4 .218 .003 .411
10 -.142 -.099 396
13 -.007 .334 .360
17 .016 .175 .193
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Table 2.2 Pattern matrix for four factor extraction from factor analysis o f BIS-11
BIS-11 Factor
item
1 2 3 4
11 .749 -.015 -.029 -.004
1 .694 .044 -.100 .031
15 .667 -.093 .108 -.015
6 ,538 .115 -.112 .016
7 .525 .018 .090 -.116
12 .465 -.038 -075 .044
9 .415 .214 -.135 .018
22 375 -.219 -.093 .294
28 .230 031 -.164 -.015
16 .002 .725 .065 -.029
14 .014 .721 .033 .022
3 -.150 .510 -.253 .122
18 .067 .433 .043 .155
2 309 380 .098 -.102
19 .201 315 .056 .159
24 ,086 .230 -.057 -.075
30 .125 .119 .073 .069
20 -.054 .040 .611 -.026
21 -.057 -.094 .545 .220
8 .367 -.121 .421 .066
5 -.121 .205 .416 -.049
10 -.182 -.082 .405 .076
4 .192 -.004 395 .130
13 .211 .256 .321 -.183
29 .215 .234 -.255 .213
17 -.110 .204 .235 .219
26 -.064 .003 .180 .566
23 .182 -.054 -.027 .461
27 -.045 .115 .095 375
25 -.131 .192 .117 .234
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Table 2.3 Factor correlations for three and four factor extractions from factor analyses of
BIS-11
Factor correlations for three factor 
extraction
Item
1
2 
3
Factor 
1 2 
1.000
.464 1.000
.568 .516
Factor correlations for four factor 
extraction
1.000
Factor
1
2
3
4
1
1.000
.430
.562
.334
1.000
.469
.069
1.000
. 1 1 1 1.000
, One of the principal aims of this study was to attempt to replicate the structure of the 
BIS-11 as proposed by Patton et al (1996); this was approached in two ways. The first 
approach was to compute the factor scores for the three factor solution and to correlate 
these with the scale scores computed from the data provided by Patton et al (1995) and 
set out most clearly in Fossati et al. (2 001). From table 2.3 it can be seen that the 
conelations between the Patton et al (1995) scales and the conesponding factor scores 
ranged from .87 to .94. such high correlations reflect the fact that the present studied 
showed substantial agreement with Patton et al. (1995) in the identification of items with 
factors. The correlations between the factor scores (.55 to .63) strongly support the 
hypothesis of a hierarchical model of impulsivity
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Table 2.4 Correlations between Patton et al (1995) scales and factor scores from the 
present sample.
planning attention motor factor factor factor
1995 1995 1995 score I score 2 score 3
planning 1995
attention 1995 .53
motor 1995 .56 ■ .43
factor score 1 .91 .61 .57
factor score 2 .61 .52 .87 .55
factor score 3 .62 .94 .49 . 6 8 .63
All correlations significant p < .01
planning 1995^  attention 1995 and motor1995 refer to the subscales computed as specified by 
Patton et al (1995); factor I, factor 2 and factor 3 refer to the regression fector scores derived 
from the factor analysis of the present sample.
The second method was to create three sub-scales from the present data analysis using the 
items which loaded above the threshold level (.30) in the pattern matrix. Since only six 
items loaded significantly onto factor 2 , only the first six items loading onto factors 1 and 
3 were used. Thus the first six items loading onto each of the first three factors in the four 
factor solution were combined to produce three scales. Table A. 1 provides the full 30 
item scale and shows which items were selected for the sub-scales derived for this study. 
The responses to the six items identified with each factor were simply summed (after 
appropriate reversal) to produce a scale score. As can be seen in table 2.4 correlations 
between the subscales derived from the two data sets correlate substantially, correlations 
ranging from .90 to .92. Tliese high correlations are due to the substantial similarity in the 
items making up the two sets of scales; five of the first six items loading onto factor 1 
corresponded to non-planning items as defined by Patton et al (1996), all the six factor 2
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items correspond to their motor factor while five out of the six items loading on factor 3 
coiTesponded to their attention factor.
Table 2.5 Correlations between scores derived from the Patton et al (1995) scales and 
scores from the subscales created from the present sample.
planning attention motor planning attention
1995 1995 1995 2006 2006
planning 1995
attention 1995 .53
motor 1995 .56 .43
planning 2006 .90 .49 .49
attention 2006 .55 .92 .44 .46
motor 2006 .52 .43 .90 .45 .47
planning 1995, attention 1995 and motor1995 refer to the subscales as specified by 
Patton et al. (1995); planning 2006, attention 2006 and motor 2006 refer to the subscales 
constructed from the present data set.
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were .70, .65 and .69 for the Patton et al (1995) attention, 
motor and non-planning scales respectively and for the corresponding current six-item 
scales were .69, .70 and .73. Cronbach’s alpha for the full 30 item BIS-11 was .84, a 
figure very close to the Cronbach’s alpha value of .82 for the sample reported by Patton 
et al. (1995). Correlations between the Patton et al (1995) scales ranged from .43 to .56 
and from .45 to .47 for the scales derived from the present study. The correlations 
between the factor scores as well as the correlations between the scales scores support the 
claim that there is a higher order factor of impulsivity subsuming the three primary 
factors.
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Development of a short form of the BIS-11
Since the results of the factor analysis support the existence of a single higher order 
factor/variable, the next step was to derive a short form of the BIS-11 which would 
correlate highly with the whole 30 item scale as well as the three sub-scales. In 
developing this short form the caveats and recommendations of Smith, McCarthy and 
Anderson (2000) were taken into account. Smith et al (2000) argue for the importance of 
showing that the new short form preserves the content domains represented by the 
subfactors of the original scale; to this end the items for the short form were selected so 
as to represent the three factors identified by the factor analysis above. See appendix 1 for 
the selection of items. They also argue the importance of showing the validity of the 
short form in an independent sample; to this end a small sample was administered the 
BIS-Short separately approximately three months after the administration of the BIS-11, 
these data were collected after the BIS-11 had been developed.
A principal components analysis was carried out on the total sample extracting only one 
factor, nine items were chosen from the 15 highest loading items such that there was an 
equal selection of items from the three factors, 4 from the motor impulsivity factor and 3 
from each of the other factors; scores on these 9 items were simply summated to produce 
the scale BIS-Short. See appendix 1 for the BIS-Short items. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
new scale was .81 and the correlation between the BIS-Short and the BIS-11 was .89. 
Table 2.5 illustrates the correlations between the BIS-11, the BIS-Short and the three . 
subscales; it can be seen that the correlations of the subscales with the BIS- Short were
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virtually the same as with the full scale BIS-11. The correlation between the BIS-Short 
and the regression factor score for the single factor extraction was .95.
Table 2.6 Correlations between the scales of impulsivity
■ Bis-11 BIS-short attention motor planning
BIS-11 (84)
BIS-short .89 (.81)
attention .75 .75 (69)
motor .75 .78 .47 (.70)
planning .78 .75 .46 .45 (.73)
N = 975 All correlations significant p< .01.
Figures in parentheses on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha coefficients.
Table 2 . 6  shows the correlations between the BIS-11 administered at time 1, the BIS- 
Short assessed as a constituent part of the BIS-11, and thus also at time 1 , and the BIS- 
Short administered independently (as a 10-item scale) at time 2, tliree months later. The 
correlation of .79 between BIS-Short at time 1 and BIS-Short at time 2 is an estimate of 
test-retest reliability; the virtually identical correlation between BIS-11 at time 1 and BIS- 
Short at time 2 implies that apart from the error due to temporal instability the BIS-Short 
as a stand alone 10 item scale relates to the longer BIS-11 as well as does the BIS-Short 
when it is extracted from items embedded within the parent scale.
Table 2.7 Correlations between BIS-11 and BIS-Short administered at time 1 and the 
BIS-Short administered at time 2.
BIS-11 BIS-Short 1
BIS-n
BIS-Short 1 .91
BIS-Short 2 .78 .79
N  = 47 all correlations significant p < .01.
BIS-Short at time 2; alpha =  .80.
Evidence for the validity of the BIS-Short as a stand-alone scale comes from data 
collected as part of a study to be discussed in a later chapter where a small sample (n = 
114) completed only the 10-item BIS-Short as well as the driving scales described above. 
Correlations between the BIS-Short and the driving violations and driving errors scales 
were .51 and .48 respectively (both correlations were significant - p < .01); these 
correlations compare favourably with the correlations reported in table 2.7 below.
An exploratory factor analysis of the 9 items of the BIS-Short produced a scree plot 
strongly suggestive of a single factor. The first eigen value was 3.50 with the remaining 
eigen values forming an almost perfectly straight line; the next three values were 1.06, 
.89, ..80. of course the items were initially chosen from a single factor extraction so that 
a new sample would be needed to confirm this finding.
Validity of the impulsivity scales
The final step in the validation of the BIS-11 involved examining the relative validity of 
the BIS-11 and its subscales and the BIS-Short by examining the correlations with
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aspects of aggression as measured by the Buss -  Perry aggression scale and with self 
report measures of drinking behaviour, emotion regulation and driving behaviour.
Table 2.6 shows the correlations between the BIS scales the aggression sub-scales of the 
Buss -  Perry aggression questionnaire, the alcohol scale and the DBQ. The BIS-11 and 
the BIS-Short show essentially similar correlations with the four aggression scales and 
with the alcohol, driving and emotion regulation scales, attesting to the validity of the 
newly developed short scale. The BIS subscales do however show some degree of 
differentiation. While the cognitive subscale shows approximately equal correlations with 
each of the aggression scales, the motor subscale shows significant correlations with 
angry, physical and verbal aggression but not with hostility while the planning sub-scale 
does not correlate with any of the aggression scales. The alcohol scale shows similar 
relationships with the three impulsivity subscales. The emotion regulation scale shows a 
similar degree of relationship with motor and planning impulsivity but a considerably 
higher conelation with cognitive impulsivity.
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Table 2.8 Correlations between impulsivity, aggression, drinking and emotion regulation 
scales.
physical verbal angry hostile drinking driving driving emotion
violations errors regulation
BIS-short , 2 1 . 2 1 .25 .18 .42 .37 .33 ,36
BIS-11 .16 .24 . 2 2 .13 .39 .34 .29 ,38
attention . 2 2 . 2 1 .28 . 2 0 .26 .29 .17 .49
motor . 2 0 .26 . 2 1 .09 .37 .38 .26 . 2 0
planning .04 .09 .05 .05 .31 . 2 0 .26 .28
Aggression scales N  =  242, drinking, emotion regulation and driving scales N  =  335 
Correlations in bold are significant p <  .01
Discussion
The analysis of the data in large part replicates the tripartite structure of the BIS-11 
suggested by Patton et al (1995). When scales were constmcted from the items loading 
most substantially on the three factors identified in both three and four factor extractions 
there was a striking correspondence with the subscales derived from the items identified 
by Patton et ai (1995) as marking the three factors. There was also agreement between the 
two investigations in the correlations between the factors; Patton et al. reported factor 
inter-correlations of .46 to .53, in this investigation they ranged from .55 to .6 8 . 
Correlations between the scales from the two investigations ranged from .90 to .92. The 
alpha coefficients for the subscales ranged from .69 to .73; satisfactory for scales of only
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six items each, and the alpha coefficient for the whole questionnaire was .82. Test-retest 
reliability was found to be .78 in a small sample.
The new shortened version of the scale, the BIS-Short, correlated highly with the parent 
scale the BIS-11 (r = .89 p< .01) and with the three sub-scales (.71 to .78). Correlations 
with the outcome variables were not significantly different between BIS-11 and BIS- 
short; suggesting that the short form can be substituted with confidence; this was further 
supported by data from a small study in which the BIS-Short administered alone 
correlated highly with the BIS-11. The use of a shortened form is particularly valuable 
when working with clinical samples or with disturbed adolescents, especially where a 
number of tests are to be administered.
The results overall support an analysis of the BIS-11 as a three factor structure in which 
the correlations between factors and between the constructed scales suggest a hierarchical 
structure in which a higher order factor of general impulsivity subsumes the three lower 
order factors.
Evidence considered in the introduction supports the validity of the BIS-II as an overall 
measure of impulsivity; however evidence for the differential validity of the subscales is 
slight. As discussed in the introduction, Miller et al (2004) found correlations between 
the BIS subscales and Dickman’s dysfunctional impulsivity scale which ranged firom .45 
to ,63, and for Eysenck’s impulsiveness scale between .52 and .58. The studies discussed 
in the introduction to this chapter which looked at correlations between the BIS-11 and
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the degree of psychopathology found a consistent relationship with the BIS-11 total score 
but inconsistent relationships with the subscales. Likewise, the data presented in this 
chapter suggest that the correlations of the attentional and motor scales with the Buss and 
Perry (1992) aggression scales are essentially similar, though the planning subscale 
seems to stand apart in this respect.
When considering the present questionnaire, the BIS-Short and its subscales, it seems 
clear that the sense of impulsivity identified by the attentional and motor impulsivity 
scales is close to the conceptualization of impulsivity set out in the introduction to the 
thesis; momentary, though perhaps frequent, failures of inhibition, lapses of attention and 
distractibility, as well as frequent instances of acting without forethought. Furthermore 
the distinction between cognitive and motor (behavioural) impulsivity highlights the role 
of attentional factors in impulsivity as argued by both Barratt and Dickman.
The non-planning aspect of impulsivity, however, seems to reflect actions and behaviour 
on a larger scale; e.g. not planning trips well ahead of time, not planning for job security 
and not saving regularly. Planning trips involves controlling and coordinating diverse 
aspects of behaviour across a considerable time span; though paradoxically it may be that 
impulsive individuals make plans which they do not follow through or which they change 
soon after have conceived them. In the present study the non-planning subscale failed to 
correlate with any of the aggression scales while the other two scales correlated 
significantly with all of the aggression scales, with one exception. This difference 
between the impulsivity scales can be seen in two other studies which considered the
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relationship between the BIS-11 subscales and the Buss and Perry aggression scales. Wu 
and Clark (2003) replicated the lack of significant correlations with the non-planning 
scales though they also failed to find a significant correlation between the aggression 
scales and the attentional subscale of the BIS-11. Marsh et al. (2002) found that the 
attentional and motor impulsivity scales correlated with all the aggression scales while 
the non-planning scale correlated only with the anger and hostility scales not with the 
physical and verbal aggression scales. Thus these three studies concur in finding the non- 
planning scale of the BIS-11 to be a less valid predictor of aggression than the attentional 
or the motor impulsivity scales; all three concur in finding significant correlations 
between the total BIS-11 score and all four of the aggression scales. Nevertheless the 
non-planning scale does correlate substantially with both the attentional and the motor 
scale; one possibility is that it may be the outcome of impulsivity rather than an integral 
element
To what extent does this analysis o f the BIS-11 illuminate impulsivity? Inferences as to 
the natur e and structure of impulsivity are limited by the construct as operationalised by 
the set of items within any questionnaire or other instrument. A different 
conceptualization and operationalisation will suggest a different construct; an example of 
such a conceptualization -  that of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) - will be considered in 
chapter 6 . Evidence considered in the introduction (Parker and Bagby 1997) suggests a 
two factor rather than a three factor model of impulsivity though once again the 
substantial correlation between the methodical/disorganized and the cautious/spontaneous 
dimensions suggest that these are likely to be facets of a higher order trait of impulsivity.
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It is not however clear that these two dimensions map onto the BIS-11 dimensions in any 
simple or obvious way. An alternative two factor model for impulsive behaviour is 
provided by the structure of ADHD behaviours as described in DSM-IV a model which 
also distinguishes between attention failure and behavioral inhibition; this model is 
explored in chapter 7. Though the factor structure of the BIS-11 has been replicated and 
further evidence provided for the validity of the scale and subscales it remains uncertain 
to what extent this is the best model of impulsivity.
Note \  During the development o f the BIS. Barratt has used the terms attentional and 
cognitive impulsivity somewhat interchangeably, though since Patton et al (1995) the 
term attentional has stuck. This thesis uses the term cognitive impulsivity to avoid 
confusion with the construct o f  inattention which occurs in later chapters.
Note Fossati et al (2001) argued against using confirmatory factor analysis to confirm 
in a new sample the factor structure outlined by Patton et al (1995). Their argument was 
based on two considerations; — the first was that the item scores could not be normally 
distributed and thus would violate one o f  the required conditions for such an analysis.
The second consideration was that with a questionnaire such as the BIS-11 with 
correlated sub-factors many items would load on. more that one factor; a model which 
did not allow fo r factorial complexity i.e. which allowedfor an item loading on one 
factor but specified zero loadings on the other two factor would inevitably register a poor 
fit. Alternatively allowing many cross factor loadings to appear in the model would result 
in a lack o f identification o f  the model. Their argument repeats that ofMcCrae et al.
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(1996) who argue against the use o f confirmatory factor analysis in the confirmation o f  
the NEO-PI-R; in that questionnaire facet scales which are assigned to a particular 
domain nevertheless have significant and meaningful secondary loadings on other 
domains. In their analysis even a model which allowed for numerous secondary loadings 
o f the facet scales across domains failed to produce an acceptable fit. McCrae et al 
(1996) conclude that since the five factor structure o f  the NEO has been replicated in 
many studies “We believe this points to serious problems with CFA itself when used to 
examine personality structure. ”(p 563)
Nevertheless the author did carry out a confirmatory factor analysis with maximum 
likelihood estimation using AMOS 5.0.1 (Arbuckle 2003) upon the whole data set. The 
relevant f i t  indices chosen were the Goodness o f  Fit index, the Confirmatory Fit Index, 
the Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation and the chi-square. The chi-square 
significant, indicating a lack o f f i t  between the model and the data, and the other fit  
indices were inadequate (GFI = .846. CFI = .687, RMSEA = .072.)
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Chapter 5
Demonstrating the Incremental Validity of Impulsivity over the Big five Traits in
the Prediction of Behaviour.
Chapter summary
The aim of this chapter was to compare the predictive validity of impulsivity with the 
Big Five personality traits and to examine whether the predictive validity of the trait of 
impulsivity is accounted for by the variance which it shares with a higher order trait, or 
traits, of which it may be considered a facet, or whether the variance independent of the 
higher order traits has independent predictive validity.
Study 2 shows that impulsivity adds incremental validity to the Big Five in the 
prediction of academic performance and self-reported alcohol consumption in first year 
female undergraduates. Study 3, using a more heterogenous sample and a different Big 
Five questionnaire, shows that impulsivity adds incremental validity to the Big Five in 
die prediction of behaviour which includes self and peer reports of alcohol consumption 
and self reports of driving behaviour.
Introduction
There is considerable evidence for the validity of the trait of impulsivity and for its 
utility in the prediction and understanding of both normal and pathological behaviour.
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Kipnis (1971) reported significant correlations between impulsivity and academic 
performance in college students, and Vitaro, Arseneault and Tremblay (1999) found 
impulsivity to predict both delinquency and problem gambling in adolescents. Colder 
and Chassin (1997) found a significant correlation between impulsivity and alcohol 
consumption in young adolescents. Stanford, Greve, Boudreaux, Mathias, and 
Brumbelow (1996) found that impulsivity, assessed by the BIS-11, predicted aggression, 
drug taking and drunk driving in high school and college students - a relationship which 
was especially strong for females. The traits of sensation seeking and ego control, which 
are closely related to impulsivity, were found by Hampson, Severson, Bums, Slovic and 
Fisher (2001) to predict alcohol use in high school students. The results of the Kelly 
longitudinal study (Kelly & Conley, 1987) illustrate the continuing importance of 
impulsivity beyond the adolescent years; the trait of ‘impulse control’ predicted the 
incidence of divorce, marital satisfaction and alcohol abuse in males (though not in 
females) across a period o f 15 years.
While the study of single traits such as impulsivity and related traits such as sensation 
seeking continues, recent decades have seen the rise of hierarchical trait models which 
aim to encompass the major aspects of personality the most prominent of these being the 
Five Factor Model (FFM; John & Srivastava, 1999). Such models tend to converge on 
five broad traits at the highest level of the hierarchy: openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. At a lower level of the 
hierarchy more narrow tiaits such as deliberation and self discipline are identified as
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facets of, for example, conscientiousness; while at the lowest level are narrowly defined 
traits such as tidiness and punctuality.
The success of the FFM in promoting the exploration of predictors of interesting 
behaviours in such areas as occupational psychology, and its growing acceptance as a 
map of human personality, has led FFM theorists to argue that those who study 
individual traits need to situate those traits with respect to the FFM. Adopting 
Goldberg’s simile - comparing the FFM to the latitude and longitude of cartography - 
Ozer and Reise (1994) suggested that “Personality psychologists who continue to 
employ their preferred measure without locating it within the five factor model can be 
likened to geographers who issue reports of new lands but refuse to locate them on the 
map for others to find." (p. 361). Moreover, Costa and McCrae have argued that most 
questionnaire models of personality can be reduced to the Big five; thus they have re­
analysed the MMPI to extract the big five.
The FFM subsumes the major traits, both singly and in combination, that are predictive 
of significant behaviours. For example, there is an extensive body of evidence relating 
the trait of conscientiousness to various indices of work performance (e.g. Barrick & 
Mount, 1991: Salgado, 2001) and research on the concept of integrity utilises a construct 
which is an emergent trait — a blend of the independent traits of conscientiousness, 
neuroticism and agreeableness ( Ones & Viswesvaran, 2001 ). Carver (2006) in 
discussing the trait approach to impulsivity identifies conscientiousness and 
agreeableness as the Big Five traits which most clearly relate to impulsivity; furthermore
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the NEO-PI-R includes a facet of neuroticism which is labelled impulsivity. hr the light 
of this it seems relevant to study the relationships between impulsivity and the Big Five 
in the prediction of behaviour.
Study 2: The incremental validity of impulsivity in the prediction of academic 
performance in female undergraduates.
Introduction
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between academic performance 
and the Big Five traits and the most consistent findings are the positive correlations with 
openness and conscientiousness (Busato et al., 2000). Research has also demonstrated 
the value of utilising the more narrow traits, or facets, which constitute the broad Big 
Five traits. Mershon and Gorsuch (1988) compared the amount of variance predicted in 
a variety of criteria by either five broad traits or the sixteen more narrow traits from the 
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire and found the latter to predict almost double 
the criterion variance. Chamorro- Premuzic and Fumham (2003) similarly found tliat 
analysis at the level of facets predicted more variance in the educational performance of 
British undergraduates than analysis at the level of the Big Five traits (28% versus 13% 
respectively for total exam results). Such studies are, however, susceptible to two types 
of criticism. Goldberg (1999) pointed out that adding variance to the predictor side of a 
regression equation will almost always add to the predicted variance, and Ashton (1998) 
argued that the large number of lower order tiaits may produce “spuriously high multiple
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correlations which are unlikely to survive cross validation.” Paunonen and Ashton 
(2001a) took a more focussed approach and “selected two Big Five factor predictors 
and compared each of them against only one lower level trait” (p. 81), the latter being 
selected by a panel of graduate students as most closely related to academic 
performance. They found that the lower level traits of ‘need for achievement’ and ‘need 
for understanding’, performed better than their super-ordinate traits conscientiousness 
and openness to experience in the prediction of undergraduate course grades.
Paunonen and Ashton (2001b) have argued for the importance of measuring narrow 
traits, those at lower levels of the Big Five hierarchy, providing evidence that the 
variance specific to the lower level traits — not shared with the higher order trait -  cames 
predictive and explanatory value. This argument is part of an ongoing debate as to the 
appropriate level of analysis (Ones and Viswesvaran 1996).; this debate is however 
concerned largely with predictive validity and says little about theoretical issues such as 
the nature of models of personality and the relationships between traits at different levels 
of a hierarchy. Indeed the results may seem to question the value of identifying and 
assessing higher order traits and - since the logic of the argument could be made to 
extend further down the hierarchy - may seem to question the validity of the trait 
approach itself. In this thesis it is argued that lower order traits may have greater 
theoretical value due to their relationship with significant latent variables which 
influence behaviour and which may even explain the covariance of the lower order traits 
which comprise higher order traits. Such a tlieoretical approach characterises Eysenck’s 
approach to personality; for example, he proposed that the various facets of extraversion.
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and their covariance, are a consequence of individual differences in arousal (Eysenck & 
Eysenck 1985). A similar conceptual model characterises the attempts by Depue and 
Collins (1999) and by Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh, and Shao (2000) to identify reward 
sensitivity not merely as a useful lower order trait but as the common variable 
underlying the various facets of extra version.
Overview
Many impulsivity scales exist as elements within omnibus personality questionnaires. 
Within such questionnaires, and the models of personality which they embody, 
impulsivity is usually situated as a lower level trait, or facet, of a higher order trait -  e.g. 
Constraint within the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Patrick et al 
2003), The aim of this research was first to establish the relationship between 
impulsivity and the Big five and secondly to compare the predictive validity of 
impulsivity and the Big Five personality traits and examine whether the predictive 
validity of the trait of impulsivity is accounted for by the variance which it shares with a 
higher order trait, or traits, of which it is a facet or whether the variance independent of 
the higher order traits has independent predictive validity.
Since impulsivity has been considered a lower level trait subsumed by the higher level 
trait of conscientiousness, the first hypothesis to be tested was that impulsivity 
significantly predicts the criteria after the contribution of conscientiousness has been 
partialled out. Furthermore, since impulsivity is often found to correlate with
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neuroticism, extraversion and agreeableness there is the possibility that impulsivity is 
not simply a facet of one higher level trait but rather may be a blend of several traits or 
of their facets; the parallel here being with traits such as integrity or ‘customer service 
orientation’ (Schneider & Hough, 1995). Therefore a second hypothesis was formulated 
whereby impulsivity predicts additional statistically significant amounts of variance in 
the criterion after the influence of all the Big Five traits has been partialled out.
The criterion measures chosen were academic performance and alcohol consumption in 
the first year of undergraduate study; both of these behaviours having been previously 
associated with measures o f impulsivity as well as the Big Five personality traits.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The present sample consisted of 236 female undergraduate students, made up of three 
consecutive years of students taking a freshman psychology class. All subjects 
participated in return for course credits. Age at onset of course ranged from 17 to 35 
years with a mean of 20.3 (sd = 2.7). Respondents completed personality measures at 
the beginning of their first semester during class time and examination performance data 
were taken from records at the end of the year. A self report measure of alcohol 
consumption was also administered at the beginning of the first semester, but only to the 
latter two samples (N = 178).
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Measures
The Big Five personality traits were assessed by the Big Five inventory ( BFI; Benet- 
Martinez & John, 1998). The BFI is a 44 item self-report questionnaire wherein each of 
the Big Five traits is measured by between 8 and 10 items. Responses are made on a 5- 
point Likert scale ranging from 1= disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly. For the 
present sample, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha reliabilities ranged from .73 to .82 and 
were comparable to values published by the test authors (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). 
Impulsivity was assessed with the short form of the Baixatt Impulsiveness Scale — 
Version 11 (BIS-11 Patton et al., 1995) the BIS-Short, the development of which is , 
described in Chapter 4.
There were three measures of academic performance. The first was a multiple choice 
statistics examination taken at the beginning of the second semester, the second was the 
aggregate of the multiple choice examinations taken at the end of the second semester 
and the third was the mean of the grades for four essay assignments which the students 
had completed during the coiuse of the year.
Alcohol consumption was assessed with the 10 item self report scale described in 
chapter 4.
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Results
Table 5.1 shows the correlations between impulsivity, the four criterion variables and 
the Big Five traits. Impulsivity correlated most strongly with conscientiousness but also 
significantly and negatively with agreeableness and positively with neuroticism. 
Regression of impulsivity on the Big Five traits produced a multiple correlation of .74, 
indicating a considerable amount of shared variance. Regressing the BIS-Short onto the 
Big Five produced significant independent effects for conscientiousness, extraversion, 
neuroticism and agreeableness; Beta weights o f—.67, .25. .12 and -.10 respectively (R  ^
= .55, F = 59.97, df = 5, 231. p < .01). The significant effect of extraversion upon 
impulsivity, despite the non significant first order correlation, is attributable to the fact 
that extraversion correlates positively with both agreeableness and conscientiousness 
and negatively with neuroticism(r = .11, .14 and -.36 respectively) but has opposite 
effects upon impulsivity; this effect will appear again in later chapters. The partial 
correlation between impulsivity and extraversion, after controlling for neuroticism, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness was .33 (df = 231, p < .01).
Impulsivity correlated negatively and conscientiousness correlated positively — both 
significantly - with all four criteria. Agreeableness correlated negatively and neuroticism 
correlated positively with alcohol consumption though neither correlated significantly 
with any of the academic performance criteria, extraversion correlated negatively with 
exam performance by with no other criterion variable.
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Table 5.1 Correlations between criterion variables and personality traits.
Stats
exam
Exam
mean
Assign Alcohol 
mean scale
Imp E A C N
Statistics exam 
Examination mean ,61
Assignment mean ,46 .47
Alcohol scale -.10 -.14 -.11
Impulsivity -.25 -.24 -.26 .35
Extraversion .04 -.15 -.12 .06 .11
Agreeableness .07 .01 .06 -.29 -.31 .14
Conscientiousness .14 .18 .13 -.27 -.70 .13 .34
Neuroticism .09 -.11 00 .22 .20 -.34 -.29 .21
Openness -.10 00 00 .03 .07 .23 .07 .01 .03
Figures in bold p< .05
For correlations involving academic criteria n = 236. For correlations involving the alcohol 
scale n= 178
Table 5.2 shows the result of the regression analyses to predict the criterion variables. For 
each criterion two regression analyses were carried out. In the first set of analyses 
conscientiousness was entered as a first block and impulsivity as a second block. In each 
case the F value for the first block and the F change value for the second block was
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significant; i.e. though conscientiousness predicted a significant amount of variance in 
the independent variable, impulsivity predicted a significant amount of additional 
variance. As might be expected from the pattern of first order correlations, when these 
regressions were reversed and impulsivity entered as a block before conscientiousness 
then in no case was the change in significant. In the second set of analyses, the Big 
Five traits were entered as a first block and impulsivity as a second block. In each case 
the F value for the first block was significant- The F change value for the second block 
value was significant for the alcohol scale criterion and for two of the three academic 
criteria- (statistics exam mark and essay grade average but not exam average). Thus the 
increment in R  ^due to the addition of impulsivity was significant in every analysis except 
one. When these regressions were reversed the Big Five entered as a second block added 
a significant additional amount of variance to the prediction of alcohol consumption and 
the examination average but not of statistics exam or assignment mean.
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Table 5.2 Results of regression analyses
Criterion
variables
Step 1 variables Step 1. Step 2. impulsivity
R- F R  ^ change F change
Statistics
examination
conscientiousness .03 6.6 .04 10.3
Big Five .05 2.2 .03 8,3
Examination
average
conscientiousness .03 8.9 .02 4.3
Big Five .10 5.1 .00 1-5
Assignment
average
conscientiousness .02 4.1 .05 13.1
Big Five .04 1.7 -04 9.9
Alcohol
scale
conscientiousness .07 14 -06 10.6
Big Five .16 6.6 .03 5.7 •
All values of F greater tlian 1.6 are significant, p < .05
N = 236 for academic criterion variables N = 178 for alcohol criterion variable
Discussion
The results supported the hypotheses by demonstrating that impulsivity predicted the 
target criteria even after the effects of conscientiousness or the Big Five traits, were
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partialled out. The predictive validity of impulsivity was not attributable to its 
covariance with any, or all, of the Big Five traits. The data were all the more striking 
given the high correlations between impulsivity and conscientiousness (-.69) and the 
joint correlation with all the Big Five (-74). The results also suggested that not only did 
impulsivity add to the variance predicted by conscientiousness but that impulsivity was 
in fact a better predictor than conscientiousness. Indeed, in most cases if impulsivity 
was entered into the regression equations first then the Big Five added no significant 
amount of variance when added as a second block.
The results of the present study correspond closely to those of Busato et al. (2000) who 
found correlations between first year psychology undergraduate examinations and only 
extraversion and conscientiousness of the Big Five traits; correlations of -.13 and .16 
respectively, values very close to those found in the present study.
The results also agree with those of Paunonnen and Ashton (2001a) who found that 
adding predictor variables to a regression equation did not always add a significant 
amount of variance - that depended on the conceptual relationship between predictor and 
outcome. Impulsivity seems to be, to some extent, independent of conscientiousness and 
of the Big Five despite the large amount of shared variance.
Although the homogeneity of the sample (female undergraduate students tested in the 
first year of a psychology degree) prevents confident generalisation to a wider 
population, it makes it less likely that the results are affected by variables such as
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intelligence and educational experience. Furthermore this degree of range restriction 
may well serve to attenuate the real relationship between traits and behaviour; indeed the 
high level of qualification required to enter the course attests to a high level of 
conscientiousness.
Study 3: The incremental validity of impulsivity in the prediction of alcohol 
consumption and driving behaviour.
This study is a partial replication of study 2. While the sample in study 2 was entirely 
female the sample in this study was 47% male. This study includes a peer report as well 
as a self report measure of alcohol consumption and self report measure of driving 
behaviour as well as using a different measure of the Big five. The present study utilised 
the same strategy as the previous study to assess whether the predictive validity of 
impulsivity in predicting alcohol consumption and driving behaviour is accounted for by 
the variance which it shares with the Big Five trait of conscientiousness or by the 
variance which it shares with all five of those traits. As in Study 2 the first hypothesis to 
be tested was that impulsivity significantly predicts the criteria after the contribution of 
conscientiousness has been partialled out, and the second hypothesis was that 
impulsivity predicts additional statistically significant amounts of variance in the 
criterion after the influence of all the Big Five traits has been partialled out.
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Method
Participants and procedure
The sample consisted of 389 subjects, 48% of which were males, who completed the 
NEO-FFI and a self-report alcohol consumption scale. Of these, 323 (58% male) 
completed a driving questionnaire and 213 (59% male) returned a peer- report alcohol 
scale. Of the total sample 154 were undergraduate students of psychology, 16% of whom 
were male; this sample of undergraduates did not overlap with tliat in Study 2. The 
remaining 245 were a convenience sample of people from outside tlie university of whom 
68% were male; age ranged from 17 to 65 with a mean of 34.1 and standard deviation of 
13.7.
Undergraduate respondents completed questionnaires in class time. Data from the 
convenience sample were collected by the students who were asked to approach two 
friends or relatives, at least one of which should be male, and request that they complete 
the same questionnaires. Students themselves then completed a peer report version of the 
alcohol consumption questionnaire as a description of those friends. The participation of 
the undergraduate students was rewarded by course credits though not all students who 
volunteered completed their quota.
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Measures
Impulsivity was assessed with the BIS-Short as in Study 5.1. Tl\e Big Five personality 
traits were assessed by the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae 1992). The NEO-FFI is a 60- 
item self-report questionnaire wherein each of the Big Five traits is measured by 12 
items. Responses are made on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1= disagree strongly 
to 5 = agree strongly. For the present sample, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha reliabilities 
ranged from 0.73 to 0.82 and were comparable to values published by the test authors 
(Costa & McCrae 1992).
Driving behaviour was assessed with the Driving Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ; 
Westerman & Haigney 2000) described in chapter 4. The alcohol consumption scale was 
the same as that reported in Study 1. In addition a peer report version was constructed 
simply by changing the first person pronoun to the second personal plural; thus T have 
found myself unable to stop drinking once I have started.’ became ‘They have found 
themselves unable to stop drinking one they have started.’ The correlation between self 
and peer alcohol reports was .62 (n = 211, p < .01).
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Results
Table 5.3 shows the first-order correlations (Pearson’s r) between impulsivity, the four 
criterion variables and the Big Five traits. The pattern of correlations between The BIS- 
11 and the Big Five traits was very similar to that in study 5.1. Impulsivity correlated 
substantially and negatively with conscientiousness and to a lesser degree with 
agreeableness. Regressing the BIS-Short onto the Big Five produced significant 
independent effects for conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and agreeableness; 
Beta weights of -.49, .31, .16 and -.16 respectively (R  ^= .34, F = 49.20, df = 5, 385. p < 
.01). Once again there is a significant effect of Extraversion upon impulsivity, despite 
the low first order correlation, attributable to the fact that extraversion correlates 
positively with both agreeableness and conscientiousness (r = .23 and .18) and 
negatively with neuroticism (r = -.42). The partial correlation between impulsivity and 
extraversion, after controlling for agreeableness, neuroticism and conscientiousness was 
.32(df=380, p < .01)
Both measures of alcohol consumption (self and peer reports) correlated significantly 
with impulsivity, extraversion and conscientiousness; agreeableness correlated 
significantly with self but not peer reports of alcohol consumption. In each case the self 
report trait scales correlated more substantially with self than with peer report alcohol 
scales; a pattern typically found and which is likely to reflect the .effect of shared method 
variance though it may also reflect the fact that a person is more aware of certain aspects 
of their own behaviour than is a peer. Self reports of both driving violations and driving
113
errors correlated significantly with impulsivity, neuroticism, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness; extraversion correlated significantly with errors but not violations.
Table 5.3 Correlations between criterion variables and personality traits.
Self Alcohol Peer Alcohol Violations Errors Impulsivity
Impulsivity .38 .23 ,41 ,36
Neuroticism .08 -.08 ,12 ,23 .15
Extraversion .19 .17 .03 -.14 ,11
Openness -.08 .05 -.11 -.09 -.07
Agreeableness -.18 -.05 -.37 -.22 -.24
Conscientiousness -.33 -.20 -.30 -.34 -.50
Figures in bold p < .05
For correlations involving alcohol self report N = 389; for peer alcohol report n == 213, for botli 
driving violations and enors n = 323.
Table 5.4 shows the result of the regression analyses to predict the variables - self and 
peer alcohol consumption, driving violations and driving errors. For each criterion 
variable two regression analyses were carried out. In the first set of analyses 
conscientiousness was entered as a first block and impulsivity as a second block. In each 
case the F value for the first block and the F change value for the second block was 
significant (p < .05); i.e. though conscientiousness predicted a significant amount of 
variance in the independent variable, impulsivity predicted a significant amount of 
additional variance. In the second set of analyses the Big Five traits were entered as a
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first block and impulsivity as a second block; once again in each case the F values for 
both blocks were significant (p < .05),
Table 5.4 Results of regiessing each o f the criterion variables onto the predictors in a two 
step procedure
Criterion
variables
Step I variables •Step 1, results Step 2. results impulsivity
R^ F R  ^change F change
Alcohol
scale
conscientiousness .11 47.9 .06 27.9
Big Five .20 24.6 .02 10.9
Peer alcohol 
scale
conscientiousness ,04 8.2 .04 8.6
Big Five ,08 4.4 .02 4.3
Violations conscientiousness .10 33.7 ,07 29.1
Big Five .20 20.1 .05 22.05
Errors conscientiousness ,13 46.1 .03 12.9
Big Five .16 15.5 .03 11.7
All values of F are significant, p < .05
Discussion
The results supported the study hypotheses by showing that impulsivity significantly 
predicted the target criteria after partialling out the effects of first conscientiousness and
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secondly all five of the Big Five traits. As expected, conscientiousness correlated 
significantly with each of the criterion variables; between 30 and .34 with the self- 
report variables and .20 with the peer- report variable. Impulsivity correlated at least as 
well with the same variables; between .36 and .41 with the self-report variables and .23 
with the peer report variable. When conscientiousness and impulsivity were entered as 
two blocks, impulsivity added a significant amount of variance in each of the criterion 
variables — between 3% and 6%. Entering the Big Five as a first block predicted 
significantly more variance that conscientiousness alone -  between 3% and 6% more; 
nevertheless impulsivity when added as a second block again added a significant amount 
of variance — between 2% and 5%.
Chapter Discussion
Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with a larger and more varied sample, a 
different measure of the Big Five and a new set of outcomes. The pattern of correlations 
between impulsivity and the Big Five were very similar across the two studies. In each 
case impulsivity correlated most strongly with conscientiousness (-.70 and -.50 in study 
2 and 3 respectively) and moderately, though significantly, with agieeableness (-.23 and 
-.24 respectively). The correlations with the remaining traits were small or non­
significant. In both studies, however, a relationship between impulsivity and 
extraversion emerged when the influence of the other traits was partialled out in the 
regression analysis; the partial correlation of extra version with impulsivity was ,33 and 
.32 in the two studies. The relationship between impulsivity and extraversion is masked
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by the pattern of co-variance between impulsivity and the traits of conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.
While using the same self report alcohol scale as Study 2, Study 3 also included a peer 
report alcohol scale as well as self report measures of driving errors and driving 
violations. In all cases impulsivity added significantly to the variance in the criterion 
variables explained either by conscientiousness or by the Big Five together. There was 
considerable consistency in the results across the two studies. In Study 2 self reported 
alcohol consumption correlated .35 and .27 with impulsivity and conscientiousness 
respectively, in Study 3 the corresponding correlations were .38 and .33; and the overall 
correlation of the Big Five traits with alcohol consumption was .40 in both studies. This 
is a striking degree of consistency across the two different Big Five scales.
Each study contained at least one variable which was not derived from self reports; 
measures of academic performance in Study 2 and peer reports of alcohol consumption 
in Study 3; while the correlations with these variables were consistently smaller than 
correlations with self report variables the pattern of results were the same — in particular 
the added variance contributed by impulsivity.
These results concur with those of Paunonen and Ashton (2001a) as well as Chamoiro- 
Premuzic and Fumham (2003) discussed in the introduction to this chapter. The lower- 
level trait of Impulsivity predicted a significant amount of variance beyond that 
predicted by the higher-level trait of conscientiousness of which it is generally
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considered to be a part. At issue however is the implication of these findings. Identifying 
the importance of lower level traits can serve two functions, one descriptive and 
predictive the other explanatory. The first of these involves identifying the most accurate 
predictor, or battery of predictors, of a criterion behaviour; an approach typical of areas 
of applied psychology such as occupational psychology. This approach however tends to 
eschew explanation and understanding and to treat personality traits as independent 
variables; as argued in chapter 2, this approach tends to effectively undermine the value 
of traits in understanding behaviour.
The second function is to develop explanations of behaviour and of traits themselves; to 
treat traits as dependant as well as independent variables. This approach to studying 
lower level traits, discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, can be seen in the attempts by 
Lucas et al (2000) and Ashton et al (2002) to identify the core of extraversion. However 
both of those studies apply a trait approach to the question and it may be that the 
apparently incommensurable differences in their results indicate the limitations of the 
trait approach as an explanatory framework
In considering the relationship between impulsivity and conscientiousness the present 
thesis would argue for the status of impulsivity as a core aspect of conscientiousness 
rather than as simply a lower level facet; a status similar to that which Lucas et al (20000 
would attribute to reward sensitivity as a core feature of extraversion. These issues will 
be revisited in the final chapter.
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Chapter 6 
An alternative model for impulsivity 
Chapter summary
The aim of this chapter is to explore the model of impulsivity proposed by Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001). The first step in Study 4 replicated the three factor structure of the scales 
adapted from the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) UPPS impulsivity questionnaire. The 
second step demonstrated that tlie relationship between the UPPS scales and the Big Five 
personality traits is more complex than is implied by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) and 
that an independent measure of impulsivity, the BIS-Short, predicts a significant amount 
of variance in each of the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) variables after the influence of 
the Big Five is partialled out. The final step compared the facets of impulsivity identified 
by the APPS scales and the BIS-11; in their inter-relationships and in their correlations 
with other variables.
Introduction
This thesis has so far argued for a construct of impulsivity as a coherent, well defined 
trait which is independent of, though related to, the five factor model of personality; the 
model of impulsivity developed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) presents a strong 
challenge to that construct. Whiteside and Lynam (2001) argued that the construct of
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impulsivity is a description of behaviour with no implication as to the causes of that 
behaviour, and with no implication that all instances of impulsive behaviour reflect a 
common underlying variable. This approach echoes the arguments described in the 
introduction from Parker and Bagby (1997) and Depue and Collins (1999) who refer to 
wide range of disparate behaviours described as impulsive. What is distinctive about the 
approach of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) is the use of the five factor model of 
personality to organise these disparate behaviours into homogenous and distinct 
categories.
This is expressed with particular clarity by Miller, Flory, Lynam and Leukfield (2003) 
when they define impulsivity as ‘ ... an artificial umbrella term Üiat actually encompasses 
four distinct facets o f personality associated with impulsive behaviour.” They distinguish 
between four types of impulsive behaviour; relating each of these to a different facet 
within the Big Five model of personality. The first two of these — lack o f  premeditation 
and lack o f  perseverance - refer, respectively, to acting without appropriate forethought 
and to an inability to persevere at a task which may be difficult or boring; these are 
related to the Big Five trait of conscientiousness; specifically, to the facets of deliberation 
and self discipline respectively. The third, sensation seekings, relates to the desire to 
pursue new and exciting experiences; this they relate to the Big Five trait of extraversion; 
specifically to the facet of excitement seeking. The fourth impulsivity trait is urgency^ the 
tendency to act on the impetus of strong negatively affective impulses; this they relate to 
the Big Five trait of neuroticism; specifically to the facet of impulsivity. The degree of 
identification of the impulsivity traits with the NEO facets can be seen in the Miller et al
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(2003) study which actually uses the relevant facet scores from the NEO as proxy 
measures of impulsivity.
A crucial aspect of this model is the implication that the different facets of impulsivity 
should relate differentially to different behavioural variables. Whiteside et al (2005) 
aimed to demonstrate the differential validity of the four UPPS scales in relation to 
clinical syndromes associated with impulsivity. Their study employed five groups of 
subjects; two groups of participants with alcohol problems, one with and one without 
symptoms of antisocial disorder (groups b and a), clients in treatment for borderline 
personality disorder (group c) and clients in treatment for pathological gambling (group 
d); the final group (e) was a control group. Though the authors argue that there was 
evidence of differential validity, from the perspective of the present thesis the results 
were equivocal. Subjects manifesting symptoms of alcohol abuse but not antisocial 
personality disorder and the control subjects, did not differ on any of the impulsivity 
measures. Groups b, c, and d did not differ on the premeditation, perseverance or urgency 
scales; though each differed from the control group on all three measures. Thus the three 
measures of impulsivity under scrutiny in the present study acted in concert in 
differentiating between the psychopathology groups and the control group. Whiteside et 
al (2005) concluded that urgency was the form of impulsivity most strongly associated 
with psychopathology; this may however be largely if not entirely attributable to its high 
covariance with negative affect.
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Nevertheless the nature of this model is in crucial ways underspecified. Neither 
Whiteside and Lyiam (2001) nor Whiteside et al (2005) report correlations between the 
UPPS scales and the NEO traits or facets, nor do they explicitly demonstrate that the 
UPPS scales correlate with their related facets in preference to other facets of the same 
trait. They do not discuss the relationship between premeditation and perseverance as 
manifestations of facets of a common trait -  conscientiousness -  a commonality which 
suggests that the possibility of a common latent variable. Rather they seem to assume that 
there is no more relationship between premeditation and perseverance than there is 
between either of those and sensation seeking or urgency; though of course the FFM 
itself is unclear as to the meaning of the relationship between facets and traits.
When they describe impulsivity as “being made up of multiple traits or pathways that can 
lead to a variety of impulsivity related behaviours” they seem to imply that impulsive 
behaviour (U, P, P and S are merely descriptive phenotypic constructs) is caused by the 
related personality traits, however the FFM, whether derived from lexical studies or from 
questionnaire studies, is not proposed as a causal model but rather a descriptive scheme 
which maps out the relations of covariance between behaviours. This covariance is not 
itself explained; thus the question remains as to how impulsivity is explained after it has 
been identified with facets of the Big Five since the FFM does not itself offer an 
explanation merely a description. The authors’ explanatory schema requires that the Big 
Five traits, and indeed their facets, are treated as causal variables but this requires 
justification, since relatively narrow traits such as deliberation are just as much 
phenotypical behaviour patterns as premeditation;
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What is the relationship between premeditation, perseverance and the higher order trait of 
conscientiousness, apart from their covariance and what does the high correlation 
between these two types of impulsivity indicate? If the four varieties of impulsive 
behaviour are to be identified with three different Big Five trait domains which are 
themselves unrelated, at least theoretically, then the varieties of impulsivity ought to be 
uncorrelated. We see here again how the neglected causal status of the latent variables 
within most models of personality impedes the explanation and understanding of 
impulsivity.
Nevertheless the Whiteside and Lynam model of impulsivity has several positive 
qualities. Their data seems to indicate only a weak relationship between sensation 
seeking and other aspects o f impulsivity, thus supporting the argument made in the 
introduction to this thesis. Whiteside and Lynam (2001) reported non-significant 
correlations of .00 and -.14 between sensation seeking and premeditation and 
perseverance respectively; Whiteside et al (2005) found correlations between the same 
traits of ,20 and .02 respectively. Also of value is their emphasis upon tlie construct of 
perseverance which, as the auüiors point out, has received less attention than the 
construct of premeditation in the literature on impulsivity; though the high correlations 
obtained between premeditation and perseverance (.45 and .65 in the afore-mentioned 
studies) argues against their independence.
Of particular interest however is their emphasis upon the impulsive behaviour which they 
label ‘urgency’ which seems to have considerable relevance to the impulsive element of
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many varieties of psychopathology. The implication of their argument seems to be that 
the impulsive behaviour which one sees in disorders such as borderline personality or 
bulimia is a function of the high levels of the negative affect which characterize such 
disorders rather than a function of conscientiousness or any of its facets; though once 
again because of their identification of urgency with a particular facet of neuroticism it is 
unclear what the relationship is with neuroticism as a whole and indeed to agreeableness 
which also contains a substantial measure of negative affect. A fruitful way to 
characterize the difference between a conscientiousness-based impulsivity and 
neuroticism-based impulsivity may be to consider the former as due to weakness of 
inliibition whereas latter is due to strength of impulses interacting with weakness of 
inhibition. This conceptualisation coincides with that of Depue and Lenzenweger (2005) 
who distinguish between an affect-ffee impulsivity and an “affective impulsivity (which) 
emerges from the interaction of nonaffective constraint with other distinct affective 
motivational systems, such as positive incentive motivation-agentic extraversion or 
anxiety-neuroticism” (p.421). The former configuration, of impulsivity interacting with 
positive affect, is discussed by Depue and Collins (1999) as the basis of sensation seeking 
while the latter configuration, of impulsivity interacting with negative affect, is discussed 
by Depue and Lenzenweger (2005) as the basis of personality disorder syndromes.
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Study 4: Evaluating the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) model of impulsivity
Aims
The overall aim of the present study was to analyse and evaluate the model of impulsivity 
proposed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) and compare it with that of Barratt and his 
colleagues Patton et al 1995). Given the results of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) relating 
to the sensation seeking dimension and given the general orientation of this thesis to 
distinguish between sensation seeking and impulsivity proper it was decided at an early 
stage to discard the sensation seeking scale and to utilise only the urgency, premeditation 
■and perseverance (UPP) scales. More specific aims are as follows.
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) do not report a factor analysis of the final UPPS 
questionnaire, only of a 50-item preliminary version from which 5 items were removed 
due to low factor loadings; so the first step in this study was to carry out an exploratory 
factor analysis of the UPP scales to replicate the structure they proposed. Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001) argued that premeditation and perseverance are a function of 
conscientiousness while urgency is a function of neuroticism so the second step was to 
relate the UPP scales to two measures of the Big Five. Given that in the Whiteside and 
Lynam model there is no common underlying impulsivity variable influencing 
premeditation & perseverance and urgency.there might be expected to be no correlation 
between these three traits; however the covariance of conscientiousness facets (Costa and 
McCrae report a correlation of .39 between the facets of deliberation and self discipline)
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would lead to a prediction of a high correlation between premeditation and perseverance. 
On the other hand, given that the traits of neuroticism and conscientiousness are unrelated 
then two hypotheses follow; there should be but only minor correlations between the 
neuroticism trait of urgency and the conscientiousness traits of perseverance and 
premeditation; and premeditation and perseverance should correlate only with 
conscientiousness while urgency should correlate only with neuroticism.
The third step is to consider the relationship between the UPP scales, the Big Five and a 
measure of impulsivity -  the BIS-11. If tlie UPP constructs of impulsivity are largely, or 
entirely, a function of personality then the BIS-11 should not predict a substantial amount 
of variance in these scales after their relationship with the Big Five have been partialled 
out. The fourth step is to map out the relationship between the aspects of impulsivity 
identified by the UPP scales and the BIS-11, and then to consider their relative efficacy in 
predicting impulsivity related behaviours.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
Participants consisted of a sample o f488 subjects, 16% male, all of whom were 
contained in the sample considered in chapter 4 (sample 1). The sample consisted of 
54% nursing students and 46% psychology students. All 488 completed the UPP scales
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and the BIS-11. Three hundred and forty five of the participants completed the Big Five 
Inventory and 272 of those also completed the NEO-FFI. Within this sample 241 
completed the Buss and Perry (1992) scales of aggiession and 236 completed scales of 
eating and drinking behaviour.
Measures
The UPPS scales of impulsivity were developed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) from a 
joint analysis of a number of impulsivity scales, where impulsivity was broadly defined, 
and the facet scales of the NBO-PI-R. The questionnaire consists of four scales to 
measure urgency, premeditation, perseverance and sensation seeking; having 12, 11, 10 
and 12 items respectively, and alpha coefficients of .86, .91, .82 and .90 respectively. 
Premeditation and perseverance correlated .45; these two traits correlated equally with 
urgency (.28 and .29 respectively) and non-significantly with sensation seeking (.00 and 
.14 respectively); sensation seeking and urgency correlated only .18. In summaiy it 
would seem that sensation seeking is largely unrelated to the other three types of 
impulsivity; a finding which corroborates the differentiation made by Eysenck between 
impulsivity and venturesomeness, as well as the research reviewed in the introduction to 
this thesis. Consequently only the urgency, premeditation and perseverance (UPP) scales 
were administered to the participants (Table A.4 in appendix).
The alcohol consumption scale is as described in study 1. The eating behaviour scale 
was developed for the author’s research programme and was devised to parallel the
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alcohol consumption scale. This is a 10-item self report scale, consisting of items 
relating to a sense of lack of control over eating (see Table A.5 in the appendix). The 
BIS-11 and the Buss and Perry aggression scales were described in previous chapters as 
were the NEO-FFI and the BFI
A composite measure of the Big Five was created from an amalgamation of the NEO-FFI 
and the BFI; these composite scores were available for 269 subjects. Z scores for each 
trait from the two questionnaires were added to give a composite trait measure. The aim 
here was to avoid reliance upon only one operationalisation of the Big Five traits by 
using two independently developed questionnaires with different response formats and 
different behavioural representations of the five traits. Correlations between traits across 
the two measures were .70 for both conscientiousness and neuroticism; while the 
correlations between two measures of extraversion, openness and agreeableness ranged 
from .57 to .59. The latter figures especially suggest only a modest amount of overlap 
between the two measures of the same construct.
Results
Factor analysis of the Urgency, Premeditation and Perseverance (UPP) Items
The items from the UPP scales were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis which 
produced a scree plot, Figure 6.1, strongly suggestive of 3 factom which accounted for 
41% of the total variance.
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Figure 6 J  Scree plot of eigen values following factor analysis of UPP items
Scree Plot
10
(D
c
(D.2 )in
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25  27 29 31 33
Factor Number
Extraction of three factors using principal axis factoring and subjected to promax rotation 
produced the following pattern. Factor 1 consisted of all twelve urgency items as 
defined by Whiteside and Lynam (2001), factor 2 consisted of nine of the ten 
perseverance items- the remaining perseverance item showed approximately equal 
loadings on all three factors — and factor 3 consisted of ten of the eleven premeditation 
items -the missing item did not load on any factor. Correlations between factors ranged 
from .36 to .63. Alpha reliabilities for the three 10-item scales, premeditation, 
perseverance and urgency, were .85, .80 and .88 respectively.
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Table 6.1 shows the correlations between the UPP scales as defined by Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001) and the impulsivity measures used in previous chapters. The three UPP 
variables correlated highly, particularly premeditation with perseverance, and both of 
these correlated approximately equally with urgency though to a lesser degree. All of 
these correlations are substantially higher than those reported by Whiteside and Lynam 
(2001) though similar those reported in Whiteside et al (2005); in all three the pattern is 
the same.
In table 6.1 it can also be seen that the UPP scales correlate highly with each of the BIS- 
11 sub-scales, ranging from .59 to .71. It is clear, however, that there is no simple 
correspondence between the traits in the two models, each trait in one model correlates 
substantially with at least two of the impulsivity traits in the other model. The three UPP 
scales each conelate highly, and to a similar degree with the BIS-Short. This pattern of 
results suggests that the UPP variables share considerable variance with the BIS-11 and 
may be a function of the same underlying variable; they may in fact be facets of 
impulsivity rather than different types of impulsive behaviour.
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Table 6.1 Pearson product moment correlations between UPP scales, (premediation, 
perseverance, and urgency), BIS-11 (planning, motor, and cognitive) and BIS-Short
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Premeditation
2 Perseverance .59
3 Urgency -.40 -.37
4 Planning -.73 -.65 .39
5 Motor -.45 -.27 .54 .39
6 Cognitive -.46 -.52 .63 .50 .47
7 BIS-Short .68 .61 -68 .71 .77 .75
N = 488. All correlations are significant p< .01
The six impulsivity scale variables were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis (using 
principle axis factoring and promax rotation). The scree plot indicated a clear single 
factor solution accounting for 56% of the total variance; with eigen values of 3.36, 1.00, 
.59, .39, .35, .29. Scores of the un-rotated first factor correlated .90 with scores on the 
BIS-Short.
To further assess the possibility that the relationships between these impulsivity traits 
reflect an underlying variable, the first-order correlations between premeditation, 
perseverance and urgency were compared with the partial correlations when the BIS- 
Short score was partialled out. The first-order correlation between premeditation and
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perseverance of ,59 was reduced to a partial correlation of .30 when BIS-Short was 
partialled out; i.e. the shared variance was reduced from 35% to 9% implying that 74% of 
the variance shared by premeditation and perseverance is shared with impulsivity as 
measured by the BIS-short. The first-order correlation between premeditation and 
urgency of .39 reduces to .13 and that between perseverance and urgency from .36 to .08; 
implying that 87% and 99% of the variance shared by these pairs of variables is 
attributable to the variance which they share with the BIS-Shoit.
Correlations between UPP scales and the Big Five
Table 6.2 depicts the correlations between the UPP scales and the composite measures of 
the Big Five. Premeditation correlated primarily with conscientiousness and secondarily 
with extraversion and agreeableness; perseverance correlated predominantly with 
conscientiousness and secondarily with neuroticism, extraversion and agreeableness 
while urgency correlated primarily with neuroticism but also substantially with 
conscientiousness and agreeableness.
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Table 6.2 Correlations between UPP scales and the Big Five composite measures
N E O A C
1 Premeditation .00 -.28** -.07 .23** .45**
2 Perseverance -.24** .18** -.07 .16* .71**
3 Urgency .57** -.02 .00 -.42** -.39**
N = 269
N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O = openness to experience, A = agreeableness, C 
conscientiousness.
The relationship between the UPP traits was further investigated utilizing regression 
analysis. The regression analyses show that the Big Five personality traits predicted a 
substantial amount of the variance in each of the 3 UPP traits. Premeditation was a 
function of conscientiousness and extraversion (standardised Beta = .46 and -.34 
respectively; = .33 df = 5,264, F = 26.0, p< .01). Perseverance, was very largely a 
function of conscientiousness, with a minor though significant relationship with 
agreeableness (standardised Beta = .75 and .17 respectively; = .53, df = 5,264, F = 
59.6, p< .01). Urgency was largely a function of neuroticism with lesser though 
significant relationships with conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness 
(standardised Beta = .53, -.22, .21 and -.18 respectively; R  ^= .46 df = 5,264, F = 44.2, p 
< .01). This pattern of Beta weights suggests that the traits of conscientiousness, 
extraversion and agreeableness together share as much variance with urgency as does 
neuroticism.
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The next step in the analysis was to assess the Whiteside and Lynam (2001) claim that 
the UPP traits are simply a manifestation of the Big Five personality traits rather than a 
manifestation of an independent impulsivity dimension by examining whether the BIS- 
Short measure of impulsivity would add to the prediction of the UPP traits if entered into 
a regression model after the Big Five. Table 4.3 shows the results of a hierarchical 
regression analyses whereby each of the UPP variables was independently regressed onto 
the Big Five composite variables as a first step and onto the BIS-Short as a second step. 
The results show that while the Big Five predicted significant and substantial amounts of 
variance in the UPP variables when the BIS-Short was added to the equation a significant 
amount of additional variance was added in each case, ranging from 4% to 18%.
Table 6.3 Hierarchical regression of each UPP variable on the Big Five traits as a first 
step followed by BIS-Short as a second step
Criterion
variables
Step 1. Big Five Step 2. Impulsivity
F change F change
Premeditation 33% 25.9 18% 99.1
Perseverence 53% 59.4 4% 25.4
Urgency 46% 44.1 17% 116.1
N = 269. All F values are signilScant p< .01.
Given the important role of negative affect in influencing urgency according to the 
model, the next analysis examined the contribution of BIS-Short impulsivity to urgency
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over and above the contributions of neuroticism and agreeableness. When urgency was 
regressed onto neuroticism, agreeableness and BIS-impulsivity simultaneously (method 
enter) the standardised beta weights were .41, .09 and .52 respectively with the effect of 
agreeableness not achieving significance. The joint correlation of neuroticism and BIS- 
impulsivity with urgency was .78, with the two traits making approximately equal 
contributions to the predicted variance (Beta = .41 and .52 respectively; R“ - .61, df ~
3,266 F = 141.78, p < .01).
Correlations between Impulsivity Traits and Criterion Behaviour: Eating, Drinking and 
Driving
The final analysis entails comparing the degree to which the UPP scales and the BIS- 
Short correlate with behaviours typically thought to reflect impulsivity. Table 6,4 shows 
the correlations with self reports of eating and drinking behaviour. The most striking 
aspect of the data here is the high correlation between urgency and both of the dependant 
variables. Inspection of the table shows that among the UPP scales urgency was the best 
predictor of both eating and drinking. When a regression analysis was conducted 
whereby the eating and drinking variables were regressed onto the three UPP variables, 
only urgency showed a significant effect; accounting for 23% of the variance in eating 
and 17% in drinking.
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Table 6.4 Correlations between impulsivity traits and eating and drinking behaviour.
Premed Persevere Urgency BIS-Short
Eating
Drinking
-.21**
-.26**
-.23**
-.23**
.48**
.42**
.34**
.35**
N = 236. All correlations significant p<.01 (2-tail)
In the light of the analysis following table 6.3 which showed that impulsivity and 
neuroticism together accounted for 61% of the variance in urgency, a further regression 
analysis was carried out which regressed eating and alcohol consumption onto BIS-short 
and neuroticism as a first block and urgency as a second block. BIS-Short impulsivity 
and neuroticism together accounted for 16% of the variance in eating behaviour while 
urgency added only another 2% (r  ^= .18, df = 3, 207. F = 14.88, p < .01) a small but 
significant amount. A similar analysis found that BIS impulsivity and neuroticism 
together accounted for 11% of the variance in eating behaviour while urgency added a 
more substantial 8% (r  ^= .19, df = 3, 207. F -  13.02, p < .01).
A further subset (n = 241) of this sample completed the Buss and Perry (1992) scales of 
aggression. Of the UPP scales urgency showed the strongest correlations with the 
aggression scales. Once again, among the UPP scales urgency correlates most 
substantially with the criterion variables. Regression analyses where each aggression 
scale was regressed separately onto premeditation, perseverance and urgency showed that 
only urgency made a significant independent contribution to the angry, verbal and 
physical aggression scales.
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Table 6.5 Pearson product moment correlations between anger scales and impulsivity 
scales of UPP and BIS-11.
Premed Persever Urgency BIS-Short
Angry -.19** -.12 .57** .36**
Hostile .00 -.22** .45** .26**
Physical .-.14* -.18** .44** .29**
Verbal -.13* -.01 .31** .23**
N = 261 ** significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) * significant at 0.05 level
The importance of urgency as a predictor of aggression was further explored through a 
regression analysis to assess whether urgency significantly predicted aggressive traits as 
well as eating and drinking behaviour when the influence of the negative affect traits of 
neuroticism and agreeableness were partialled out. Table 6.7 shows the results of 
regressing each of the aggression, eating and drinking variables in turn onto neuroticism, 
agreeableness and urgency as a single block (method enter). Urgency made a significant 
independent contribution to all of the variables except hostility, and was the only 
significant predictor of eating and drinking.
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Table 6.6 Regression of aggression, eating and drinking scales onto neuroticism, 
agreeableness and urgency.
Criterion Standardised Beta coefficients Total R^
variables N A urgency
Physical .04 -.46** .26** .36
Verbal -.19** -.59** .17** .38
Angry .21** -.45** .26** .54
Hostile .55** -.27** .03 .50
Eating .03 .06 .44** ,44
Drinking .03 -.03 .37** .40
N = 270. ** Beta significant p < .01
Discussion
Analysis of the data from this sample replicated the structure proposed by Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001) for the three scales urgency, premeditation and perseverance; 31 of 33 
items loaded significantly on the appropriate factor. Of the two exceptions, one item 
loaded significantly on all three factors and the other on none. All three scales had high 
levels of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .85, .80 and .88) and were normally 
distributed (skewness statistic ranging from -.29 to .35).
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The correlations between scales were somewhat higher than those obtained by Whiteside 
and Lynam (2001) but similar to those obtained Whiteside et al. (2005). The pattern of 
relationships across the three samples was essentially the same in that the two 
conscientiousness scales, premeditation and perseverance, correlated highly, .59, and 
each correlated to an equal but lesser degree with urgency, -.39 and -.36 respectively. 
Though Whiteside and Lynam argue for the conceptual and empirical separation and 
independence of their impulsivity scales the essentially similar correlations between their 
scale and the BIS-11 (.71 .59 .62) as well as the BIS-short (.65, .58, 71) are compatible 
with a hierarchical model of impulsivity as argued by Patton et al (1995).
There were substantial correlations between all six of the impulsivity scales studied in 
this chapter and a factor analysis supported a single factor interpretation; the first un- 
rotated factor accounting for 56% of the total variance. The correlation between the factor 
score on this first factor and the BIS-Short was .90
An important contribution of the model o f Whiteside and Lynam (2001) is their 
identification and treatment of the type of impulsivity which they term ‘urgency’ and 
which they argue should be identified with the facet of impulsivity within the domain of 
neuroticism; however they do not explore the relationship between urgency and the other 
facets of neuroticism. To identify urgency solely with the impulsivity facet of 
neuroticism may simply be to say that the two scales are measuring the same trait; more 
interestingly however, to make the point that urgency is a facet of neuroticism has 
conceptual point if it draws a commonality with other aspects/facets of neuroticism.
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Since the facet of impulsivity correlates substantially with the other facets of the 
neuroticism then urgency would also be correlated with the other neuroticism facets. The 
results of the present study which find urgency to correlate highly with the trait domain 
of neuroticism support such a possibility. It is not clear from the discussion by Whiteside 
and Lynam (2001) whether urgency is considered to be a function of the facet impulsivity 
in particular rather than the domain of neuroticism, or whether they consider urgency to 
be a consequence of the latent variable neuroticism while the facet impulsivity is a 
measure of the behaviour which they identify by the construct urgency
The data reported in the present study finds urgency to correlate substantially with 
agreeableness as well as neuroticism (-.42 and .57 respectively, combined = ,39) 
suggesting tiiat behaviour which is described as urgent may be a function of 
agreeableness as well as neuroticism; a possibility which does not conflict with the 
general thrust of the argument of Whiteside and Lynam (2001). The data from this study 
suggests however that urgency is also predicted by an independent measure of 
impulsivity, the BIS-ShorL As reported earlier regression of urgency onto neuroticism, 
agreeableness and BIS-Short finds neuroticism and BIS impulsivity to predict 
approximately equal amounts of variance in urgency. That this not attributable to BIS 
impulsivity being a function of other Big Five traits is supported by the regression results 
reported in table 4,3 where BIS impulsivity can be seen to add a substantial and 
significant amount of variance when entered into the regression equation after the Big 
Five.
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The high correlation of BIS-short and urgency (.71) is of particular interest since the 
correlation of the two impulsivity traits with neuroticism is markedly different (.26 and 
.57). Partial correlations between BIS impulsivity and urgency remained very high when 
neuroticism was partialled out (partial r = .68 p< .01). This was even true when both Big 
Five traits of negative affect, neuroticism and agreeableness were partialled out (partial r 
= .63 p<.01). The implication seems to be that urgency is a function of an independent 
measure of impulsivity as well as negative affect.
Conceptual weaknesses in this model relate to the lack of clarity within the hierarchical 
model of the FFM. The relationship between a domain -  conscientiousness - and its 
facets has implications for the relationship between premeditation and perseverance and 
the trait of C. Does the substantial correlation between premeditation and perseverance 
reflect -  is it explained by - the correlation between deliberation and self-discipline? Do 
these correlations imply a common latent variable, and if so is it conscientiousness? The 
discourse of the FFM neglects issues both of causation and of interactions between traits 
-  at whatever level of the hierarchy. Typically for the FFM approach, there is no 
consideration of interactions between Big Five traits so tliat the issue of impulsive 
behaviour as a function of more than one personality trait and perhaps of the interaction 
between traits is not examined.
There is furthermore something of a lurking reductionism implicit in much of the 
research of FFM theorists whereby interesting traits are reduced to -  are seen as nothing 
but -  Big Five traits or their facets. The danger is that traits which were embedded in a
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research domain which explores relationships between phenomena at different levels of 
explanation are now reduced to the essentially descriptive framework of the FFM. Tlie 
study of impulsivity as a separate trait explores the relationship between impulsivity and 
bio chemical and neuropsychological substrates as well as identifying laboratory tasks 
which might identify the cognitive processes involved in causing impulsive behaviour.
Whiteside & Lynam (2001) developed a model of impulsivity which is rooted in the five 
factor model of personality and which distinguishes four types, or sources, of impulsivity. 
The first two, premeditation and perseverance, they relate to the Big Five trait of 
conscientiousness, the third, urgency, they relate to neuroticism and particularly to tlie 
facet ‘impulsivity’ as operationalised by the NEO-PI-R, while the fourth is sensation 
seeking, which they identify with Eysenck’s venturesomeness and Zuckerman’s sensation 
seeking scales.
Their identification of urgency as an independent aspect of impulsivity is however less 
clear and, indeed, there are substantial correlations between urgency and both 
premeditation and perseverance. The correlation of urgency with both,premeditation and 
perseverance also requires explanation, though their identification with two distinct and 
orthogonally related factors should make them unrelated. The factor analysis reported by 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001, p.684) shows a substantial secondary loading of urgency on 
the same factor as premeditation and perseverance, while the data from this study shows 
that urgency correlates significantly with conscientiousness (the domain subsuming 
premeditation and perseverance); a relationship which persists after urgency is regressed
142
onto all five personality traits. These data suggest that there may be a latent trait common 
to the three impulsivity facets of Whiteside and Lynam (2001).
These data further suggest that urgency may in fact be a combination of factors, although 
here there are two possibilities. The first is that urgency is a joint product of low 
conscientiousness and high neuroticism; a possibility which would not conflict with the 
model which they propose, but which they do not discuss. The second possibility, which 
fits the model underlying this thesis, is that the latent variable of narrow impulsivity- a 
central aspect of conscientiousness- interacts with neuroticism to produce the behaviour 
which they label urgency and which others have labelled emotional dysregulation.
This thesis argues that urgency is not a primary trait within the higher order trait of 
neuroticism but rather that it is an emergent trait; an amalgam, or even interaction 
between impulsivity, neuroticism and perhaps agreeableness. This conceptualisation fits 
with the argument of Depue and Collins (1999) and Depue and Lenzenweger (2005) that 
constraint is itself affect neutral but that it interacts with negative affect to produce 
complexes of behaviour such as sensation seeking or emotion dysregulation. The simplest 
evidence for this is the result of the regression of urgency on BIS-Short together with 
either the Big Five personality traits or only the traits of neuroticism and agreeableness.
In the first analysis neuroticism and impulsivity make substantial contributions 
(standardised betas of .44 and .56), agreeableness and conscientiousness making minor 
though significant contributions with Beta weights of .11 and the remaining traits not 
significant. In the second analysis only neuroticism and impulsivity make significant
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contributions with beta weights of .41 and .52, while agreeableness makes no significant 
contribution. Thus it seems that urgency is largely a function of impulsivity and 
neuroticism.
Despite their radical critique, the results of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) do contribute to 
the clarification of the construct of impulsivity. Their sensation seeking scale correlated 
only minimally with the other aspects of impulsivity, confirming Eysenck et al.’s (1985) 
separation of narrow impulsivity and venturesomeness, and questioning the validity of 
Zuckerman’s trait of impulsive-sensation seeking. Their distinction between 
premeditation and perseverance reflects a number of distinctions made within single trait 
models of impulsivity which explore the facets of impulsivity; e.g. Parker and Bagby’s 
distinction between their two dimensions — cautious/spontaneous and 
methodical/disorganized and tlie Barratt BIS-11 facets of planning and 
cognitive/attentional impulsivity. Whiteside and Lynam (2001) point out that the 
perseverance trait -  which reflects the individual’s ability to remain focused on a task and 
to work under conditions which require resistance to distracting stimuli -  is not well 
represented in most measures of impulsivity; though it is given due salience in the model 
which the present thesis derives from the theoretical framework of ADHD.
The examination of the two questionnaires under consideration suggests two conclusions. 
Starting firom different theoretical perspectives the two questionnaires both divide the 
domain of impulsivity into three facets but there is no simple and clear correspondence 
between the facets in the two questionnaires. Nevertheless the data, by showing
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substantial correlations between the six facets, as well as the substantial and 
approximately equal correlations between the three UPP variables and the BIS-Short, are 
consistent with the hypothesised construct of narrow impulsivity defended by this thesis. 
While the two questionnaires are based upon two very different conceptualisations of 
impulsivity there is the possibility of rapprochement through recognising that impulsivity 
may interact with other aspects of personality to produce emergent traits such as urgency 
and emotion dysregulation.
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Chapter 7 
ADHD traits as a model for impulsivity 
Summary
The overall aim of this chapter was to explore the way in which an understanding of 
ADHD behaviour as'one or more dimensional traits contributes to an understanding of 
the multi dimensional nature of impulsivity. As outlined in chapter 1, there is a 
considerable overlap between the constructs of ADHD and impulsivity; not only in terms 
of the behavioural phenotype (surface behaviours such as acting or speaking without 
thought, distractibility and disorganisation) but also in terms of the latent variable of 
inhibition which is hypothesised as a fundamental cause of both sets of behaviour.
This chapter aims first to demonstrate the validity of the trait concept of ADHD in a 
sample of non-clinical adults and secondly to explore the relationships between the facets 
of ADHD and those of impulsivity as identified by the BIS-11.
Study 5 provided evidence for the validity of a trait conception of ADHD behaviour. 
Factor analysis of an 18-item scale designed to assess ADHD behaviours in adults 
produced a clear two factor structure paralleling the sub-type analysis of ADHD 
symptoms in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4^ ed. 
Construction of scales based upon this analysis produced ‘traits’ which were normally 
distributed and which showed relationships with the Big Five traits similar to those
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obtained in previous research. The total ADHD scale also correlated significantly with 
self and peer reports of two categories of behaviour, driving behaviour and alcohol 
consumption, which have previously been shown to differ between ADHD cases and 
non-cases; this relationship remained significant after the variance attributable to the Big 
Five was partialled out.
Study 6 explored the relationships between the two ADHD sub-scales and the three facets 
of the BIS-11. The first aim was to explore the relationships between the five facet scales; 
the second aim was to compare the predictive validity of the ADHD and BIS scales in 
relation to both self and peer reports of driving behaviour and alcohol consumption; and 
the third aim was to carry out an exploratory factor analysis of the ADHD and BIS-11 
items together.
Introduction
The research of Barratt and his colleagues as well as the data presented in earlier chapters 
of this thesis suggests a model of impulsivity wherein a higher order general impulsivity 
construct subsumes three correlated facets. If this model is conceptualised simply as a 
description of co-variances between measures then it has a similar conceptual logic to the 
five factor models of personality whether derived from lexical or questioimaire studies. 
Alternatively it may be conceptualised as a causal model in which an hypothesised latent 
variable is manifest as three correlated facets. In this latter model the differences between
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individuals in impulsivity as well as the covariance between the facets is caused by the 
latent variable.
The model presented by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) is an extension of the former, 
descriptive, model. They argue for the independence of their impulsivity facets by 
identifying them with facets within the Big Five model of personality as operationalised 
by the NEO-PI-R; yet the relationships between the identified factors within the NED are 
merely descriptions of covariance. If their impulsivity facet ‘urgency’ is simply identified 
with the neuroticism facet of ‘impulsivity’ then little is explained except perhaps to say 
that the NEC already contains a ready made measure of ‘urgency. The model of 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) incorporates the same theoretical assumptions as most five 
factor models of personality; for example, they do not discuss the possibility that some of 
the varieties of impulsive behaviour which they describe may be a function of a number 
of different traits - emergent traits. As argued in the previous chapter, this may be true of 
the facets of urgency and sensation seeking.
A model which may more fruitfully contribute to the explanation and understanding of 
impulsivity is the model of ADHD from child psychopathology; as pointed out in the 
introduction, especially in its dual emphasis upon both cognitive and behavioural aspects 
of impulsivity. Most discussions of impulsivity tend to focus upon behaviour, whether 
expressed or inhibited; note tlie definitions in the introduction. Paradigm laboratory tasks 
such as delay of gratification or stop tasks are specifically focussed upon the inhibition of 
overtly observable behaviours. Nevertheless there is, in a number of research programs
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an acknowledgement of the role of cognitive as well as behavioural inhibition in 
impulsivity- Within the individual differences literature on impulsivity the BIS-11 
contains a facet of cognitive or attentional impulsivity which refers to problems of 
concentration and attention and the presence of distracting thoughts: this facet of 
attentional impulsivity correlates substantially (between .46 and .63) with the UPP scales 
of Whiteside and Lynam (2001), though there are in fact no items in the UPP scales 
which refer to such cognitive phenomena. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction 
and to be discussed further in the next chapter, Dickman (1993, 2000) reviewed evidence 
on the relationship between self-reported impulsivity and a variety of cognitive tasks and 
suggested that deficits in attention regulation, particularly in the efficient maintenance of 
sustained attention, underlie and explain individual differences in impulsive behaviour.
Perhaps the clearest explication of the inhibition of cognitive factors such as attention and 
distractibility is in the domain of child psychopathology. Goldsmith et al. (2004) illustrate 
the way in which developmental psychology has enriched the theorising of impulsivity. 
They identify a regulatory domain of temperament which involves the ability to inhibit 
behaviour when required, the ability to deploy attention effectively and the ability to 
dampen negative affect. These three regulatory functions are clearly identified in the 
theorising of Rothbart et al. (2000) as well as the model of ADHD defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4^ ed.; DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association 1994).
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Derryberry and Rothbart (1997) employ the construct of ‘effortful control’, defined as the 
ability to inhibit a dominant response to perform a subdominant response; a construct 
which involves the effortful control of both attentional processes and behaviour. Rothbart 
et al, (2000), while pointing out the similarities between some of their temperamental 
variables and the Big Five personality traits, nevertheless also suggest that descriptive 
models of personality tend to reinforce a simple trait-based model of personality without 
either dynamic or developmental elements. They argue that temperamental models are 
more likely to lead to the exploration of the interaction of organism and environment 
(and, I would add, the interaction between temperamental traits).
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is commonly conceptualised as a 
disorder arising in early childhood involving impairments in attention, poor resistance to 
distraction, deficient response inhibition and hyperactivity (Barkley, 1997). The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4^ ed.; DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association 1994) divides the symptoms of ADHD into three subtypes: an 
inattentive type, a hyperactive/impulsive type and a combined type.
As pointed out in the introduction, a number of theorists (e.g.; Barkley, 1997; Quay,
1997: Schachar et al., 2000) identify deficiencies in impulse control as central deficits in 
ADHD. For example, Barkley (1997) identifies deficits in inhibition as a primary 
dysfunction which then affect the efficacy of a variety of executive functions including 
attentional control, distractibility, working memory and emotional regulation, while
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Quay (1997) argues for an under-active behavioural inhibition system (BIS, Gray, 1982) 
as the neuropsychological basis for ADHD.
Although early conceptualisations of ADHD saw it as a disorder of middle childhood 
which tended to remit by late adolescence, largely as a consequence of maturation ( 
Mendelson, Johnson, & Stewart, 1971), Willoughby (2003) reviewed evidence to show 
that the sequelae of childhood ADHD continue into late adolescence and early adulthood 
and include negative educational and occupational outcomes, relationship problems and 
substance use. For example, Barkley, Murphy, DuPaul and Bush (2002) found that young 
adults with a history of childhood ADHD differed significantly from a control group in 
the number of driving offences recorded and in both self and peer assessments of their 
driving ability. Furthermore, the status o f ADHD as a chronic disorder which continues 
into adulthood is now supported by a considerable amount of evidence (Faraone, 
Biederman, Spencer, Wilens, Seidman, Mick, & Doyle 2000, McGough & Barkley 
2004).
Researchers are beginning to explore a conceptualisation of ADHD behaviour as a 
continuous dimension rather than as a diagnostic category, in line with developments in 
other areas of clinical psychology. Although DSM-IV provides a system for the 
categorical classification of mental disorder, Widiger and Sankis (2000) point out that 
“increasing amounts of attention and interest are being given to alternative dimensional 
models of classification, from the personality disorders... through the mood and anxiety 
disorder.... to the schizophrenic and affective psychotic disorders. (Widiger & Sankis
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2000, p.396). O’Connor (2002) reviewed evidence to suggest that analysis of both 
personality and psychopathology inventories produces the same dimensions in clinical as 
in non-clinical respondents. Particularly germane to the present discussion is his 
conclusion that, with regard to psychopathology inventories, “Their subscales sometimes 
have clinical-type names, but the dimensions that are assessed by these instruments are 
readily found in non-clinical populations.” (O’Connor, 2002, p. 974).
With regard to ADHD specifically, Buitelaar (2002) argued that since the diagnostic 
threshold as defined by DSM-IV involves a number of symptoms, and that symptoms can 
be substituted for one another, there is an explicit acknowledgement of an underlying 
dimension. Buitelaar (2002) reviewed epidemiological evidence to support a 
dimensional view of ADHD symptoms as assessed by rating scales, finding such data to 
support a two or three factor interpretation of ADHD symptoms, similar to the DSM-IV 
sub-categories of inattentive, hyperactive and combined type. Frazier, Youngstrom and 
Naugle (2007) examined the latent structure of ADHD through the analysis of self report 
and neuropsychological data firom a sample o f437 individuals and found no evidence for 
the taxonomic nature of ADHD; nor did they find evidence for a qualitative distinction 
between the inattention and hyperactivity sub-types.
Evidence for a dimensional view also comes from behaviour genetics research. Sherman, 
lacono and McGue (1997), on the basis o f their behaviour genetic data, concluded that 
ADHD should be considered as a composite of two quantitative, continuously distributed 
dimensions rather than a homogenous, categorical disorder. Levy, Hay, McStephen,
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Wood and Waldman. (1997) in their study of the heritability of ADHD came to a similar 
conclusion: - “These findings suggest that ADHD is best viewed as the extreme of a 
behaviour that varies genetically throughout the population rather that as a disorder with 
discrete determinants.” (p. 737).
A number of studies have used self and peer report scales consisting of items based upon 
DSM-IV symptoms to derive a dimensional assessment of ADHD behaviours. Wlialen, 
Jammer, Hencker, Delfmo and Lozano (2002), used DSM-IV symptom subscales and 
derived a total ADHD score by summing the ratings given for the 18 items, each item 
being rated on a four-point scale. They divided their non-clinical sample of young 
adolescents into high, low and middle scores on the ADHD symptom scale, or ADHD 
‘spectrum’, and found significant differences in alcohol consumption and smoking 
behaviour, variables which research has associated with the diagnostic status of ADHD.
Researchers have also begun to examine the relationships between normal personality 
traits and ADHD symptoms. Nigg, Blaskey, Huang-Pollock, Hinshaw, John, Wilcutt and 
Pennington (2002) reported a large scale study using a number of indicators to 
retrospectively assess the presence o f childhood ADHD and sought to relate these to the 
Big Five personality traits in adulthood as assessed by the NEO-FFI. They found the 
ADHD symptom cluster of inattention to correlate negatively with conscientiousness and, 
to a lesser extent, positively with neuroticism. The symptom cluster of hyperactivity- 
impulsivity correlated most strongly with low agreeableness (-.45), suggesting that this 
cluster is perhaps closer to conduct disorder than to ADHD. Though working within a
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conceptual framework which considers ADHD as a category, Nigg et al. (2002) derived 
scores on a continuous scale from their indicators, thereby adopting a dimensional view 
of ADHD behaviour. Parker, Majeski and Collin (2003) employed scales derived from 
Conners, Erhardt, and Sparrow (1999) based upon DSM-IV symptoms which assess 
inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity as dimensions; these scales having been 
demonstrated by Erhardt, Epstein, Conners and Sitarenios (1999) to discriminate between 
clinical cases of ADHD and non-clinical subjects with a high degree of accuracy. Using 
the NEO-FFI measure of the Big Five personality traits they found conscientiousness 
and, to a lesser extent, neuroticism to predict 41% of the variance in Inattention; a pattern 
of results very similar to that of Nigg et al (2002). Hyperactivity/impulsivity was again 
predicted most strongly by agreeableness with neuroticism, extraversion and 
conscientiousness making significant though lesser contributions: the Big Five traits 
together predicted 26% of the variance in hyperactivity/impulsivity.
Study 5 ADHD traits In young adults
The aim of the first study was to demonstrate the validity of DSM-IV ADHD Scales firom 
the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale ( Conners, Erhardt, and Sparrow 1999) as 
measures of trait dimensions in young adults without psychopathology. This involved a 
number of steps. The firat was to explore the structure of the 18-item scale to assess 
ADHD. In line with the DSM-IV model of ADHD sub-types we hypothesized that factor 
analysis would identify two independent though highly correlated factors accounting for
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a substantial portion of the variance in the data, and that these factors would correspond 
closely to the symptom definition of the ADHD subtypes within DSM-IV. Further 
evidence for the validity of these traits would be provided by the analysis of peer report 
versions of the same scales; it was hypothesised that the peer report data would produce 
the same factor structure as the self report scales arid that the scale scores across 
informants would correlated meaningfully.
The second aim was to explore the relationship between the two ADHD scales and the 
Five Factor model (FFM) as operationalised in the NEO-FFI. From the studies of Parker 
et al (2003) and Nigg et al (2002), it was hypothesised that the ADHD inattention scale 
scores would be predicted by a combination of conscientiousness and neuroticism, while 
ADHD hyperactivity/impulsivity scale scores would be predicted by agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism.
The third aim was to explore the correlations between tlie total ADHD score and driving 
behaviour and alcohol consumption. Previous research discussed above (e.g. Whalen et 
al., 2002; Barkley et al-, 2002) has concentrated upon tlie total ADHD score rather than 
subtypes; in keeping with these prior studies it was hypothesised that scores on the total 
ADHD scale would correlate positively and significantly with both self and peer reports 
of driving behaviour and alcohol consumption.
In Chapter 5 the incremental validity of impulsivity was demonstrated despite its sizeable 
relationship with the Big Five personality traits; in the same way the fourth aim was to
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demonstrate the incremental validity of the total ADHD scale over the Big Five in the 
prediction of the chosen behavioural criteria despite the sizeable relationships established 
in previous research between ADHD and Big Five personality traits.
Method
Participants and procedure
The total sample consisted of 320 subjects of which 64% were males. Sample 1 consisted 
of 118 male university students, ages ranging from 18 to 22 (mean =19.1 years, sd =
1.2). Sample 2 consisted of a convenience sample of people from outside the university 
comprising 202 subjects, of whom 43% were males with ages ranging from 18 to 64 
(mean = 33.4 sd= 13.1).
Data were collected by final year psychology students. For sample 1 students were asked 
to each approach two male student friends and request that they complete the 
questionnaire. Students then completed a peer report version of the same questiormaires 
as a description of those same friends. For sample 2 students were requested to each 
approach four subjects who were not at university, two male and two female, without 
regard to age. No peer reports were obtained for this second sample. All 320 subjects 
completed the ADHD and Big Five scales. Of these, 282 reported driving behaviour, 38 
reporting that they did not drive, while 303 completed alcohol scales, 17 reporting that
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they did not drink alcohol. Peer report versions of the alcohol consumption and driving 
scales were returned by 95 and 110 respectively of the fellow students.
Measures
ADHD traits were assessed with the 18 item ADHD scale from Conners, Erhardt and 
Sparrow (1999) based upon the 18 symptoms specified by The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4* ed.; DSM-ÏV; American Psychiatric Association 1994). 
Nine of tliese relate to the inattentive sub-type and nine to the hyperactive/impulsive sub- 
type (Table A.6 in appendix). However, as explained below in the results, a factor 
analysis of the scale led to one of the hyperactivity-impülsivity items being dropped; 
resulting in a 17 item scale. Items consisted of statements which required responses on a 
6- point scale ranging from 1 = never/ disagree strongly to 6 = very often/agree 
strongly. The total ADHD trait score was the simple sum of responses to all 17 items. 
The ADHD inattention and ADHD impulsivity trait scores were obtained by summating 
the responses to the relevant statements, nine in the case of inattention and eight in the 
case of impulsivity- Alpha reliability values were 0.88 for the ADHD scale, 0.85 for the 
inattention scale and 0.78 for the impulsivity scale (n = 320).
Driving behaviour was assessed with the Driving Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ; 
Westerman & Haigney 2000) which assesses violations (deliberate infringements of the 
law or driving improperly), errors (errors of intention) and lapses (errors of action).
Alpha reliability coefficients for the three scales, each of eight items, were 0.74 for
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lapses. 0.67 for errors and 0.74 for violations, Westerman and Haigney (2000) report a 
correlation of 0.59 between errors and lapses, suggesting considerable overlap between 
the two. In the interests of economy only the former two scales, violations and errors 
were utilised; thus there were 16 items to which responses were made on a 6-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1= never to 6 = very often. In the present research, violations and 
errors correlated 0.50 and the Alpha reliability values were .80 for the violations scale 
and .82 for the errors scale (n = 284). Self-rated violations correlated significantly more 
highly with peer-rated violations than with peer-rated errors (.67 versus .23, t = 5.67, d f= 
92, p <.05), Self rated errors correlated significantly more highly with peer rated errors 
than with peer rated violations (.51 versus . 17, t = 3.79, df = 92, p < .05).
The Big Five personality traits were assessed by the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae 1992). 
The NEO-FFI is a 60-item self-report questionnaire wherein each of the Big Five traits 
is measured by 12 items. Responses are made on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1= 
disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly. For the present samples, Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha reliabilities ranged from 0.73 to 0.82 and were comparable to values published by 
the test authors (Costa & McCrae 1992).
Alcohol consumption was assessed with a 10-item self report scale developed by the 
authors for this and other studies, consisting of nine questions relating either to excessive 
alcohol consumption or to the undesirable consequences of such consumption, the final 
question asked about the firequency of consuming more than 6 units of alcohol on one 
occasion - a commonly used measure of binge drinking. See Chapter 4 for the actual 
scale items. Questions required responses on a 6 point scale ranging from 1 = never to 6
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= almost always and the total score was the simple sum of responses. Cronbach’s alpha 
for this scale was 0,91. In an earlier study, the test-retest correlation between two 
administrations of the alcohol scale across approximately 12 weeks was r = .74 (N = 144, 
p < .01) and the correlation between self and peer report versions of this scale was r = 
0.62 (N = 266, p < .01). In the present sample the correlation between self and peer 
reports of alcohol consumption was r = 0.72 (N = 110. p < .01).
Results
Factor analysis of ADHD items
The 18 ADHD items were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis, using a principal 
axis factor extraction followed by Promax rotation ( N = 320). The scree plot showed two 
distinct factors accounting for 36% of the total variance, with the rest of the factors 
forming an almost perfectly straight line of scree ( first six Eigen values were 5.9,1.8,
1.1, .1.0, .90, .85): A two-factor solution produced a division of items into two clear 
groups corresponding almost exactly to the sub-types proposed by DSM-IV. The 
exception was an item referring to the respondent being ‘always on the go* which loaded 
equally but in opposite directions on the two factors; i.e. negatively on the first 
‘inattention’ factor and positively on the second ‘impulsivity’ factor. That item was 
dropped from consideration in the analyses which follow. Factor analysis of the 17 items 
again produced a clear two factor structure with the items divided into the predicted 
grouping; the correlation between the two factors was .65. The distribution of the scores 
was essentially normal; skewness statistics for inattention and impulsivity were .69 and
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.52 respectively, values which were comparable to those obtained for the Big Five traits 
of extraversion and agreeableness, -.60 and -.65 respectively.
Factor analysis of the peer-report ADHD data (available for a sub-sample of 116) 
produced a very similar result; item 9 again loaded in opposite directions on the two 
factors. Factor analysis of 17 items again produced a clear two factor structure, 
accounting for 47% of the variance, with a between factor coirelation of .49. Once again 
the items divided into the predicted groups.
Comparing correlations and cross correlations between self and peer reports provided 
evidence for the validity of the trait scales. The correlation between the sub-scales was 
.60 for self-report and .49 for the peer-report data. Self-rated inattention correlated 
significantly more highly with peer-rated inattention than with peer rated 
hyperactivity/impulsivity (.54 versus .22, t = 3,97, df = 113, p < ,05), while self-rated 
hyperactivity/impulsivity correlated significantly more highly with peer-rated 
hyperactivity/impulsivity than with peer-rated inattention (.47 versus .31, t = 1.90, d f= 
113, p < .05, one-tailed.). All of these correlations were significant; p < .05.
ADHD symptoms and the Big Five personality traits
Table 7.1 shows the correlations between the two ADHD traits of inattention and 
impulsivity and the Big Five personality traits. Regression of the two ADHD traits 
separately onto the Big Five provided results which were very similar across sexes.
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Inattention was predicted primarily by conscientiousness and secondarily by neuroticism 
and extraversion; Beta = -.57, .25 and .13 respectively (R  ^= .44, F = 62.3, df. = 4,318, 
p< ,01). Hyperactivity/impulsivity was predicted by extraversion, agreeableness, 
neuroticism and conscientiousness; Beta = .37, -.34, ,22 and -.22 respectively (R  ^= .29, F 
= 31.8,df=4,318p<.01.).
Table 7.1 Correlations between two ADHD sub-traits and the Big Five traits
Inatten hyper neuro extra open agree
Inattention
Hyperactivity .60**
neuroticism .32** .17**
extiaversion -.09 .16** -.39**
openness .06 -.10 .05 .15*
agreeableness -.27** -.37** -.12* .21** .12*
conscientiousness -.62** -.32** -.20** .16** .08 .33**
n = 320
** significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed)
ADHD characteristics and driving behaviour and alcohol consumption
Table 7.2 shows the correlations between the total ADHD scale score and the dependent 
variables, driving violations, driving errors and alcohol consumption; each of these being
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assessed by both self and peer reports. As hypothesised, self-reported ADHD correlated 
significantly with self reports of both types of driving behaviour and alcohol 
consumption. Self-reported ADHD trait scores correlated significantly with peer reports 
of alcohol consumption and driving errors but not of violations. Peer reported ADHD 
correlated significantly with both self and peer reports of all three of the dependent 
variables. Among the Big Five traits, agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism 
correlated significantly with self reports of violations, errors and alcohol consumption but 
with no peer reports. Extraversion was unusual in correlating with both self and peer 
reports of alcohol consumption as well as with peer reports - though not self reports - of 
violations.
Table 7.2 Correlations between ADHD and Big Five traits and the independent 
variables, driving behaviour and alcohol consumption.
Self
ADHD
Peer
ADHD
N E O A C
Self violations .46** .21* .14* .10 -.11 -.42** -.35**
(282) (100) (282) (282) (282) (282) (282)
Self errors .46** .23* .25** -.07* -.06 -.25** -.38**
(282) (100) (282) (282) .(282) (282) (282)
Peer violations .14 .35** -.10 .20* .01 -.05 -.01
(95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95)
Peer errors .32** .53** -.08 -.05 .06 -.15 ' -.16
(95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95)
Self alcohol .51** .24* ,11* .21** .02 -.25** -.43**
(303) (110) (303) (303) (303) (303) (303)
Peer alcohol .24* .26** -.07 .21* .03 -.08 -.07
(110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110) (110)
* significant at 0,05 level (2 tailed) significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)
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Table 7,3 shows the results of a number o f hierarchical regressions whereby each 
dependent variable was regressed onto a two-step model in which the first step was 
always the Big Five traits and the second was the self-report ADHD trait. Analysis of the 
self report data showed that the total ADHD scale added significantly to the amount of 
variance predicted in the independent variables - driving behaviour and alcohol 
consumption -  when added to a regression equation after the Big Five. In the peer-report 
data the ADHD scale added significant variance in the prediction of driving errors only. 
However, the results for peer-reported alcohol consumption were suggestive since the 
combination of the Big Five traits and ADHD was significant (R?= .11, F = 2.61, df. = 
5,105 p = .03) though the separate steps in the hierarchical regression were not. In a post 
hoc analysis, peer-reported alcohol consumption was regressed onto ADHD and 
extraversion simultaneously, (these being the only traits with which it correlated 
significantly, see table 7,2). Both traits were significant predictors of peer- reported 
alcohol consumption with approximately equal beta coefficients ,24 and .21 respectively.
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Table 73 Hierarchical regression of each dependent variable on the Big Five traits at step 
I followed by the addition of ADHD at step 2
Dependant
variable
Model ‘ R square 
change
F change Significance 
of F change
df
Violations 1 .297 29.2 ,00 5, 276
self report 2 .037 15.3 .00 1,275
Errors 1 .198 17.2 .00 4, 276
self report 2 .062 23.4 .00 1,275
Violations 1 .073 1.8 .14 ns 5, 89
peer reports 2 .011 1.0 .31 ns 1,88
Errors 1 .042 .99 .41 ns 5, 89
peer reports 2 .074 7.5 .00 1,88
Alcohol 1 31 32.8 .00 5,297
self report 2 .054 25.1 .00 1,296
Alcohol 1 .082 2.4 .06 ns 5, 105
peer report 2 .028 3.4 .07 ns 1,104
Alcohol 
peer report^
1 .10 6,08 .00 2, 108
 ^Model 1 = neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness 
Model 2 =  neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness and ADHD 
 ^model 1 ■= ADHD and extraversion entered simultaneously (‘method enter’)
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Discussion
Exploratory factor analysis of the 18 ADHD characteristics in both the self-reported and 
peer-reported data led to the extraction of two factors which corresponded very closely to 
the ADHD subtypes identified by DSM-IV. The two scales based upon those factors were 
significantly correlated to a degree similar to previous research. Conners, Erhardt and 
Sparrow (1999) report correlations between their DSM subtype scales of 0.43 for males 
and 0.52 for females, while Nigg et al., (2002) found an overall correlation of .56 across 
their samples using a DSM-IV based rating scale for recalled childhood ADHD 
symptoms.
When the inattention scores were plotted against conscientiousness, the Big Five trait 
with which it was most highly correlated (r = -0.62), and against self reported alcohol 
consumption (r — .51), inspection of the scatter plots suggested that the relationships held 
across the full range of both traits with no indication that inattention might be related 
only to the higher levels of conscientiousness or of alcohol consumption. The scores for 
the ADHD sub-traits were moderately positively skewed though to a similar degree as the 
personality traits of extraversion and agreeableness.
The results of correlating the two ADHD sub-traits with the Big Five traits confirmed the 
hypotheses and correspond closely to those reported by Parker et al. (2003) and by Nigg 
et al. (2002). All three sets of data found the inattention sub-trait to correlate most 
substantially with conscientiousness (r ranging from -.48 to -.62) and secondarily with
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neuroticism (,23 to .42); all three studies also found the hyperactivity/impulsivity sub­
trait to be correlated predominantly with agreeablehess and conscientiousness and, to a 
lesser extent, neuroticism and extraversion. There were also close similarities between 
the present results and those of Parker et al. (2003) in the amount of variance in the 
ADHD sub-tiaits predicted by the Big Five. In the present study the Big Five traits 
predicted 44% of the variance in inattention and 29% of the variance in impulsivity, the 
corresponding figures from Parker et al., (2003) were 41% and 26%.
The ADHD total score correlated significantly with driving behaviour and alcohol 
consumption as hypothesised on the basis of previous research relating ADHD cases to 
these behaviours. The results relating the total ADHD trait to the behavioural variables 
are in line with those of Whalen et al. (2002) who construed ADHD characteristics as a 
spectrum and demonstrated differences in behaviour (including alcohol consumption) 
between young people identified as high, medium or low on that spectrum. The results of 
the present study support the hypothesis that such a pattern of results is found when the 
ADHD spectrum is treated as a trait dimension.
Though the multiple correlation of the Big Five traits with the ADHD score was 0.64, 
the variance in ADHD which was independent of the Big Five significantly predicted the 
dependent variables. Thus these results concur with those of Nigg et al. (2002) who 
conclude that “... personality traits seem to reflect an important element of the ADHD 
syndrome, whereas ADHD itself includes surplus symptoms and problems not fully 
captured by the personality measures.” (p. 463). Nigg et al. (2002) treat ADHD
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symptoms as distinct from personality traits as conceptualised and operationalised by Big 
Five models of personality. However, personality traits may predispose to ADHD 
disorder or ADHD symptoms may influence the development of personality. Moreover, 
ADHD behaviours may be manifestations of traits which are at the core of personality. 
Watson, Gamez, and Simms (2005) argue for just such a ‘spectrum’ or dimensional, 
approach when accounting for the relationship between levels o f negative emotionality 
and the development of depressive disorder; arguing for a fundamental continuity 
between normal and abnormal psychological processes.
Study 6 ADHD traits and the BIS-11
Aims
The aim o f this study was to compare the constructs derived from the ADHD trait scales 
and the BIS-11. The BIS-11 was developed as a bespoke measure of impulsivity; 
research into the construct validity of the scale and its development through various 
forms has resulted in a three-faceted model which, by implication, proposes a three factor 
model of impulsivity itself. The importance of the cognitive impulsivity facet, referring to 
distractibility and difficulties in maintaining attention, suggests a clear parallel with the 
model of ADHD which includes an attentional as well as a behavioural element.
The first step was to map the relationships between the two facet scales of the ADHD 
scale and the three facet scales of the BIS-11; these scales were then compared in their
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relationship to a number of outcome variables relating to driving and drinking behaviour. 
The second step was to carry out a joint factor analysis of the items from the ADHD and 
the BIS-11 scales to explore the factors which might emerge from this sample of 48 
impulsivity - related items.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The sample for this study included the 320 subjects from Study 5.1 plus an extra 159 
subjects, 129 (81%) of whom were females; thus the total sample for Study 5.2 consisted 
of 479 subjects, 49% of whom were male. The extra sample consisted of second year 
psychology students who completed a number of self and peer report scales in return for 
course credit All subjects in the new sample completed the self report version of the 
ADHD trait scales, the BIS-11 and the alcohol consumption scales and 143 completed the 
NEO-FFI. Of these new subjects 129 obtained peer reports of ADHD trait and 121 peer 
report alcohol consumption scales. Of these, 50 subjects also provided self and peer 
report versions of the driving scales. All of the scales administered to this, new sample 
were the same as those utilised in study 5.1. An independent samples t test found the two 
samples not to differ significantly in self rated ADHD traits, the BIS-11 and its sub-scales 
and alcohol consumption.
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Results
The 17 ADHD items identified in Study 1 were subjected to a factor analysis utilising the 
expanded data set. As before the items were analysed using a principal axis factor 
extraction followed by Promax rotation (n = 479). Tlie scree plot once again showed two 
distinct factors accounting for 41% of the total variance, with the rest of the factors 
forming an almost perfectly straight line of scree ( the first six Eigen values were 5.5, 1.7, 
1.1, .1.0, .86, .81). A two-factor solution produced a division of items into two clear 
groups corresponding to the sub-types proposed by DSM-IV; the correlation between the 
two factors was .61.
Figure 7.1 scree f)lot of data from the 17 ADHD traits: n = 479.
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The correlation between scale scores was .55 for the whole sample; .59 for males and .52 
for females. Alpha for the nine item inattention scale was .83 for the whole sample; .84 
for males and .80 for females. For the eight item hyperactivity scale, alpha was.75; .76 
for both males and females. The scale score for inattention and hyperactivity were 
moderately positively skewed (.64 and .52 respectively), values which were comparable 
to those for extraversion and agreeableness (-.52 and -.63 respectively).
Table 7.4 shows the correlations between the ADHD subtraits and the BIS-11 facets.
Each of the BIS-11 facets correlated significantly with both inattention and hyperactivity; 
however there were differential relationships between the two ADHD traits and the three 
BIS-11 facets. While the correlation between inattention and motor impulsivity was 
significantly less than the correlations between inattention and both cognitive and 
planning impulsivity (which did not themselves differ) the correlation between 
hyperactivity and cognitive impulsivity was significantly higher than with either planning 
or motor impulsivity (which also did not themselves differ).
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Table 7.4 Coixelations between ADHD scales and BIS-11 Scales.
1 2 3 4 , 5
Inattention
H yp eractiv ity .55**
C o g n itiv e  im p .59** .51**
M otor im p .27** .37** .46**
P lan nin g  im p .45** .31** .43** .47**
N = 479
* significant at 0,05 level (2 tailed) ** significant at 0,01 level (2 tailed) 
Differences between the following pairs of correlations were significant; df = 476 for all. 
Inattention and cognitive v inattention and motor (t = 8.20 p< .01)
Inattention and planning v inattention and motor (t = 4.25 p<-01)
Hyperactivity and cognitive v hyperactivity and motor (t = 3.4 p<.01)
Two sets of regression analyses were carried out; the first analysis regressed inattention 
and hyperactivity separately onto the three BIS-11 facets, the second regressed each of 
the three BIS-11 facets separately onto inattention and hyperactivity.
The results of the first regression analysis, whereby inattention and hyperactivity were 
separately regressed (method enter) onto the three BIS-11 facets, showed that inattention 
was predicted primarily by cognitive impulsivity and secondly by planning impulsivity 
with motor impulsivity non-significant; beta weights of .48 and .25 respectively; R^=.39 
(F = 154.4, df == 3,475, p <.01). Hyperactivity was predicted primarily by cognitive 
impulsivity and secondarily by motor impulsivity with planning impulsivity now non­
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significant; beta weights of .43 and ,17 respectively; = .28 (F = 62.2, df = 3, 475 p < 
.01).
The results of the second regression analysis whereby each of the BIS-11 facets were 
regressed (method enter) onto inattention and hyperactivity showed that attentional 
impulsivity was significantly predicted by both inattention and hyperactivity with beta 
weights of .40 and .26 respectively (R^= .39, F = 154.40, p < .01). Motor impulsivity 
was predicted significantly only by hyperactivity (R  ^= .14, F = 39.32, p < .01) while 
planning impulsivity was predicted significantly only by inattention (R^ = .21, F = 62.86,
p < .01). .
Table 7.5 compares the correlations of the ADHD scales and the BIS-11 scales with the 
Big Five personality traits as measured by the NEO-FFI. Cognitive impulsivity is similar 
to the inattention scale in correlating primarily with conscientiousness while having 
lesser but significant correlations with neuroticism and agreeableness. Planning 
impulsivity, like inattention, has its primary correlation with conscientiousness but, 
unlike inattention, does not correlate significantly with neuroticism. Motor impulsivity 
resembles hyperactivity in showing approximately equal correlations with extraversion, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness.
172
Table 7.5 Correlations between ADHD scales, BIS-11 scales and the Big Five.
N E O A C
Inattention .31** .09 -.09 -.20** -.61**
Hyperactivity .09 .18** -.06 -.33** -.28**
Cognitive imp .28** .00 .00 -.30** -.46**
Motor imp .02 .27** .07 t .20* * -.31**
Planning imp .09 -.02 -.11* -.19** -.63**
N = 463
* significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) ** significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)
Table 7.6 shows the results of regressing each of the impulsivity traits separately onto the 
Big Five personality traits, only significant results are shown. The pattern of Beta 
weights largely corresponds to the pattern of first order correlations, though with some 
notable differences; agreeableness does not now predict either inattention or planning 
impulsivity and conscientiousness is now the only Big Five predictor of planning 
impulsivity. When the other Big Five traits are partialled out, extraversion emerges as a 
salient predictor of both hyperactivity and motor impulsivity.
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Table 7.6 Results of regression o f impulsivity variables onto Big Five personality traits.
outcomes Beta weights of Big Five traits as predictors
N E O A C R^ F
Inattention .25 .11 ns ns -.57 .43 85.58
Hyperactivity .ns .36 ns -.34 -.21 .26 39.97
Cognitive imp .28 .22 ns -.21 -.38 .32 52.83
Motor imp .10 .40 ns -.20 .30 .25 37.54
Planning imp ns ns ns ns -.64 .40 77.35
N = 464 for all regression analyses.
All f  values significant p< .01
Given the frequent identification of impulsivity as a facet of conscientiousness, the trait 
of conscientiousness was regr essed onto the five impulsivity related facet traits. In this 
analysis conscientiousness was predicted predominantly and equally by inattention and 
planning impulsivity (beta weights of -.44 and -.44 respectively). The contribution of the 
other facets was minor; only hyperactivity made a significant contribution (beta = .14 p< 
.01) while cognitive and motor impulsivity had non-significant beta weights o f -.08 and 
.00 respectively. When the regression was carried out in two steps, entering inattention 
and plaiming impulsivity as a first block produced a highly significant R  ^of .53 while 
entering the remaining three facets as a second block produced an increase in R  ^of only 
.01 (though this was significant due to the large sample ). Analysis of semi-partial 
correlations showed that the overlap between inattention and planning impulsivity
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accounted for 24% of the variance in conscientiousness while the remainder was 
predicted independently arid equally by inattention (13%) and planning impulsivity 
(16%).
Table 7.7 shows that self reports of driving violations correlated significantly, and to an 
equal extent, with inattention, hyperactivity, cognitive and motor impulsivity; with 
correlations ranging from .33 to .38. The correlation between plaiming impulsivity and 
self-reported violations (.18) was significantly less than the correlation (.31) between 
hyperactivity and self reported violations (t = 2,12, df = 332, p<.05).
Self-reported driving eiTors showed the strongest correlations with inattention and 
hyperactivity with lesser though still significant correlations with cognitive, motor and 
planning impulsivity. Correlation between self-reported errors and planning impulsivity 
(r = .22) was significantly different from the correlation of self-reported errors and 
inattention (r = .39. t = 2.85, df = 332, p<,05) The pattern of correlations between trait 
scores and peer reports of driving behaviour followed the same pattern though all the 
correlations were weaker. Overall planning impulsivity showed the weakest, and non­
significant, correlations while the correlation between inattention and peer report errors 
was significantly stronger than the others. The correlation of self reported alcohol 
consumption with motor impulsivity was significantly greater than with either cognitive 
or planning impulsivity (t =  2.10 and 2.79, d f=  377, and p<.05 for both) though not 
significantly greater that with either inattention or hyperactivity. There were no
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significant differences between the correlations of any of the impulsivity traits with peer 
reports of alcohol consumption.
Table 7.7 Correlations of ADHD scales and B IS-11 scales with driving behaviour and 
drinking variables.
Self
violations
Self errors Peer
violations
Peer errors Self
alcohol
Peer
alcohol
Inattention .38** .39** .21** .38** .33** ,24**
Hyperactivity .31** .32** .16* .25** .32** .24**
Cognitive imp .32** .19** .11 .21* .31** .21**
Motor imp .34** .20** .22** .12 .40** .28**
Planning imp ,18** .22** .05 .07 ‘ .27** .20**
* significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) ** significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)
N = 335 driving self reports. N = 139 driving peer reports..
N = 380 alcohol self reports. N =  232 alcohol peer reports..
Item level factor analysis of the five impulsivity facet scales
Exploratory factor analysis of the 17 ADHD items together with the 30 items of the BIS- 
11 (N == 479) produced a scree plot (see appendix) suggestive of three factors. Three 
factors were extracted using principal axis factors and subjected to a promax rotation; the 
first three factors accounted for 32% of the variance (28% after PFA extraction).
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Figure 1.2 Scree plot o f eigen values after factor analysis o f ADHD and BIS-11 items
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As can be seen from the pattern matrix in Figure 7.3, the 21 items which loaded .30 or 
above on the first factor, after factor rotation, consisted of 17 of the ADHD items plus 
five of the BIS-11 items - items which were included in the cognitive impulsivity factor 
in the analysis of the BIS-11 in chapter two. The 11 items of factor two contained the six 
planning impulsivity items identified in chapter 2 and four further plamiing items from 
the Patton et al (1995) analysis, while 10 items of factor three contained the six motor 
impulsivity items identified in chapter 2. (See table 1 in appendix.) Factors one and two 
correlated .55; factor tliree correlated .40 and .35 with factors one and two respectively.
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Figure 7.3 Pattern matrix of 17 ADHD items and 18 BIS-11 items after Principal Axis 
factoring and Promax rotation.
' Factor
1 2 3
117 .70 -.09 -.11
16 .62 .08 -.03
111 .61 .19 -.12
113 .58 -.24 .19
116 .54 -.16 .13
BIS21 .54 -.09 .03
18 .53 .05 -.09
15 .53 -.09 .08
BIS8 .52 .23 .02
112 .51 .24 -.13
110 .50 -.11 .04
118 .49 .25 -.11
14 .49 -.04 .22
115 .47 .26 -.06
17 .46 .14 -.08
13 .42 -.12 .18
114 .41 -.16 ,22
BIS20 J9 -.00 .21
11 .35 .22 -.22
BIS4 ,34 .24 .09
BIS 10 .30 -.04 -.07
12 .25 -.06 .22
BIS26 .23 .210 -.07
BIS28 -.13 .04 .02
BISll .01 .63 ,12
BISl .01 .62 ,09
BIS29 -.16 .50 .02
BIS22 -.16 .49 -.27
BIS 12 -.11 .48 .03
BIS6 -.04 .48 .17
BIS 15 .07 ,45 -09
BIS9 -.12 .44 .26
BIS23 .40 ,40 -.23
BIS24 -.09 31 .24
BIS7 .09 .30 .17
BIS 16 .03 -.04 .78
BIS 14 -.06 .10 .76
BIS2 .01 .25 .49
BIS 18 -.10 .16 .45
BIS3 -.18 .04 .42
BIS25 -.00 -.16 .40
BIS 13 .23 .12 .37
BIS5 .25 -.20 .34
BIS 19 Ç.04 .31 .33
BIS 17 .066 .061 .31
BIS27 .119 -.033 .21
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Discussion
The internal, factorial, validity of the ADHD scales was maintained in the enlarged 
sample, as was the reliability of the scales. Consideration of males and females separately 
showed very similar values for scale inter-correlations and reliability. Correlations 
between the inattention and hyperactivity scales and the Big Five personality traits as 
assessed by the NEO-FFI were again very similar to the values obtained in study 5,1.
Analysis of the data showed a substantial overlap in variance between the facet sub- x- 
scales of the ADHD and BIS-11 questionnaires. When the inattention and hyperactivity 
variables were correlated with the BIS-11 facet scales all the scales correlated 
significantly. Cognitive impulsivity overlapped substantially with both inattention and 
hyperactivity (.59 and .51 respectively). Planning impulsivity correlated significantly 
with both inattention and hyperactivity but niore strongly with the former (.45 and .31 
respectively.). Motor impulsivity similarly correlated with both inattention and 
hyperactivity but more strongly with the latter (.27 and .37 respectively).
Correlations of the impulsivity facet scales and personality trait scales showed 
conscientiousness to be the trait most highly correlated with inattention, cognitive and 
planning impulsivity. Planning impulsivity however differed from attention and cognitive 
impulsivity in its relationship with the negative affects of neuroticism and agreeableness; 
while plamiing impulsivity correlated almost entirely with conscientiousness, attention 
and cognitive impulsivity correlated significantly with both neuroticism and
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agreeableness. Motor impulsivity and hyperactivity both showed lower correlations with 
conscientiousness’ and neither correlated significantly with neuroticism, though both 
correlated significantly with extraversion. This latter relationship was made clearer in the 
regression analyses reported in Table 5.2.3 where extraversion shows the strongest beta 
weight of tlie Big Five personality traits. The fact that extraversion and conscientiousness 
correlate positively while they have opposite effects upon impulsivity (extraversion 
positive and the conscientiousness negative) exerts a suppressor effect upon the influence 
of extraversion; when the influence of conscientiousness is partialled out of the equation 
the influence of extraversion upon motor impulsivity and hyperactive becomes clear.
Chapter discussion
Data analysed in this chapter support two arguments. The first is that ADHD behaviours 
can be treated as traits which are normally distributed within a non-clinical population. 
This argument concurs with a number of authors who argue that the diagnostic categories 
of DSM are an artefact of diagnostic algorithms. The relationships between the two 
ADHD traits obtained by other research were confirmed and, furthermore, evidence was 
provided for the predictive validity of these traits. The second argument is that the traits 
identified by ADHD scales and the traits identified by impulsivity scales show 
considerable overlap and that this is attributable to their tapping into common variables.
1 8 0
The picture from the scales level analysis is that while planning impulsivity is relatively 
unrelated to affect, inattention and cognitive impulsivity are related to neuroticism with 
motor impulsivity and hyperactivity related to extraversion. This tripartite parsing of 
impulsivity facets is reflected, albeit imperfectly, by the results of the item-level factor 
analysis of the ADHD and BIS-11 questionnaires. The item-level factor analysis 
separated out motor and planning impulsivity as separate factors and combined 
inattention and cognitive impulsivity, however hyperactivity items combined with 
inattention and cognitive impulsivity rather than with motor impulsivity.
The relationships between impulsivity and affect are not easily explained. It has been 
argued that extraversion is at least in part a consequence of rewards sensitivity producing 
strong approach behaviours to potential rewards (Smillie and Jackson 2006); thus 
extraversion coupled with disinhibition would produce impulsive behaviours. The effects 
of neuroticism might be somewhat different; anxiety in general produces inhibition of 
behaviour, however it also interferes with concentration leading to rumination, intmsive 
thoughts and distractibility. This however implies that neuroticism is itself an 
independent source of cognitive impulsivity, distinct from the construct of inhibition. It 
may of course interact with inhibition to produce the hot impulsivity which is described 
by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) as urgency. Extraversion thus amplifies the effects of 
disinhibition in producing behavioural impulsivity while neuroticism is an influence on 
attentional impulsivity independent of disinhibition.
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Conceptual analysis of the non-planning impulsivity construct and a consideration of its 
relationship to other variables suggest that this aspect of impulsivity stands somewhat 
apart from the other two aspects in an interesting way. Planning impulsivity correlated 
highly with conscientiousness and non-significantly with the other Big Five traits and 
showed thé weakest correlations with the driving and alcohol consumption variables. It 
may be that while the other impulsivity traits may be conceptualised as aspects of 
temperament, non-planning impulsivity may be a more complex trait such as 
conscientiousness. Martel and Nigg (2006) distinguish between temperament and 
personality by proposing that temperament be “defined in terms of constitutionally-based 
differences in behavioural style, in particular reactivity and self regulation, whereas 
personality includes additional characteristics such as attitudes, values, self concept and 
long term motives”. They further suggest that in the adult at least, “personality includes 
many elements beyond temperament”; thus while attentional and motor impulsivity may 
be at the core of conscientiousness, as necessary though not sufficient conditions, 
‘planning’ develops as a part of the general trait of conscientiousness, data presented 
throughout this tliesis suggest that temperamental factors continue to exert a notable 
effect into adulthood
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Chapter 8,
On the relationship between self report measures of impulsivity and laboratory 
measures of inhibition and attention.
Summary
This chapter investigates the relationship of laboratory measures of attention regulation 
and of response inhibition to self report measures of in-attention and impulsivity. Factor 
analysis of a number of tasks chosen to relate to either attention regulation or response 
inhibition produced two independent factors which separated the two sets of tasks as 
hypothesised. The first of these, the attention regulation factor, correlated significantly 
. and equally with both of the self report scales; supporting the hypothesis that attention 
regulation is a cognitive underpinning to both aspects of the behavioural phenotype of 
impulsivity. The second component (the response inhibition component) did not 
correlate significantly with either of the self report scales or with the attention 
component.
Introduction
The introduction to this thesis (chapters 1 to 3) identified two lines of research into the 
underlying elements of impulsivity; studies of response inhibition and studies of 
inattention. The study of impulsivity, whether as a personality trait or as an element in
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psychopathology, takes as its paradigm case the failure to inhibit a behavioural response. 
Behaviours typically characterised as impulsive are speaking and acting without 
appropriate aforethought, spending money that one cannot afford to spend; in each case, 
as argued in chapter 1, the behaviour is often quickly regretted. In the study of 
psychopathology the behaviours are more dramatic and more readily visible and 
disruptive; impulsive aggression, compulsive gambling, alcohol and drug abuse. In each 
of these cases the behaviour which is not inhibited, as well as its consequences, are 
readily observable. Thus the laboratory tasks typically employed to assess impulsivity 
involve the suppression of a well defined and observable response; a prepotent response 
is defined and established and its inappropriate occurrence is the manifestation of 
impulsivity. The term inhibition when used to describe behaviour in such tasks has a 
descriptive rather than an explanatory or theoretical function unlike its use in a number of 
theoretical formulations discussed below, e.g. Barkley (1997).
Research in developmental psychopathology takes a broader view of impulsivity;
As described in chapter 3, the theories of Goldsmitli et al. (2004) and DeiTyberry and 
Rothbart (1997) identify a temperamental trait which involves the control of attention 
and interference control as well as inhibition of a behavioural response. In his theorising 
on ADHD, Barkley (1997) argues that inhibition (though this construct is not explicitly 
defined or delineated) is manifested as both poor response inhibition (of a pre-potent 
response) and as poor interference control (inhibition of irrelevant information or 
stimuli). Bar kley’s inclusion of cognitive as well as behavioural inhibition reflects the 
symptoms of ADHD as defined by DSM-IV, which are differentiated into symptoms of
184
hyperactivity/impulsivity and symptoms of inattention. The strong degree of co-variation 
between these two sets of symptoms suggests a common latent variable which Barkley 
identifies as inhibition; though the nature of this inhibition is left under-specified it is 
argued to have wide ranging effects upon a variety of cognitive functions such as 
working memory.
This construct of cognitive inhibition or attentional control is typically characterised in 
terms of distractibility, forgetfulness, disorganisation and a tendency to lose things; 
behaviours which are less easy to observe and monitor and which as often involve an 
omission of appropriate behaviour as much as the commission of an inappropriate 
behaviour. Whether or not to describe such processes as inhibition is a moot point though 
in fact there is a general lack of agreement in classifying various tasks as involving 
inhibition or some aspect of attentional malfunction, an interesting example is tlie Stroop 
test which has been classified as a measure of response inhibition (Friedman & Miyake 
2004) as well as a measure of selective attention (Hervey et al 2004). Nigg, Stavro,’ 
Ettenhofer, Hambrick, Miller and Henderson (2005) describe the Stroop test as 
measuring “...the ability to shift attention and inhibit interfering information.” This 
description is interesting for its use of the term inhibition in connection with information 
rather than behavioural response tendencies.
At the level of observable behaviour it is clear that these two varieties of impulsivity, or 
inhibition, covary to a degree which suggests a common latent variable. Friedman and 
Miyake (2004) found a correlation between their latent variables of .68 and ADHD
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studies find correlations in excess of .50 between the inattention and hyperactivity/- 
impulsivity components of the syndrome (Barkley 2006). Data from two studies 
reported in chapter 7 of this thesis found correlations of .55 and .60 between trait 
measures of inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity; these two trait measures correlated 
.59 and .51 respectively with the cognitive impulsivity scale of the BIS-11.
The evidence considered in the preceding chapters concurs with this developmental data 
in a number of ways; in particular in the identification of a cognitive as well as a 
behavioural element within impulsivity and the substantial correlation between the two. 
Chapter five explored the relationship between facets of impulsivity identified by the 
BIS-11 and ADHD traits in a non-clinical sample, obtaining a substantial overlap in 
variance between the two domains.
The aim of the present study was to identify a number of experimental tasks which reflect 
predominantly either response inhibition or sustained attention and to relate the factors 
derived from a factor analysis of these tasks to self report measures of inattention and 
behavioural impulsivity. If the self report variables refer to separate underlying functions 
then they should correlate differentially with the two sets of tasks; inattention with the 
attention regulation tasks and impulsivity with the response inhibition tasks. However if 
both inattention and behavioural impulsivity reflect a common underlying variable then 
each self report variables should correlate with both factors.
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Experimental design and choice o f tasks and measures
As Nigg (2000) has pointed out, it is not clear that that all tasks purporting to assess the 
same cognitive fiinction do in fact tap into the same underlying latent variable. In the 
majority of cases only one behavioural task is considered and few studies have included 
more than one such test. The small number of studies which have done so found few 
significant or sizeable correlations between the different tests which are puiportedly 
tapping into the same function. Rabbitt (1998) argues that inhibition is used as a 
description of task demands rather than an indication of cognitive functional processes; 
an argument which is rehearsed in the discussion, chapter nine. To establish the construct 
validity of a number of tests purportedly of the same cognitive function requires evidence 
that they rank order a sample of subjects in the same way. Attempts to establish such 
construct validity have shown only modest success. Kramer et ai (1994) gave a number 
of inhibition related tasks, including a stop task, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task and a 
negative priming task to 62 older adults and found correlations ranging from .01 to .35, 
most of which were non-significant. More dramatically. Shilling, Chetwynd and Rabbitt
(2002) in a study of 49 older adults found very low correlations between variants of the 
Stroop task, ranging from -.13 to .22; all of which were non-significant.
Such results may bring into question the existence of a general inhibitory function, 
however there are a number of possible reasons for such results. As Shilling et al. (2002) 
argued, the nature of the tasks typically employed often implies low reliability; either 
because the tasks are susceptible to strong practice effects or because they rely upon
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difference scores which are known to increase measurement error. A second 
consideration of validity applies to of these tasks - tire problem of task impurity (Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki and Howerter. 2000). All inhibition related tasks will involve 
processes other than inhibition, thus any relationships between the inhibitory processes 
will be at least partly masked by individual variance in the other processes.
Miyake et al. (2000) argued for the value of an approach which identifies tasks 
involving different hypothesised processes and using these to construct a latent 
variable model which is then assessed by structural equation modelling 
techniques. Thus Miyake et al. (2000) tested a model which related a number of 
cognitive tasks to tliree executive fiinctions — mental set shifting, information 
updating and inhibition of prepotent impulses. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
confirmed that the three executive fiinctions were clearly separable though the 
latent variables showed substantial inter-correlations, between .42 and .63. The 
inhibition fiinction was defined by performance on three tasks, the Stroop, an 
anti-saccade task and a stop signal task. The correlations between these three 
inhibition based tasks were low and ranged from .18 to .20; these being all 
significant (n = 136, p< .05)
In a later study, Friedman and Miyake (2004) elaborated a model wliich 
distinguished between three inhibition related fiinctions; prepotent response 
inhibition (defined by the same three tasks as in the earlier study), a factor, 
labelled ‘resistance to distracter interference’ (defined by the Eriksen flanker
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task among others), and a factor of proactive interference. Though the fit 
statistics supported a model distinguishing between these three clusters o f tasks 
there was a correlation of .68 between the first two latent variables. A 
composite variable made up of these two factors correlated significantly with 
the self report Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald 
& Parkes 1982). Here again correlations between related'tasks were generally 
low; .15, .16 and .23 among the response inhibition tasks (similar in magnitude 
to the earlier study); .11, .13 and . 18 between the distractor interference tasks.
All except the lowest of these was significant given the sample size o f220.
Nigg et al. (2005) carried out a similar study in the area of ADHD amongst 
adults which identified a two factor model of cognitive tasks; an executive 
function factor and a processing speed factor, the two factors correlating .58.
Once again the correlations between the executive function tasks were very 
low, ranging from .08 to .22, half of which were non-significant. In these .tliree 
studies the low correlations between variables, typical of much o f the literature 
in tliis area, nonetheless allowed for an analysis into coherently definable and 
distinguishable, though related, latent variables.
Tasks involving response inhibition.
The Stroop test is variously described as a test of response inliibition, selective attention, 
interference control and response conflict. Macleod and MacDonald (2000) characterise
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Stroop performance as requiring both the maintenance of goal-oriented processing and 
the suppression of more readily available word reading responses. Kane and Eagly
(2003) however argue that the traditional presentation of the Stroop test, in which the 
incongruent stimuli are presented as a blocked continuous sequence, minimises the 
demands upon the first of the elements -  the effort to maintain the goal in mind. The 
implication then is that performance on the incongruent condition in the traditional 
blocked presentation task entails only the suppression of the prepotent reading response.
The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) has been used as a measure of 
inhibition in a number of studies (e.g. Wodushek and Neumann 2003), in keeping with 
Ferret’s (1974) suggestion that performance on a word fluency task requires the 
suppression of habitual word associations (usually semantic) to previous words in a list. 
PeiTet (1974) argued, on the basis of data from a group of patients with left frontal 
lesions, that the Stroop task and the typical word fluency task make similar cognitive 
demands despite their difference in format and behaviour; in that they both require the 
subject to suppress an habitual response
The Hayling Test was developed by Burgess and Shallice (1996) as a measure of 
efficiency of the separate processes of response initiation and response suppression 
following frontal lobe lesions; the dimension of interest in the present context being the 
ability to suppress, or inhibit, an habitual or highly cued response -  i.e. to provide a final 
word to complete a sentence which does not make sense of the sentence.
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Tasks involving regulation o f attention.
Tlie Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) was developed by Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley and Yiend. (1997) as a task which would be sensitive to brief and 
transitory reductions in attention leading to slips and errors; they argue for a construct of 
sustained attention which entails transient lapses of attention which may characterise 
both patients with traumatic brain injury as well as non-clinical subjects who report 
attentional slips in everyday life. Evidence for the validity of this measure comes from 
the fact that SART measures showed a stronger correlation to other measures of 
sustained attention, such as the Telephone Search with Counting subtest (discussed 
below) than to measures with a strong response inhibitory component, such as the Stroop 
Test (Robertson et al. 1997).
The Telephone Search with Counting subtest from the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA) 
is argued by Robertson et al (1994) to be a measure of attention regulation. A factor 
analysis of the TEA subtests together with a number of other tests of attention found that 
the Telephone Search with Counting subtest loaded onto a factor which they label 
sustained attention. In that factor analysis the Stroop test loaded on a different factor, a 
selective attention factor.
The Digit Symbol Substitution Task from the WAIS-III (Wechsler 1997) was included as 
a measure of processing speed which would be an element in all of these speeded tasks.
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Self report scales
This thesis argues that impulsivity is most fruitfully conceptualised as consisting of two 
aspects, response inhibition and inattention. As a self report measure of inattention the 
scale derived from DSM symptoms of ADHD-inattention was used; data in chapter 5 
attests to its reliability and validity in a non-clinical sample. The BIS-Short was used as 
a measure of the standard conceptualisation of impulsivity; the reliability and validity of 
this scale having been demonstrated in previous chapters. However the BIS-Short also 
contains items derived from the cognitive impulsivity facet of the BIS-11, a facet which 
was shown in chapter 5 to overlap considerably with inattention (r = .58), so the BIS- 
short was modified for the present study by the removal of 3 items clearly related to the 
construct of inattention. In this way there were two scales with little obvious overlap in 
item content.
Study 7
Hypotheses
This discussion has identified a number of tasks which divide into two groups; the first 
group includes three tasks which are argued to reflect the ability to inhibit a prepotent 
response (Stroop, Verbal Fluency and Hayling tasks) while the second group reflect the 
ability to sustain and regulate attention ( SART and Telephone Search Task) and the 
DSST task as a measure of processing speed..
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The first hypothesis is that an exploratory factor analysis will separate the experimental 
tasks according to the a-priori classification into two groups; the Stroop task, Hayling 
task and CO WAT will load onto one factor and the SART and Telephone Search task 
will load onto the second factor. The DSST as a measure of speed is predicted to 
correlate with both. The second hypothesis is that the factor scores will coirelate 
differentially with the two self report measures. The third is that the two factor scores 
will correlate significantly.
Method
Participants
There were fifty-nine participants, twenty-seven male and thirty-two female, aged 
between 18 and 40 (M = 22.42 years, SD = 3.9 years). The age range was highly skewed 
(skew statistic = 2.45); while fifty-five (93%) of the sample were 27 or less, there were 
four participants aged 30, 31, 35 and 40. Thirty-eight of the subjects were undergraduate 
students and most of the remainder were postgraduate students or researchers. Two 
exceptions were an administrator and a technician. Four participants were excluded from 
the analysis because of failure to complete one of the tasks, thus all of the tasks were 
completed by all of the subjects; there were no missing values.
Procedures
Participants were recruited by public posters around the university campus offering £5 
for participation in an experiment. The tasks were administered in two blocks by two
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experimenters, each block administered by each experimenter an approximately equal 
number of times; in the same way the two blocks were administered in an approximately 
random order. One block consisted of the computer administered SART, the self-report 
scales and the DSST. The second block consisted of the telephone task, the Hayling task, 
the verbal fluency task and the Stroop task. Within each block the tasks were 
administered in a fixed order. The entire procedure took approximately 30 minutes.
Measures
Self report measures.
Impulsivity was assessed with a modified form of the BIS-Short, a short form of the BIS- 
11, developed for the purposes of the study described in chapter 2. The BIS-Short was 
modified by the removal of 3 items which were clear instances of attentional problems in 
order to avoid overlap with the inattention scale; items relating to being able to 
concentrate and pay attention and the occunence of extraneous and distracting thoughts 
while thinking. Reliability for this 8-item scale was .76 while the reliability of the 11- 
item scale was .81. The 8-item scale correlated .94 with the full-11 item scale. Data 
relating to the 11-item BIS-Short is taken from chapter 2.
Inattention was assessed utilising a scale derived from Conners et al (1999) consisting of 
9 items based upon the 9 symptoms specified by The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (4‘*^ ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association 1994) as 
diagnostic of ADHD inattention. This scale was previously used in the ADHD trait study
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reported in chapter 5. In the present study item response data indicated that one of the 
inattention items failed to show an acceptable item-total conrelation and was also 
dropped; the item referred to a dislike of activities where one has to think a lot. Tlie total 
inattention trait score was the simple sum of responses to all 8 items. Alpha reliability for 
the inattention scale in the previous study was 0.85 and in the present study 0.80.
Items on both scales consisted of statements which required responses on a 6 point scale 
ranging from 1 = never/ disagree strongly to 6 = very often/agree strongly.
The correlation between the BIS-Short and the attention scale was .69; this was reduced 
to .54 after the removal o f the three items as outlined above.
Laboratory tasks.
1. The Stroop Colour-Word test here consisted of two conditions. In the first condition 
participants were presented with 60 colour blocks arranged in 12 lines of five block each 
on a single A4 sized sheet; they were required to name the colour of each block. The 
colours were red, yellow, green and blue spread randomly across the page. In the second 
condition the stimuli were 60 colour words, red, yellow, green or blue, which were 
written in incongruent ink colours; e.g. the word red was printed either in yellow, blue or 
green. In both conditions participants were requested to work across the lines and down 
the page naming the colour of the ink. They were instructed to work as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. Their performance was timed with a stop watch. Each condition 
began with six sample stimuli on the reverse of the sheet which subjects were allowed to
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work through as a practice session. Timing on the main task was started when the 
experimenter turned over the sheet and spoke the word ‘start’; timing ended when the last 
stimulus was named. The dependant variable was the time taken to read each stimulus, 
errors were not recorded.
2. The Hayling task as devised by Burgess and Shallice (1996) consists of 30 sentences 
from which the final word is omitted; sentences were chosen which had a particularly 
high probability of one particular word for completion. The sentences were divided by 
the authors into two groups of 15 which served as material for the two sections of the 
test- In both conditions sentences were read to the participants at a normal reading speed 
and participants were required to complete the sentence with a single word as quickly 
and as accurately as possible. In the first condition they were required to complete the 
sentence with a word which made good sense of the whole sentence, in the second 
condition they were required to provide a work which made no sense in the context of the 
sentence. Response latency was timed with a stop watch which the experimenter started 
as soon as he read the last word and then stopped as soon as the participant began their 
response. Responses in the second condition were also scored as correct or error 
responses, as advocated by Burgess and Shallice (1996) A response received an eiror 
score of 2 if it was a reasonable completion of the sentence, an error score of 1 if it was 
semantically connected to the subject of the sentence and an error score of 0 if it was 
completely unconnected to the sentence. These individual error scores were added to 
produce an overall error score for each subject. As a check on the reliability of the error
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ratings a second rater judged the error rating of responses, blind to the rating of the first 
judge, for 20% of the subjects; the two raters agreed on the error score in 90% of trials.
3. The Telephone Search Task utilised in this study is a combination of two subtests from 
the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA. Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway & Nimmo-Smith. 
1994). The first task is a simple search of a telephone directory page for certain 
combinations of symbols. On an A3 size page there are 100 entries for a type of service -  
e.g. plumber. Each entry is followed by two symbols and participants have to indicate 
when a certain combination of symbols occurs by circling the symbols, there are 20 
target combinations. Time taken is measured by a stop watch which the experimenter 
starts as he gives the participant the signal to begin and stops when the participant has 
checked the box at the end of the list of entries. Participants are asked to work as quickly 
and as accurately as possible. The experimenter also counts the number of targets 
correctly identified. In the second condition the subject repeats a version of the first task 
with different stimuli but in combination with another task, counting strings of tones 
which are presented on a tape recorder. After each sequence of tones the participant hears 
the words “how many?” on the tape and they must answer correctly. The strings of tones 
vary from 2 to 7 tones and are heard in the same order by all participants. A practice 
string of tones is given before the task to ensure that the instructions are understood. The 
experimenter notes the time taken and errors on the telephone search part of the task as 
well as the number of tone strings correctly or incorrectly counted.
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4, The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) as developed by Robertson et al 
(1997) involved presenting the digits 1 to 9 singly in random order, each digit presented 
for 250 msec followed by a 900 msec mask. Thus the period from digit onset to digit 
onset was 1150 msec. Participants were required to respond with a key press to each digit 
except when the digit 3 appeared, when they had to withhold the response. Participants 
were asked to give equal importance to accuracy and speed when doing the task. 
Robertson et al (1997) presented participants with 225 digits of which 25 were the target 
digit. The present study modified the procedure to present three variants of the task. In 
the first condition (900S) the original procedure was followed except that there were only 
100 digits overall, 15 of which were the target digit 3. In the second condition (600S) the 
number and distribution of digits was the same but the rate of presentation was changed; 
while the time that the digit was presented was unchanged at 250 msec the length of the 
mask was reduced to 600 msec so that the period from data onset to data onset was 850 
msec. In the third condition (600L) the rate of presentation remained the same as the 
second condition as did the number of target digits but the number of non-3 digits was 
increased to 125 so that 140 digits were presented in all. The mean time taken for the 
three conditions was 115, 85 and 119 seconds respectively. Each condition was preceded 
by a practice session consisting of 12 digits of which 3 were targets. The dependant 
variables were the number of commission errors (pressing the key to the target 3 digit) 
and the number of omission errors (not pressing the key to any of the other digits) as well 
as the resiponse time for correct and incorrect (commission) responses
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5. In the Verbal Fluency Task participants were required to produce as many words as 
possible beginning with a specified letter within 60 seconds. They were required to do 
this three times, once with each of the letters F, A and S. instructions were to not use 
either proper names or numbers and to avoid using the same word but with a different 
suffix. Responses were recorded onto audio tape for later analysis. Performance was 
scored by counting the number of permissible words produced, errors were also scored.
6. In the Digit Symbol Substitution Task there are 9 symbols each paired with one of the 
digits 1-9 (Wechsler 1997). A single sheet containing 140 symbols distributed randomly 
in 7 lines was presented to the participants who were required to write tlie appropriate 
digit beneath each symbol in spaces provided. Participants were required to work quickly 
and accurately, from left to right across each line. Performance was scored by simply 
counting the number of symbols coded; errors were not scored.
Results
The first part of the results section reports the data from the various tasks and assesses 
whether the data from this study matches the pattern of data found in previous research. 
The second part carries out an exploratory factor analysis of the six task variables chosen 
and relates the emerging components to the self report scales of attention and 
impulsivity.
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Task data.
Stroop task
The classical Stroop manipulation was clearly effective; all subjects took longer on task 2 
(the interference condition where colour name and colour of ink conflicted) than task 1 
(naming the colour of a colour block). The difference between conditions was highly 
significant (t = 9.65, p < .01), with differences ranging from 5 to 82 sec. The variable 
‘Stroop interference’ was computed as the difference between task 2, the interference 
condition, and task 1. This variable takes into account individual differences in the speed 
of simple colour recognition and naming and estimates the cost of the interference control 
required by the second condition. The mean Stroop interference effect was 29.8 with a 
standard deviation of 23.8.
Table 8.1 Means and standard deviations for Stroop task variables.
Min-max mean SD
Stroop task 1 24-49 35.5 5.8
Stroop task 2 33-115 65.4 27.2
interference 5-82 29.9 23.8
The correlation between the two tasks was .66. In keeping with the literature which 
utilises the Stroop as a measure of interference or inhibition, the interference variable was 
utilised as the variable to enter into the results model.
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Hayling Task
The interference effect is evident in that time to complete task 2, where subjects were 
required to produce an incompatible word, was significantly longer than task 1, where 
subjects were to produce a compatible word (29 as against 12.5 sec, t = 7.00 p < .01.) the 
mean number of errors in task 2 was also significantly gr eater than in task 1 (3.14 against 
.29, t = 10.01 p < .01). Five subjects registered negative interference time scores 
indicating that their time on task 2 was faster than on task 1 and four subjects registered 
more errors on task 1 than task 2; only two subjects were in both groups. Nevertheless the 
correlation between time and errors was significant in both conditions (.37 and ,30); 
subjects witli longer performance times committed the most errors, implying no trade-off 
between speed and accuracy; the interference affected both speed and errors. An 
interference variable was constructed by computing the difference between the time taken 
to complete the incompatible and incompatible conditions with the aim of estimating the 
cost of the interference control required by the second condition.
In line with the use of the Stroop tire Hayling interference variable was entered into the 
results model.
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Table 8.2 Means and standard deviations for Hayling task variables.
Time variables Mean {SD) Error variables Mean {SD)
Hayling 1 12.5 {4.4} Errors 1 .29 {JO)
Hayling 2 29 {12.9} Errors 2 3.14 {3.14)
Interference time 16.5 Interference errors 2.85
Verbal fluency test
The number of words produced to the F, A and S stimuli were 13.8,12.4 and 16.1 
respectively. The three conditions of the verbal fluency test correlated between .56 and 
.65 and were simply summated to produce an overall score; mean = 42.6, SD = 11:8. 
Though the correlation between number of words produced and number of errors was .27 
(p < .05) the number of errors was very small, mean = .56, sd = 1.28. Only two subjects 
made more than two errors and 70% of the subjects made no errors. Only the number of 
words variable was entered into the factor analysis.
DSST
Scores showed a mean of 83.4 items attempted with a standard deviation of 15,7. The 
number of errors was small, mean = .46, SD =1.1. Forty-five of the participants 
committed no errors and nine committed only one; the remaining five participants 
committed between 2 and 5 errors. The correlation between number of items checked and 
errors was non-significant (r = -.20, p = .06, 1-t
ailed) there was thus no evidence of participants trading speed for accuracy.
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Telephone task
Here three variables were computed;
a. time per target (tpt) for both sub-tests as suggested by Robertson et ah 1994.
b. an interference variable, analogous to the interference variable in the Stroop test, was 
computed by subtracting tpt task 1 from tpt task 2; a measure of the increase in tpt 
caused by the secondary task.
c. dual task decrement variable which takes into account the number of counting errors 
on the secondary task as suggested by Robertson et al, 1994.
Average time per target for task 2 was significantly longer than for task 1 (3.1 and 2.7 
sec, t = 3.36 p<.01). The number of tone clusters correctly identified in task 2 correlated 
negatively and significantly with both tpt 2 (r = -.32) and time per task interference (r = - 
.28); thus again there was no trade-off between accuracy in the two tasks. The 
interference variable and the decrement variable correlated r = .77, and both correlated 
highly with the tpt2 (r = .68 and .61 respectively) but non-significantly with tptl. The 
decrement variable was highly skewed, (mean = .76, sd=1.41, skew statistic = 2.46): the 
data provided by Robertson et al (1994) for a control group of subjects also suggest a 
high degree of skew (mean = 2.03, sd = 3.4) though they do not provide skew statistics. 
A number of transformations failed to reduce this statistic to less than 2 so the dual task 
variable was ranked. This ordinal variable was entered into the results model.
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SART
This analysis will concentrate on four variables, two error variables and two reaction 
time variables, across the three conditions. Errors of commission, or false alarms, the 
number of times a participant pressed the key when the digit 3 was presented and errors 
of omission, where the subject failed to press the button when a digit other than 3 was 
presented. Hit reaction time, the time taken to respond to the non-targets, digits other 
than 3, and false alarm reaction times, where the subject pressed in response to tlie target 
digit 3.
Condition 900S, the baseline condition where each of the 100 stimuli were separated by a 
900 msec mask, produced significantly less false alarms (mean = 7.73) than either tlie 
600S condition, in which the inter-stimulus interval was decreased to 600 msec (mean = 
9.12, t = 4.01, p<.01) or 600L condition , where in addition the number of stimuli was 
increased to 125 (mean = 9.39, t = 4.08. p<.01); there was no significant difference 
between the latter two conditions. Increasing the speed of presentation, produced more 
false alarms but decreasing the proportion of targets did not. False alarms correlated 
significantly across all three conditions; from .60 to .72. A composite false alarm score 
was computed by adding the number of false alarms across the three conditions.
The number of errors of omission was very small; in the 900s condition the average 
number of omissions was 1.1, in the 600s it was 2,0 and in the 6001 it was 3.1; thus the 
percentage of responses missed were 1.3%, 2.4% and 2.5% respectively, of omissions 
again is in accord with the tendency to respond automatically to the stimuli. A composite 
omissions score was computed by adding the number of omissions across the three
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conditions. There was a significant correlation between the aggregate number of false 
alarms and the aggregate number of omissions, .43; those subjects making more false 
alarm response also had a tendency to make more omissions.
Hit reaction times were significantly slower in 900S condition (mean = 302 msec) than in 
600S (mean = 286 msec, t = 2.85, p<.01) or 600L (275 msec, t — 3.76, p<.Ol) conditions; 
the latter two conditions did not differ significantly. Hit reaction times correlated highly 
across the three conditions, from 65 to .77. A composite hits reaction time score was 
computed by averaging the reaction time across the three conditions. Hit reaction time 
correlated negatively with the number of false alarms in all three conditions, ranging 
from -.70 to -.74; the faster the overall speed of responding the more false alarms. The 
correlation between the composite false alarm variable and hit reaction times scores was 
-.82.
A composite false alarm reaction time variable was created out of the mean of the three 
conditions which conelated strongly with the composite hit reaction times variable — r = 
.80. Mean false alarm reaction times were significantly faster than mean hit reaction 
times (255.38 and 284.00 msec, t = -7.44, df = 58, p < .01)
A composite SART enors variable was created out of the commission and omission error 
variables; each variable was standardised and the Z scores added. The composite error 
variable was entered into the factor analysis.
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Table 8.3 SART results
variable Conditions Mean
900s 600s 6001 All conditions
Commission
errors
7.7 (3.8) 9.12(3.3) 9-4 (3-2) 8.8 (3.0)
Omission
errors
1.1 (1.6) 
[1.3%]
2.0 (2.4) 
[2.4%]
3.1 (4.5) 
[2.5%]
Hit reaction 
time
302 (62.9) 286 (62.2) 275 (64.8) 298 (57.1)
Commission 
reaction time
262 (43.4) 261 (70.5) 243 (49.5) 255 (44.8)
Figures in brackets are standard deviations. Figures in square brackets are percentage 
scores. Reaction times are in milliseconds.
Exploratory Factor analysis
The aim of this phase of the analysis was first to confirm the predicted distribution of 
tasks between factors and secondly to use the extracted factors as measures of latent 
variables which will then be correlated with the self report scales.
The six chosen task variables were subjected to a principal axis factor analysis followed 
by a promax rotation. The eigen values for the six components were 1.73, 1.46, 1.00, .74, 
.62 and .45; the first two factors accounting for 36% of the total variance and correlated
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.08. Table 8.4 shows the loadings of each variable on the two factors. Factor 1 was 
defined by SART and telephone search task variables (both positive loadings) and the 
DSST variable (negative loading), with a secondary negative loading from verbal fluency 
This pattern of loadings implies that a high ffactor score reflects poor performance on 
these tasks. Factor 2 was defined by the Stroop and Hayling interference tasks and the 
verbal fluency task with a secondary loading from DSST, The positive loadings of the 
Stroop and Hayling tasks (which are measures of interference) and the negative loading 
of the verbal fluency task (where a high score is hypothesised to be a measure of 
resistance to interference) imply that the component score is a measure of interference; 
i.e. a high component score reflects a high degree of interference.
Table 8.4 Pattern matrix from factor analysis of laboratory tasks.
task Factor 1 Factor 2
Stroop JO .54
Hayling -.14 .54
Verbal fluency -.28 -.49
Decrement .90 -J9
DSST -.50 -.28
SART .20 -.05
Factor loadings equal to, or greater t nan, .30 in bold.
While the loadings of the three tasks onto factor 2 were relatively similar, ranging from 
.49 to .56, the loadings of the tasks onto factor 1 varied considerably. The high loading of
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the telephone search task suggests that the variance captured by factor 1 is virtually 
identical with the variance attributable to that task. The low loading of the SART task on 
factor 1 suggests that little of the variance in that task was captured by the factor:
Diagram 8.1 depicts the factor loadings of the task variable scores scores (loadings less 
than .20 are ignored) and the Pearson product moment correlations between the factor 
scores and the self report scales of inattention and impulsivity. Both of the self report 
scales correlated positively and significantly with factor I, the correlations were not 
significantly different (df = 56, t = 0.68)
The response inhibition component did not correlate significantly with either impulsivity 
or inattention.
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Diagram 8,1 Principal Axis Factor analysis. Loadings of tasks upon derived factors and 
the correlations between factors and the self report measures of impulsivity and 
inattention.
SART
Telephone
decrement
.90 Factor 1 
attention
-.50 .39
DSST Impulsivity
.31
-.28 .05
Word
fluency
Inattention
-.49
Stroop Factor 2 
inhibition.54
.54
Hayling
In the light of the low loading of the SART variable on factor 1 and the lack of any 
significant correlations of SART with variables (see table 8.4 below) a secondary factor 
analysis was carried out of the five tasks minus the SART variable (reported as figure x
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in appendix.), the results of that analysis correspond to tlie primary analysis except for 
the absence of the SART variable. Factors 1 and 2 are defined by the same variables and 
the correlation of factor 1 with the impulsivity and inattention are almost exactly the 
same.
Nigg et al. (2005), in the analysis of their data, drew attention to a processing speed 
factor operating in the laboratory tasks which they employed, a factor which they 
identified by the Stroop and Trails non-interference conditions. The equivalent tasks in 
this study are the Stroop 1, Hayling 1 and Telephone tptl tasks; these were subjected to a 
principal components analysis and a single component score computed, tliis first 
component accounted for 45% of the variance. The eigen values were 1.35, .93 and .72.
Due to the loading of the relevant tasks a high component score indicates a low 
processing speed. This processing speed component correlated significantly with both the 
attention regulation and the response inhibition factors (r == .38 and .28 respectively) as 
well as with DSST performance (r = -.51); thus both factors 1 and 2 involve an element 
of speed. Low processing speed is associated with a high degree of both attentional 
failure and response inhibition failure. However the processing speed component did not 
correlate significantly with either the inattention or the impulsivity self report variables 
(though this latter correlation was just short of significance): consequently partial 
correlations between the attention regulation factor and both inattention and impulsivity 
(.28 and .33 respectively) remained significant when the processing speed component 
score was partialled out.
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Table 8.5 depicts the zero-order correlations among factor scores, the task variables and 
the self report measures. Correlations between the inattention variables range from .17 to 
.38; between the response inhibition variables they range from .25 to .29. These compare 
favourably with values reported in the research described above. Note that while factors 1 
and 2 were derived from the analysis of all six tasks, component 3 was derived from a 
separate analysis as described above.
Table 8.5 Pearson product moment correlations between factor scores and task variables 
and self report data.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I. Factor 1
2. Factor 2. .13
3. Component 3 .38 .28
4. Stroop .07 .70 37
5. Hayling -.18 .70 -.08 .25
6. VF -.27 -.62 -.31 -.29 -.25
7, DSST -.52 -J3 -.51 -.22 -.05 .23-
8. SART .22 -.06 .18 -.02 .05 .01 -.17
9. Dual task .98 -.30 .29 -.05 -.27 -.18 -38 .18
10. impulse .39 .01 .25 .06 -.14 -.25 -.19 .08 .38
11. inattention .31 ,04 ,14 ,02 -.13 -.08 -.24 .22 .29 .54
Correlations of .25 and above are significant; p < .05 in bold type.
The correlations between task variables and factor scores largely reflect the factor 
loadings, though the conelation between the telephone task variable and the factor score
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is now near unity; consequently the correlations of the self report scales with factor 1 
were almost exactly the same as with the telephone task.
A secondary analysis of the data involved dividing the sample into extreme groups on the 
two self report variables. The sample was divided approximately into thirds according to 
the distribution of scores. Thus the lowest third and the highest third for each of the two 
self report variables were compared on the six tasks. These results paralleled in large part 
the correlation data in Table 4, the only exception being the results for the DSST task 
The high and low impulsivity groups differed significantly, mean scores of 79.2 and 91.4 
respectively (df = 2,38. t = 2.51. p < .05). There was also a significant difference between 
the high and low in-attention groups with mean scores of 77.0 and87.8 respectively (d f= 
2, 39. t = 2.24 p< .05). high scorers on impulsivity and on inattention performed less well 
in the DSST task.
Discussion
The essential findings of this study relate to the relationships between the self report 
measures of the behavioural phenotypes of inattention and impulsivity and the laboratory 
tasks as measures of cognitive fiinctions. Both inattention and impulsivity correlated with 
the DSST and the telephone search task; in addition impulsivity correlated with the 
verbal fluency task. This pattern of relationships suggests that the correlation between 
inattention and impulsivity at the level of every day behaviour is echoed in their common 
cognitive processes. Of these five significant relationships, four involve the
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hypothesised attention regulation tasks and only one involved a response inhibition task. 
Neither the Stroop task nor the Hayling task showed a significant relationship with either 
of the self report variables.
Following the suggestions of a number of theorists, discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, the tasks were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis to produce factors 
which would represent the common variance shared by the tasks, which factors could 
then be interpreted as a latent variable affecting each task. As hypothesised, the 
purported attention and response inliibition tasks loaded onto two different and 
uncorrelated factors. A third component was extracted from the non-interference versions 
of the Stroop, Hayling and telephone tasks; which component may be surmised to be a 
processing speed component. This component correlated .38 and .28 with factors 1 and 2 
respectively, suggesting a speed element common to all the tasks — which were indeed all 
speeded tasks. The two self report measures, impulsivity and inattention, correlated 
approximately equally with the attention regulation component (39 and .31), and close to 
zero with the response inhibition component.
The results of the exploratory factor analysis ‘confirmed’ the grouping of the tasks based 
upon the hypothesised latent variables (or hypothetical constructs) - attention regulation 
and response inliibition. Wliile the grouping of the tasks does not in itself define the 
nature of the latent variables it is at least consistent with the hypothesised scheme. The 
response inliibition factor was defined by the Hayling task, the Stroop task and the 
CO WAT. The Hayling task would seem to be a relatively clear instance of a task
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requiring response inhibition; the majority of errors are prepotent responses - words 
which are highly likely to occur in that particular context, suggesting that the extra cost 
involved in the interference condition is due to the cognitive effort entailed in 
suppressing or inhibiting the prepotent response. The Stroop task, despite its multifarious 
designations, is argued by McCloed and Macdonald (2000) to crucially require the 
suppression of prepotent word reading responses. While the role of response inhibition in 
the CO WAT is more debatable its position on the factor structure supports its 
commonality with the other two tasks.
Among the tasks loading on attention component the telephone search task would seem 
to be a clear case of attention regulation; Robertson et al (1994) found it to load strongly 
onto a factor along with two other tests of sustained attention from the Test of Everyday 
Attention. The SART is argued by Robertson et al (1997) to be a function of sustained 
attention though it bears considerable similarities to Go/no-Go tasks reported in the 
literature which are considered as involving response inhibition. In support of their 
argument is the high negative correlation obtained in this study between hit rate reaction 
time and number of commission errors (false alarms) such that subjects who made rapid 
correct responses (hits) also tended to make more incorrect responses (false alarms). A 
comparison of response times found the false alarm reaction times to be significantly 
faster than the hit response times, this is consistent with the suggestion by Robertson et al 
(1997) that false alarms occur because responding becomes automatic and inattentive as 
indicated by their finding of fast response times before a false alarm. The positive 
correlation between the number of false alarms and the aggregate number of omission
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would seem to argue against false alarms being a consequence of automatic responding; 
it was however the experimenter’s impression that omissions were particularly likely to 
occur after a subject had ‘caught themselves making a false alarm. To assess this 
possibility as well as the possible speeding up of responses before a false alarm would 
require the tracking of response times across trials, which the present data do not allow. It 
should be noted that while Robertson and Garavan (2000) referred to the SART as 
involving a dynamic interaction between inhibitory abilities and sustained attention there 
are near zero correlations in this data between the SART and any of the response 
inhibition tasks.
The DSST loaded onto both factors 1 and 2 (-.52 and-.33); it also correlated substantially 
(.51) with component 3 which was made up of the simpler speeded tasks. Given the lack 
of correlation between factors 1 and 2 it would seem that there are two non-overlapping 
areas of variance within DSST performance which may be identified with the two 
factors. The variance in DSST performance which overlapped with factor i (attention 
regulation) was thus not the variance shared with factor 2 (response inhibition) nor with 
the speed component, as shown by the partial correlation of DSST with factor 1 of -.42 
after partialling out factor 2 and the speed component.
While the correlations between the tasks within each factor were low in magnitude - .17, 
.18, .38 for the inattention tasks and .25, .25, .29 for the response inhibition tasks - they 
compare favourably with the magnitude of correlations reported in previous studies; 
across two studies which identified a response inhibition factor the correlations between
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the tasks making up that factor ranged from . 18 to .23 (Miyake et al 2000, Friedman & 
Miyake 2004).
The two self report measures, impulsivity and inattention, were highly correlated (r = .54, 
dis-attenuated r = .70 on the basis of alpha reliabilities) and correlated approximately 
equally with the attention regulation factor, .38 and ,30, suggesting that it is the variance 
they share which relates to the attention regulation component. Such a conclusion 
concurs with the data from ADHD studies which fail to differentiate between the 
inattention and impulsivity sub-types by cognitive tasks in either the child or adult 
literature (Nigg et al 2002, Murphy et al. 2001). The magnitude of these correlations 
compares favourably with those of Nigg et al. (2005) who, in a study of adult ADHD 
cases, obtained correlations between their executive function composite and ADHD 
rating scale measures of inattention of .28 and hyperactivity/impulsivity of .19; both 
correlations being significant.
The present sample was unlikely to manifest traits of either inattention or impulsivity at 
all comparable to either ADHD patients or to other disorders of impulse control; but that 
does not explain the difference between the two factors in their relationship with the self 
report scales. While the impulsivity scores were normally distributed, inattention scores 
were positively skewed (.18 and .79); however removing the three highest inattention 
scores (which reduced the skewness statistic to .02) did not affect the correlations of 
interest.
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Both factors 1 and 2 involve an element of speed; all the tasks are speeded though the 
majority are self paced, the exception is the SART task. The tasks themselves are scored 
in such a way that a high level of the factor indicates poor performance. For example 
factor con elates positively with the degree of decrement due to the second task in the 
telephone task and with the number of false alarms in the SART. This factor correlated 
positively with impulsivity; i.e. impulsive participants are likely to be both slower and to 
make more errors on such tasks. In all tasks there was a negative relationship between 
speed and errors -  rather than there being a trade-off between speed and accmacy, slower 
performance went with more errors. In some cases errors may have caused a slowing; in 
the Stroop task participants rarely make errors without then correcting themselves. The 
importance of a speed factor is shown by the correlation of component 3 with factors 1 
and 2. The tasks in Component 3 were scored such that a higher score indicates a slower 
speed, thus the positive correlation between factor 3 and the other two factors suggests a 
relationship between speed of processing and task performance..
Component 3 correlated significantly and positively with the impulsivity scale but not 
with the attention scales, suggesting that impulsive subjects responded more slowly on 
simple speeded tasks. However the correlation between factor 1 and both impulsivity 
and inattention was reduced only marginally after partialling out the speed component 
(-33 and .28 respectively) and remained significant. Other researchers, e.g. Dickman 
(2000), have pointed out that impulsive individuals are slower at speeded tasks despite 
the common perception that impulsive people respond quickly. It seems likely that
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apparent speed of response in impulsive people is due to premature responding rather 
than rapid responding, which is then likely to lead to error. However it was not the effect 
of impulsivity with speed of response which determined its relationship with the attention 
regulation factor.
Depending on the nature of the task it is also possible that inattention would lead to 
slower responding. Perhaps paradoxically in the SART there was a significant negative 
correlation o f-.28 between hit reaction time and the inattention scale, implying that those 
scoring higher in inattention responded more quickly when making correct responses; 
this does however fits with Robertson et aPs (1994) argument that false alarms are due 
the subject tending to respond automatically.
One of the most interesting findings in these data is that the two self report measures, of 
inattention and impulsivity correlated equally with the inattention component; a finding 
which supports the hypothesis that these two behavioural phenotypes express the same 
underlying variable. This finding also fits witli the model of impulsivity maintained 
throughout this thesis which consists of two correlated facets subsumed by a higher order 
variable.
Further interpretation as to the nature of the underlying variable depends upon the 
meaning o f the variable identified in the factor analysis; this has important implications 
for the exploration of the cognitive processes underlying impulsivity. Robertson and his 
colleagues describe both the SART and the telephone task used in this study as tests of
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sustained attention (Robertson et al, 1997 and Robertson et al. 1994), however the two 
tasks did not correlate significantly. Nor did the SART correlate with either of the self 
report scales, a finidng which echoes that of Whyte, Grieb-Neff, Gantz and Polansky 
(2006) who found no significant correlation between the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982) and SART errors of 
either commission or omission in a non-clinical group.
While the DSST correlate significantly with the telephone task it did not correlate 
significantly with the SART. This, together with the factor loadings suggests that the 
extracted factor primarily reflects the telephone task and secondarily the DSST. A 
supplementary factor analysis omitting the SART produced two factors which correlated 
very highly with the factors from the analysis containing the SART (both r = .99). the 
correlations between the factors and the
The purpose of this study was to begin to identify cognitive processes which underlie the 
phenotype of impulsivity. Tlie aim of the factor analysis was to identify the variance 
shared by labomtory tasks and to relate that shared variance to self report measures of 
impulsivity.
The factor analysis identified two factors which captured the variance shared y two 
clusters of tasks which were hypothesised to involve regulation of attention (factor I) and 
inhibition of pre-potent behaviour (factor2). The first of these correlated significantly and
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equally with both of the self report scales but the second did not correlate with either of 
the sefl report scales not with the first factor.
The reason for the lack of any significant correlation between the second factor and 
either of the impulsivity scales is unclear. Woods et al, (2002) identified Stroop Tsk and 
COWAT among a number of behavioural inhibition tasks differentiating between adult 
ADHD patient and control groups; however Nigg et al. (2005) failed to find a correlation 
between their Stroop interference measure and either of the ADHD symptom domains.
The correlation between the attention regulation factor and both of the self report scales 
support the proposal of Dickman (2000) that impulsivity involves problems of attention. 
Factor 1 correlated very highly with the telephone task from the TEA (Robertson et al., 
1994); the cognitive processes producing individual differences in this task are related to 
individual differences in impulsivity. Exploration of this task and other cognate tasks 
should help to identify the cognitive processes which produce impulsive thought and 
behaviour.
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C hapter 9 
Discussion
The broad goal of this thesis has been to explore and explain the nature of 
impulsivity. The first aim was to clarify the nature of impulsivity; to define it in 
terms of what it is and what it is not -  this latter being achieved through the 
differentiation between impulsivity and closely related traits.
The second aim was explore the structure of impulsivity as a hierarchical 
construct whereby a higher order trait of impulsivity subsumes two or more 
conelated sub-traits or facets.
The third aim was to establish the importance of impulsivity as a predictor of 
behaviour independent of its overlap, the variance shared with a standard model 
of personality. This was done firstly by exploring its relationship with the Big 
Five traits of personality and secondly by examining a model of impulsivity 
which sought to reduce impulsivity to the operation of aspects of those Big five 
traits.
The fourth aim was to explore the relationship between impulsivity traits and 
ADHD traits as a way of shedding light upon the nature of impulsivity and to
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bring out the importance of ‘cognitive’ impulsivity, in particular the role of 
inattention and distractibility for the construct of impulsivity.
• The fifth aim was to explore the cognitive underpinnings of the two aspects of 
impulsivity in an experiment utilising tasks related to inattention and impulsivity.
Chapter 1 argued that despite persistent claims that there is little agreement as to the 
nature of impulsivity or its measurement there is in fact general agreement upon a narrow 
construct of impulsivity which is characterised by weakness of inhibition. The research 
considered in Chapter 1 suggests that an emphasis upon failure of inhibition would 
clarify the construct of sensation seeking by separating out the relatively benign aspect of 
sensation seeking, described as venturesomeness, sensation seeking or functional 
impulsivity, from the maladaptive aspects such as boredom susceptibility and 
dysinhibition. Sensation seeking and the reward sensitivity characteristic of extraverts is 
not in itself impulsivity. In the light of evidence suggesting a differentiation between 
impulsivity and sensation seeking a suggestion was made to modify the sensation seeking 
construct of Zuckerman to align it more clearly with narrow impulsivity. This nairow 
construct (weakness of inhibition) can be found operationalised in a number of self report 
measures of impulsivity; an examination of research studies comparing different scales 
indicated their substantial shared variance.
Chapter one attempted to clarify a narrow construct of impulsivity which could be 
differentiated from high level traits such as neuroticism and extraversion and from lower
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level traits such as adventurousness and this same research suggested a multi-faceted, 
hierarchical, model of impulsivity consisting of two or three correlated lower level facets 
subsumed by a higher level construct.
Nigg (2001) argued cogently for the distinction between inhibition of behaviour in the 
service of plans or goals -  where failure of inhibition is maladaptive -  and inhibition 
which is due to fear or anxiety -  where inhibition itself can be maladaptive. Following 
the argument of Depue and Collins (1999) who argue that a biologically rooted variable 
should be unipolar rather than bipolar it could be argued that there are two types of 
inhibition, two independent traits which can occur in any combination; in the same way 
that the variables of positive and negative affect are independent and indeed unipolar. 
The potential conflict which can occur in anxious and disinhibited individuals is perhaps 
captured by the construct of borderline personality. Here again one is reminded of the 
limitations of the FFM which assumes the bipolar nature of the Big Five though without 
further analysis. While many theorists would recognise the commonality between 
extraversion and positive affect, the former is generally treated as a biplar trait while the 
latter is usually considered a unipolar trait. On the other hand the trait of neuroticism -  
like the trait of negative affect is, at least implicitly, considered a unipolar trait.
Chapter 1 also considered research which suggested that questionnaire studies of 
impulsivity, while arguing for a relatively narrow construct of impulsivity, nevertheless 
allowed for a sub-division of impulsivity into facets. Wliile most of the questionnaires. 
converged on a common construct of impulsivity there was less agreement on the nature 
of the facets. Some instances of faceted models of impulsivity are deceptive; Eysenck
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does not identify two facets of impulsivity but rather two traits, impulsivity and 
venturesomeness, which he locates in different and independent areas of his PEN model. 
Similarly Dickman’s model of functional and dysfunctional impulsivity is misleading 
since they are independent traits with the former being more related to extraversion and 
the relatively benign form of sensation seeking. A few studies have endeavoured to 
separate out facets of impulsivity with some success. Parker, Bagby and Webster (1993) 
after establishing the substantial variance shared by three different self report 
questionnaires concluded from their analysis that it was possible to differentiate two 
highly correlated dimensions -  a cautious/spontaneous dimension and a 
methodical/disorganised dimension. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale has undergone 
continuous development in the light of its clinical application in particular; in its latest 
form, the BIS-11 (referring to its 1 1 * incarnation) contains three substantially correlated 
facets. These facets however cannot be easily identified with the Parker et al (1996) 
facets.
Chapter 1 identified the BIS-11 as perhaps the most fruitful questionnaire measure of 
impulsivity, given its extensive validity in both normal and clinical research 
Study 1 in Chapter 4 carried out a factor analysis to replicate the factor structure of the 
BIS-11 reported by Patton et al. (1995). The development of such a scale over time and 
its validation in a variety of research projects has provided evidence not only for the 
utility of the questionnaire but also for the underlying model of a fiiree facetted model of 
impulsivity. This study was the first attempt at replication of the factor structure in the
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English language; the factor structure obtained provided a close replication of the three 
sub-factors proposed by Patton et al (1995), Correlations between the extracted factors 
ranged from ,55 to .6 8 ; these substantial correlations accord with the hypothesised 
hierarchical model of three lower level factors subsumed by a higher order factor. 
Furthermore the factor scores correlated very highly (.87 to .94) with the scale scores 
derived from the analysis of Patton et al (1995). The value of this replication lies not 
only in the replication of the factor structure but also in its confirming the existence and 
importance of a cognitive dimension to impulsivity; an impulsivity of attention as well as 
behaviour.
Study 1 also aimed to clarify and simplify the original version of the BIS-11. In the factor 
analysis of the 30 items of the BIS-11 the pattern of factor loadings led to the 
identification of six items from each facet as a reduced version of the original. Tlie value 
of these new scales was shown by the high correlations with the Patton et al. (1995) 
defined scales and with the factor scores fiom the analysis of the BIS-11. These high 
correlations are of course attributable to the fact that the present analysis identified 
factors in terms of the same items as the original Patton et al (1995) analysis; 
nevertheless the degree of correspondence across two data sets is striking- These short 
form scales were used in the following studies.
A single factor extraction allowed for the identification of 9 items with high loadings on 
the first factor and which represented equally the three facets; factor analysis of the BIS-
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Short produced evidence for a single factor; that plus the three factors identified in the 
full scale. The correlations between the BIS-Short and the scales defined by Patton et al. 
(1995) ranged from . 6 8  to .80 and correlated with the new facet scales developed in study 
1 between .72 and ,78; the BIS-Short correlated .89 with the 30 item BIS-11. Factor 
analysis of the nine item BIS-Short suggested a single factor solution. These data support 
the use of the BIS-Short as a convenient measure of ‘narrow impulsivity’ and its facets.
It should be noted however that the new scales require cross validation in a new sample.
The implication of these results for an understanding of the nature and structure of the 
variable impulsivity (rather than of a particular measure) are interesting but far from 
definitive. The factor structure of any measure is determined in large part by the items or 
elements included in that measure; while many studies of the Big Five rest their 
legitimacy upon the widest selection of possible items, the items of more focussed scales 
tend to be selected to represent a particular construct pursued by the researchers. There 
are a number of concerns with regard to the choice of BIS-11 items; in particular there 
are a number of cases of item redundancy. Of the six items identified in the factor 
analysis as the best examples of factor one (non-planning impulsivity), three begin “I 
plan...” Scrutinising the items making up the motor impulsivity scales suggests that two 
highly correlated (.6 6 ) items make up the core of that factor. These are in fact instances 
of the weaknesses of the factor analytical approach discussed in chapter 2. Nevertheless 
the questionnaire data does allow for the identification of a cognitive aspect to 
impulsivity; failures of attention and concentration and a susceptibility to extraneous and 
racing thoughts are as much a part of impulsivity as saying things or doing things without
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thinking. This emphasis on cognitive impulsivity echoes the role of attentional 
disinhibition identified in the study of ADHD as well as the perseverance trait identified 
by Whiteside and Lynam (2001).
Apart from Parker et ai. (1996) there has been no attempt to map the entire terrain of 
impulsivity — a strategy akin to the explorations of personality which attempt to 
encompass as much of the natural language lexicon as possible. Part o f the reason may be 
that the analysis of trait adjectives is less fruitful the lower one descends in the trait 
hierarchy -  witness the odd and probably artefactual effects in the Roberts et al (2004) 
analysis. The analysis of a large number of items, adjectives or sentences, has not yet 
been tried; the analyses of Parker and Bagby (1996) and of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) 
both analyse the relationship between scales.
The field remains open therefore for an attempt both more thorough and more refined to 
map out the contours of impulsivity through tlie analysis of a large number of descriptors. 
While utilizing previous questioimaires provides a valuable resource there are surely 
ways of casting the net more widely, in terms of both items and subjects. The analysis of 
the BIS-11 relied to a large extent upon student subjects who were likely to be not 
excessively high on impulsivity and without serious psychopathology. Recruiting 
subjects who are likely to display high levels of impulsivity will help to bring the domain 
of impulsivity into clearer focus.
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Following the lead of Whiteside and Lynam (2001), items could be chosen, or 
constructed, so as to tap into the ‘hot’ impulsivity characteristic of personality disorders. 
For example. Study 1 utilises a scale of emotion regulation devised by the author to tap 
into a sense of not understanding or not being in control of one’s emotions; this scale 
correlated substantially with the BIS-Short. Alternatively, people who describe 
themselves as impulsive could be asked (with appropriate guidance and perhaps 
examples) to provide instances of their own impulsive behaviours which may not figure 
in any extant questionnaires; for example while non-planning is a recognised aspect of 
impulsivity it is also true that impulsive people may make many plans but fail to carry 
them out or change them on a whim. This inability to follow through plans may or may 
not be related to either the construct of perseverance (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001), or to 
that of delay aversion (Solanto et al. 2001). While there is no set corpus of impulsivity 
items, as there are trait adjectives in a various languages, trawling more widely may raise 
interesting insights into neglected varieties of impulsivity.
Chapter 2 argued for the need to examine the relationship of impulsivity to the Five 
Factor Model of personality and in the process argued for a critique of the limits of the 
trait approach to personality. The weaknesses of the personality trait approach to the 
study of impulsivity is its purely descriptive approach and its treatment of all traits as 
independent variables at whatever level of a hierarchy of personality they may occur. 
Embedding the trait of impulsivity within a large scale model of personality thus tends to 
deflect attention away from an understanding of tlie nature and causes of impulsivity. The 
problem of constructing models which, at least to some extent, reflect semantic rather 
than psychological constructs has its counterpart in research which demonstrates
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relationships between variables which are merely re-descriptions of the variable to be 
explained. Demonstrating tliat syndromes such as borderline personality disorder are 
characterised by high levels of negative affect is simply to re-describe the diagnostic 
criteria. Nevertheless, as pointed out in chapter 2 there can be considerable utility in 
studying the relationship between impulsivity and other traits when guided by theoretical 
rather than merely descriptive considerations.
Studies 2 and 3 in chapter 5 demonstrated that impulsivity could not be subsumed by any 
or all of the Big five traits. Not only did the trait of impulsivity, as measured by the short 
form of the BIS-11 developed in chapter 4, include variance which was not encompassed 
by the Big Five but that distinctive variance proved to have incremental validity in the 
prediction of a number of variables which would be considered on both empirical and 
conceptual grounds to be a function of impulsivity. This occurred despite the large 
amount of variance which impulsivity shared with the Big Five and with 
conscientiousness in particular.
Study 2 demonstrated incremental validity of the BIS-Short over a particular measure of 
the Big five -  the BFI -  in the prediction of measures of academic performance as well as 
a self report measure of alcohol consumption in first year female undergraduates.
Previous research had established a link between maladaptive behaviours in students and 
both impulsivity and conscientiousness; by studying both of the predictors in the same 
study it was possible to replicate those previous findings and demonstrate the distinctive 
contribution of impulsivity.
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Study 3 involved a partial replication of study 2 testing the same hypotheses but utilising 
a different set of variables. The measure of the Big Five was a composite measure 
derived from two different self report questionnaires — the NEO-FFI and the BFI. While 
different measures of the Big Five do share substantial variance the correlations between 
them suggest differences in emphasising different aspects of the same trait; utilising two 
measures makes more likely a more thorough coverage of each trait. The measure of 
alcohol consumption was the same as in study 2  and the very similar relationships 
between the variables across the two studies inspired confidence in the results. In 
addition study 3 included a peer report measure o f alcohol consumption and self report 
measure of driving behaviour. In regression analyses impulsivity added to the variance 
predicted by the Big Five to each of the outcome variables.
The aim in these two studies was to show that a measure of impulsivity would predict 
conceptually related outcome criteria and that it would do so as least as well as any the 
Big Five traits which shared variance with impulsivity. The aim was not simply to 
demonstrate the incremental predictive validity of a lower level trait but to begin to ' 
explore the relationship between impulsivity and the Big Five, particularly 
conscientiousness. The data reported in these studies suggest a number of avenues for 
further investigation.
Studies 2 and 3 while demonstrating the distinctive nature of impulsivity leave open the 
question of the relationship between impulsivity and the other Big Five traits. One
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possibility is tliat that impulsivity may be the core trait which binds together the facets of 
conscientiousness in the same way that Lucas et al (2000) propose that reward sensitivity 
binds the facets of extra version. The theoretical interest in this possibility is that 
impulsivity may well be a more basic temperamental trait with clear links to 
neuropsychological factors while conscientiousness is a product of a number of 
additional factors such as socialisation into a work ethic, as sense of responsibility to 
others, or of a commitment to a career or organisation. The relationship between 
impulsivity and its cognates and values and attitudes such as a strong work ethic may be 
that the former traits would be a necessaiy condition for the development of the latter but 
they would not be sufficient. This is a more complex and theoretically interesting 
relationship than simply grouping all of these facets under a larger umbrella trait and 
affords richer possibilities for the development of causal models.
The use of impulsivity as a lever to open up conscientiousness may reveal a bifurcation 
between behaviours such as impulsivity, distractibility, disorganisation and carelessness 
and more sophisticated traits such as responsibility, achievement and order; a bifiircation 
between traits of temperament and traits of personality (Martel and Nigg, 2006). Among 
other possibilities one may explore the relationship between instances of careless 
behaviour and the traits of inattention and disorganisation and the trait (or facets) of 
agreeableness; irresponsible behaviour may be a product of either cognitive failure or of 
negative attitudes towards the organisation. The relationship between impulsivity and 
workplace behaviour may be particularly obvious in adolescents and young adults in the
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same way that Barkley et al. (2002) find a relationship between ADHD symptoms and 
work behaviour.
Chapter 5 confronted a challenging approach to conceptualising impulsivity proposed by 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001); a proposal to deconstruct the concept of impulsivity. Their 
argument is that there is no latent variable, that the construct of impulsivity has value 
only as a description of behaviour -  behaviour which is usually carried out without 
appropriate aforethought and which is usually regretted afterward -  but does not imply 
that all instances of impulsivity are caused by a single underlying trait nor that they serve 
the same function. A parallel may be drawn with approaches to aggressive behaviour; an 
instance of aggressive behaviour may be caused by different factors ( fear or anger), may 
serve different purposes (defence, robbery, to impress others, to win a boxing match), and 
may manifest in various forms (verbal or physical, direct or indirect).
Whiteside and Lynam utilise the conceptual framework of the Big Five and its facets as 
operationalised by the NEO-PI-R. After an attempt to map out the terrain of impulsive 
behaviours -  through an analysis of a number of impulsivity related scales - they identify 
four sources of impulsivity behaviour. Two of these are typically identified as aspects of 
impulsivity -  a lack of premeditation and a lack of perseverance; people who are 
characterised by these tiaits will typically behave in ways described as impulsive. The 
authors identify these impulsivity traits with two facets in the domain of 
conscientiousness - deliberation and self control respectively. Their argument seems to be 
that the lack of premeditation typically identified in studies of impulsivity is in fact the
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personality trait of deliberation; indeed in subsequent research they are willing to use 
these NEO facets as proxy measures of impulsivity. What is not altogether clear is the 
theoretical implications of this approach; implications depend on how one conceptualises 
the relationship between facets and domains within a structured hierarchical model of 
personality. If one sees facets as types of behaviour which correlate to a substantial 
degree such that they form part of a higher order trait then the theoretically neutral 
conclusion might be that impulsivity (as identified by the two facet scales) correlates with 
other aspects (facets) of conscientiousness. To put it another way; the NEO already 
contains a measure of impulsivity -  note that the two facets of deliberation and self 
control are highly correlated. A more theoretically committed view of personality models 
might, on the other hand, argue that all o f the facets of conscientiousness are influenced 
by, or are manifestations of, a common underlying variable — conscientiousness. It seems 
to the present author that this more theoretical model is implicit in tlie writing of 
Whiteside and Lynam and it is this which gives force and tlieoretical import to their 
deconstruction of impulsivity. As argued above, a commitment to such an explanatory 
model would raise interesting questions as to the nature of the latent variable, question 
which would go beyond simply noting the shared variance.
Their identification of a complex of behaviours which they refer to as urgency -  
impulsive behaviours which are driven by strong negative affects raises a number of, 
interesting issues. The first is the issue of differentiating between impulsive behaviour 
which is the effect of strong impulses and impulsive behaviour which is the consequence 
of weak inhibition; or which may indeed be a mixture of the two. This last point raises
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the second issue of whether urgency should be seen as a simple unitary trait or whether it 
can be understood as a mix of, or an interaction between, two separable traits; in this case 
an interaction between negative affect and narrow impulsivity. A further point is that the 
data of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) as well as the data from Study 4 are not 
incompatible with a higher order impulsivity which subsumes premeditation and 
perseverance and which interacts with neuroticism to produce urgency.
The neuroticism facet of impulsivity (which Whiteside and Lynam identify with urgency) 
has the lowest correlations with the other neuroticism facets from - .31 to ,40, while it 
correlates -.37 and -.46 with self discipline and deliberation from the conscientiousness 
domain. Data from Study 4 showed urgency to correlate moderately with both 
premeditation and perseverance (-.40 and -.37) despite their positioning on an 
orthogonally related dimension. The data from Study 4 supported the hypothesis that 
urgency is a function of both neuroticism and narrow impulsivity. Regressing urgency 
simultaneously onto the composite neuroticism measure and the BIS-Short found the two 
variables to contribute approximately equally to the 61% variance explained. The joint 
correlation of .78 between urgency and the two traits compares with the correlation 
usually obtained between two measures of the same trait; John and Shrivastava (1999) 
found the highest correlation between BFI and NEO-FFI traits to be .79.
Notwithstanding the above criticism the identification by Wliiteside and Lynam (2001) of 
a trait which they call urgency seems fruitful and requires frirther investigation. While it 
may not be the case that there is a distinctive unitary trait behind such ‘urgent’
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behaviours which is entirely accounted for by negative affect, Üiere are clearly 
behaviours which are ‘pushed’ by strong negative emotions so that people will lash out 
verbally or physically without sufficient aforethought and then regret having done so. 
What is at issue firom the point of view of the present thesis is whether it is still possible 
to identify the influence of a narrow, affect free impulsivity interacting with strong 
affective reactions and cognitions to produce a ‘hot’ impulsivity. Such hot impulsivity 
may help to explain the wild swings of mood and attitude characteristic of certain 
personality disorders, as suggested by Depue and Lenzenweger (2005). Within the 
domain of the treatment of psychopathology there is scope for experimental interventions 
aimed at either the negative affect or the impulsivity element of disorders such as 
borderline or narcissistic personality disorder.
Chapter 1 argued for the relevance of ADHD research to the understanding of 
impulsivity; Studies 5 and 6  in Chapter 7 had two aims; the first was to validate the use of 
ADHD trait scales in normal subjects and the second was to explore the relationship 
between ADHD traits and the traits of impulsivity derived from the BIS-11. Conjoining 
the two areas of investigation is of considerable theoretical and heuristic value 
particularly for the study of impulsivity as a personality trait. Firstly it draws attention to 
problems with attention and distractibility as well as the more overt instances of 
impulsive behaviour emphasised by theorists of impulsivity. Secondly, it links the rather 
narrow trait approach described in chapter 2  with the more complex theoretical 
framework of ADHD which aspires to the causal modelling approach discussed by 
Morton and Frith (1995). Thirdly, it encourages research into the possibility of
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interactions between impulsivity and other traits, particularly negative affect. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 6  explanations witliin the five factor model generally treat 
traits, at whatever level of the personality hierarchy as independent traits, making merely 
additive contributions to behaviour; within the study of developmental psychopathology 
there is an awareness of the interaction between effortful control and negative affect 
during early childhood to affect the development o f emotion regulation.
In both studies Conner’s ADHD scale was factor analysed; when two factors were 
extracted the grouping of the items into factors paralleled almost exactly the division of 
symptoms in DSM-IV, a division which identified the inattention and the hyperactivity- 
impulsivity subtypes. Further evidence for the validity of these trait scales came from 
correlations between self and peer reports. The dimensions which emerged from 
constructing two scales behaved like typical personality traits; they were slightly 
positively skewed, typical of trait measures o f ‘problem’ behaviours but no more so than 
some of the Big Five personality traits in this study. Furthermore their relationships with 
other variables were invariably trait4ike; the scattergram of inattention against 
conscientiousness showed a clear relationship across the range of both variables. These 
data are in accord with the research of Frazier et al. (2007) who found no evidence for the 
taxonomic structure of ADHD and that of Sherman et al. (1997) who concluded that 
ADHD should be treated as two quantitative and continuously distributed dimensions.
Studies 5 and 6  replicated the pattern of relationships between the two ADHD 
dimensions and the Big Five personality traits obtained in previous research whereby
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inattention was predicted predominantly by conscientiousness and secondarily by 
neuroticism while hyperactivity/impulsivity was predicted by extraversion, 
agreeableness, neuroticism and conscientiousness. In both of the studies, and 
commensurate with the earlier research, the overlap between inattention and 
conscientiousness was greater than that between hyperactivity and conscientiousness. 
Despite the covariance of ADHD and Big Five traits an overall measure of ADHD 
derived from both sub-traits demonstrated incremental validity in the prediction of 
driving behaviour and alcohol consumption.
The relationship between impulsivity and the traits of ADHD suggest a number of lines 
of investigation particularly into driving behaviour. The data in study 6  indicate that 
driving errors are strongly related to the cognitive- inattention aspect of impulsivity; 
suggesting Üiat further investigation into the driving errors of young adults at the 
beginning of their driving career would be fruitful. One possibility is a short term, 
prospective, longitudinal study carried out over the first six months of a person’s driving 
career, during which the person’s driving skills continue to mature.
The relationships between impulsivity and affect are not easily explained. It has been 
argued that extraversion is at least in part a consequence of reward sensitivity producing 
strong approach behaviours to potential rewards (Smillie, Jackson & Dalgleish, 2006); 
thus extraversion coupled with dis-inhibition would produce impulsive behaviours. The 
effects of neuroticism might be somewhat different; anxiety in general produces 
inhibition of behaviour; however it also interferes with concentration leading to
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rumination, intrusive thoughts and distractibility. This however implies that neuroticism 
is itself an independent source of cognitive impulsivity, distinct from the construct of 
inhibition. It may of course interact with inhibition to produce the hot impulsivity which 
is described by Wliiteside and Lynam (2001) as urgency. Extraversion thus amplifies the 
effects of dis-inhibition in producing behavioural impulsivity while neuroticism is an 
influence on attentional impulsivity independent of dis-inhibition.
Conceptual analysis of the non-planning impulsivity construct and a consideration of its 
relationship to other variables suggest that this aspect of impulsivity stands somewhat 
apart from the other two aspects in an interesting way. Planning impulsivity correlated 
highly with conscientiousness and non-significantly with the other Big Five traits and 
showed the weakest correlations with the driving and alcohol consumption variables. It 
may be that while the other impulsivity traits may be conceptualised as aspects of 
temperament, non-planning impulsivity may be a more complex trait such as 
conscientiousness. Indeed data in earlier chapters show that conscientiousness is more 
strongly related to non-planning than to the other facets of impulsivity
Martel and Nigg (2006) distinguish between temperament and personality by proposing 
that temperament be “defined in terms of constitutionally-based differences in 
behavioural style, in paiticular reactivity and self regulation, whereas personality includes 
additional characteristics such as attitudes, values, self concept and long term motives”. 
They further suggest that in the adult at least, “personality includes many elements 
beyond temperament”; thus while attentional and motor impulsivity may be at the core
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of conscientiousness, as necessary though not sufficient conditions, ‘planning’ develops 
as a part of the general trait o f conscientiousness.
The final study in this thesis sought to relate two aspects of impulsivity to laboratory 
measures of cognitive function. Thr oughout, this thesis has proposed two related 
arguments; the first is that the ‘narrow’ construct of impulsivity is to be explained in 
terms of cognitive functions rather than in terms of motivation, emotion or lifestyle, the 
second is that the domain of impulsivity contains both behavioural and cognitive aspects. 
In terras of the heuristically valuable concept of inhibition, impulsivity is a weakness in 
the inhibition of both behaviour (response inhibition) and of cognitive functions 
(interference control),
I have argued for the importance of a cognitive as well as a behavioural element to 
impulsivity; an element which is captured by the cognitive impulsivity facet of the B i l l  
and the inattention facet of the ADHD scales. The study in chapter 8  sought to relate this 
conceptualisation to laboratory tasks which could be argued to reflect cognitive or 
behavioural impulsivity.
The first aim of the final study was to identify two sets of task which would correspond 
to the distinction between behavioural and attentional impulsivity. Three tasks were 
identified as reflecting response inhibition and two reflected control of attention as well 
as a third task which reflected speed of response. The exploratory factor analysis 
extracted two factors which were identified by the hypothesised groupings of tasks.
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Conceptual analysis suggested the hypothesis that the attention factor would correlate 
with the inattention scales and the response inhibition factor would correlate with the 
impulsivity scale. Since the self report scales correlated significantly (r = .54, p < .01) it 
was hypothesised that the two factor scores would also correlate. Contrary to expectation, 
while the two self report scale correlated substantially the correlation between the factor 
scores was very low and non-significant. Again contrary to expectation, neither of the 
two self report scales correlated significantly with the response inhibition factor and both 
coiTelated only with the attention factor.
Despite the issues raised in the discussion to Study 7 there is no obvious or simple 
explanation for either the lack of correlation between the two components extracted nor 
for the lack of correlation between the response inhibition factor and the two self report 
scales. The positive and striking finding is that a composite measure of attention control 
correlated with both behavioural and attentional aspects of self reported impulsivity and 
indeed with tlie variance which tliey shared. This finding accords with two sets of 
findings discussed earlier. In the first instance it accords with the argument of Dickman 
(2 0 0 0 ) that failures of attention lie at the core of impulsivity; secondly it accords with the 
findings that in the majority of executive function tasks there are few, if any, significant 
differences between sub-types of ADHD.
While the model of impulsivity and the model of ADHD which has informed much of 
this thesis give due weight to both the constructs of response inhibition and 
inattention/distractibility the relationship between the two requires further investigation.
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Here the exploration of more laboratory tasks would seem fruitful to map out the 
underlying cognitive underpinnings of impulsivity. The traits of impulsivity and 
inattention utilised in this study correlated significantly with a measure of sustained 
attention (SART) and a measure of attentional control in a dual task paradigm (Telephone 
task). Further investigation should explore laboratory tasks which tap into the 
distractibility which is so typical of both child and adult ADHD cases. Distractibility is 
often discussed within ADHD at the level of behavioural description; however the 
cognitive basis for eveiyday distractibility is little explored or understood. Here the 
construct of vigilant attention as described by Robertson and Gavaran (2000) and the 
construct of momentary fluctuations of attention described by Douglas (2005) would 
prove fruitful. Recent research has indicated the importance of the variable of intra- 
individual variability in task performance a variable which has been linked by Douglas 
with fluctuations in attention. Such fluctuations may be a consequence of either a central 
neuro-cognitive state such as level of arousal or it may be a consequence of distractions 
either in the environment or internally generated (a wandering mind).
•
The study of arousal and its relationship to both self reported impulsivity behaviour and 
to performance on laboratory tasks could provide a framework for an explanatory model 
of impulsivity which would embrace elements of neurological, neurocognitive and 
behavioural levels. Thus the line of research begun in the final study would be extended 
by including measures of cortical arousal, measures of a number of tasks relating to the . 
attention control and response inhibition functions as well as self and peer reports of 
inattention and impulsivity; hypothesising that individual differences in arousal would
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relate to measures of sustained attention as well as to self report measures of inattention 
and attention failures.
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Appendix
Table A.l Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 and its transformations
This table shows the 30 items of the BIS-11. The first column identifies the impulsivity 
subscale according to Patton et al (1995); A -  attentional, M = motor, P = non-planning. 
The second column denotes the subscales identified in the present sample, the third 
column identifies the BIS-Short items as S.
1 I plan tasks carefully P P s
2 I do things without thinking M M s
3 I  make up my mind quickly M M
4 I don’t pay attention A A S
5 I have racing thoughts A A
6 I plan trips well ahead of time P P
7 I am self-controlled A £ S
8 I concentrate easily. A A S
9 I save regularly. P P
10 I ‘squirm’ at plays or theatres. A
11 I am a careful tiiinker. P S
12 I plan for job security P P
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13 I say things without thinking. P A s
14 I act on the spur of the moment. M M
15 I am a steady thinker. A P
16 I act on impulse. M M S
17 I often change hobbies and interests. A
18 I buy things on impulse. M . M
19 I spend more than I earn. M M S
2 0 I often have extraneous or distracting thoughts when 
thinking.
A A
2 1 I am restless at theatres or lectures A A
2 2 I like to think about complex problems P
23 I like puzzles P
24 I am more interested in the present than the future P
25 I change residences. M
26 I get easily bored when solving thought problems. P
27 I do things without thinking M
28 I can only think about one problem at a time. M
29 I am friture oriented. M
30 I am happy-go-lucky. M
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Table A.2 Emotion regulation scale
I get frightened when my feelings are too strong.
I get confused when my feelings get too stiong.
I don’t know what’s going on inside me.
I worry that my feelings will get out of control.
When I am upset I don’t know if I am sad, frightened or angry.
I have feelings I can’t quite identify.
Table A.3 Alcohol consumption scale
I drink a large amount of alcohol in a short time.
I drink alcohol in a slow and controlled way.
I have drunk alcohol until I felt ill.
At social occasions I drink more alcohol than I should.
I have found myself unable to stop drinking once I have started.
I have failed to do what was expected of me due to drinking too much alcohol.
I have been unable to remember the night before due to drinking alcohol,
I have had a feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking too much alcohol.
Friends or relatives have expressed concern over my drinking habits.
I have six or more drinks on the same occasion. (Think of one drink as being equivalent 
to a glass of wine or half a pint of beer.)
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Table A.4 Items from premeditation, perseverance and urgency scales of Whiteside and 
Lynam (2001)
1. I have a reserved and cautious attitude towards life. Pr
2. I have trouble controlling my impulses. U
3. I generally like to see things through to the end. Pe
4. My thinking is usually careful and purposeful. Pr
5. I have trouble resisting my cravings [for food, cigarettes, etc.] U
6 . I tend to give up easily. Pe
7. I am not one of those people who blurt things out without thinking. Pr
8 . I often get involved in things I later wish I could get out of. U
9- Unfinished tasks really bother me. Pe
10.1 like to stop and think things over before I do them. Pr
11. When I feel bad I will often do things I later regret in order to U
make myself feel better now.
12. Once I get going on something I hate to stop. Pe
13.1 don’t like to start a project until I know exactly how to proceed. Pr
14. Sometimes, when I feel bad, I can’t seem to stop what I am doing U
even though it is making me feel worse.
15.1 concentrate easily. Pe
16.1 tend to value and follow a rational ‘sensible’ approach to things. Pr
17. When I am upset I often act without thinking. U
18.1 finish what I start. Pe
19.1 usually make up my mind tlirough careful reasoning. Pr
20. When I feel rejected I will often say things that I later regret. U
21. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on Pe
time.
2 2 . 1  am a cautious person. Pr
23. It is hard for me to resist acting on my feelings. U
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2 4 .1 am a productive person who always gets the job done. Pe
25. Before I get into a new situation I like to find out what to expect 
from it.
Pr
2 6 .1 often make matters worse because I act without thinking when I 
am upset.
U
27. Once I start a project I almost always finish it. Pe
2 8 .1 usually think carefully before doing anything. Pe
29. In the heat of an argument I will often say things that I later regret. U
30. There are so many little jobs that need to be done that I sometimes 
ignore them all.
Pe
31. Before making up my mind, I consider all the advantages and 
disadvantages.
Pr
3 2 .1 am always able to keep my feelings under control. U
33. Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret. u
u  = urgency, Pr = premeditation, Pe = perseverance.
Table A.5 Eating behaviour scale
I feel in control whilst eating.
I eat slowly
I eat until I feel uncomfortable.
I eat large amounts when not hungry.
I sometimes eat alone
After overeating I feel guilty. I know when I have eaten enough. 
I eat large amounts over a small time scale.
Wlien I am having my favourite foods I tend to eat too much.
I sometimes eat myself sick.
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Table A.6 ADHD scale
I lose things necessary for tasks or activities. A
I talk too much. I
I have trouble doing leisure activities quietly. I
I leave my seat when I am not supposed to. I
I have trouble waiting in line or taking turns with others. I
I have trouble keeping my attentions focussed when working. A
I am forgetful in my daily activities. A
I have trouble listening to what other people are saying. A
I am always on the go. I
I fidget [with my hands or feet] or squirm in my seat. I
I make careless mistakes or have trouble paying close attention to 
detail.
A
I don’t like homework or job activities where I have to think a lot. A
I am restless or overactive. I
I give answers to questions before the questions have been 
completed.
I
I have trouble finishing my tasks or schoolwork. A
I interrupt others when they are working or playing. I
I am distracted when things are going on around me. A
I have problems organising my tasks and activities. A
A = inattention item, I = impulsive/hyperactive item
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Diagram A. 1 Principal Axis Factor analysis. Loadings of 5 tasks (excluding SART) 
upon derived factors and the correlations between factors and the self report measures of 
impulsivity and inattention.
Telephone
task
.91 Factor 1 
attention
-.45 .40
DSST Impulsivity
.31
-.29 .00
Word
fluency
Inattention
-.57
Stroop Factor 2 
inhibition.55
.52
Hayling
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Table A7, Correlations between factors and tasks including the two SART measures 
separately
i 2 3
T Factor 1
2. Factor 2. .05
3. Compon 3 .37 .32
4. Stroop .06 .72 .37
5. Hayling -.22 .68 -.08
6. VF -.27 -.67 -.31
7. DSST -.49 -.38 -.51
9. Dual task .99 -.19 ,29
8. SART .19 -.03 .18
10. fatotal .26 .02 ,17
11. misstotal .06 .08 .13
10. impulse .40 .03 .25
11. inattentio .31 .02 .14
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